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Abstract
Scholarship on clientelism typically defines the practice as the contingent exchange of goods
and services for political support, but many fail to adequately consider, both theoretically
and empirically, the quid-pro-quo aspect of this relationship. In this dissertation, I describe
and document the differences between clientelism and other forms of targeted, non-contingent
distribution, showing evidence that the two are distinct strategies that can coexist in the
same electoral space.
To explore this topic, I collected original qualitative and quantitative evidence from
Brazil, a country whose politicians, for reasons not yet fully understood, employ a wide vari-
ety of campaign strategies. During the 2018 general elections, I spent months with legislative
election campaigns, interviewed dozens of ordinary voters, activists, and community leaders,
and implemented two original nationwide surveys which focused on a series of vignette and
conjoint experiments.
The empirical results provide three main contributions. First, I estimate that politicians
offer handouts (non-contingent electoral gifts) just as often as they make vote buying offers
(contingent electoral exchanges), though the former has only recently emerged as a concept
in political science. The distinction is important, because results also show that the two
types of distribution are targeted toward different types of voters (based on socioeconomic
class). Second, I find that voters disapprove of nonprogrammatic forms of distribution that
are coercive over voters’ electoral decisions. This is the first empirical documentation that
voters reject “perverse accountability,” the idea that politicians monitor the voting behavior
of their constituents. Finally, I find that voters who see few ideological differences between
major parties are more likely to approve of and receive handouts. This provides support
for a novel explanation of why politicians choose to give electoral gifts without demanding
anything in return: handouts simply help candidates differentiate themselves when there are
many competitors and/or ideological appeals are ineffective. Overall, this study significantly
improves our understanding of citizen-elite linkages in middle-income democracies.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
A report published in the New York Times on the 2009 general elections in Lebanon1
documented the remarkable extent to which the electoral campaigns centered on delivering
cash, material goods, or special services to voters in exchange for their support. The article
describes how elections in Lebanon are a kind of Christmas-in-June, a bonanza in which
voters shop around to different parties looking to sell their ballot to the highest bidder.2. It is
estimated that over half the Lebanese population sold their vote in this election3 (Corstange
2012). The Times piece offers a short vignette of one candidate, Walid Maalouf, who,
after working briefly as a diplomat in the U.S., made an independent run for parliament.
Maalouf attempted to run a clean campaign, espousing vote buying in favor of personally
traveling from town to town and explaining his issue positions to village leaders and residents.
The villagers, while appreciative of his visit, were dismayed to not be offered any kind of
compensation for their support. Maalouf tried explaining to one leader that he should think
of politicians as employees of their constituents rather than their financial benefactors. The
leader replied that Maalouf should “Go back to America.”
Lebanon is just one example of a country in which direct transfers of goods and services
for political support form the basis of the relationship between citizens and elites. Even
in some countries that are considered fully democratic, electoral campaigns hinge on which
candidate can deliver the most valuable gifts to individual voters. Contrary to traditional
theories of democratic elections and accountability, many people living in these countries
choose to vote not for the candidate or party that best represents their policy preferences
or exerts the most effort on their behalf but for the one that offers them ad hoc material
benefits. The vignette about the idealistic politician demonstrates just how entrenched gift-
1Worth, Robert F. “Foreign Money Seeks to Buy Lebanese Votes.” New York Times. 22 April 2009.
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/world/middleeast/23lebanon.html
2Said one unemployed 24-year-old Beiruti, “Whoever pays me the most will get my vote... I won’t accept
less than $800.”
3Over 10000 expats were offered a plane ticket home in order to vote for a party according to Pearlman,
Wendy. “Competing for Lebanon’s Diaspora: Transnationalism and Domestic Struggles in a Weak State.”
International Migration Review. 48, no. 1 (2014): 34-75. Similar things are happened in the elections of
2018: Bobseine, Haley. “Lebanon’s elections: More empty promises, same old corrupt system.” Middle East
Eye. 30 April 2018. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/elections-2018-lebanese-have-no-other-option-
support-their-leaders-871989934
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
based linkages are in some countries; the very idea of voting for a politician based solely on
their policy proposals is a foreign concept.
This dissertation explores nonprogrammatic politics, defined as relationships between
citizens and representatives that are not based on policy programs. In particular, its focus
is on clientelism, a system of exchanges of material benefits for political support. Within
political science, it is common for scholars to contrast clientelism with programmatic politics.
These two concepts exist as two opposites in a variety of dichotomies: non-contingent vs.
reciprocal distribution, formal vs. informal policy, needs-based vs. politically-determined
resource allocation, public goods vs. private goods, universalism vs. particularism, and
so on. In this dissertation, I argue, in contrast to most existing literature, that clientelism
should be thought of not as the antithesis of policy-based appeals but as one type of a broader
set of nonprogrammatic, particularist modes of distribution. Many types of distribution
are decidedly not programmatic, yet they cannot be considered clientelism as they do not
satisfy elements of its formal definition, namely, that it requires conditions like a quid-pro-quo
exchange, personal interaction, an ongoing relationship, a power differential, or coercion over
client behavior. Pork barrel projects and “non-contingent benefits to individuals” (Stokes et
al. 2013), for example, exist in a gray area between clientelism and programmatic politics;
recipients are chosen solely for political reasons, but they do not demand reciprocal action
from any one voter. My conceptual framework emphasizes the importance of the quid-
pro-quo aspect of clientelist exchanges, which in existing studies often becomes obfuscated,
both theoretically and empirically. This leads many studies to confuse clientelism with
“clientelism-like behavior”.
The overall goal of this dissertation is to explain why it is important to differentiate types
of nonprogrammatic particularist behavior. I examine specifically modes of distribution
that vary along two dimensions: the level at which benefits are targeted (individual vs.
groups) and whether or not benefits are given explicitly in return for political support. In
each chapter, I make the case for my new conceptual framework by documenting empirical
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differences between these different types of distribution.
The main theory and hypotheses behind this work were formulated during qualitative
field research in Brazil, which I detail in the follow chapter. Brazil was chosen as the focus of
this study because institutional arrangements and specific features of the country’s electoral
system provide incentives for a wide range of different behaviors on the part of elites and
voters. Politicians in the country use a variety of strategies to win elections and maintain
power. Elite-citizen linkages look quite different depending on the area of the country one
happens to be in. As a full democracy, Brazil allows citizens full voting rights in addition
to guaranteeing civil liberties like free expression and protest. Nevertheless, some semi-
autocratic practices still persist in certain parts of the country, especially during and after
the ascendancy of Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency. This variation allows me to explore the
differences between modes of distribution within one case.
In each of the following chapters, I contrast different types of nonprogrammatic distri-
bution. First, I focus on the differences between conditional and non-conditional electoral
benefits given to individuals. Several previous studies, looking at a variety of elections in
different parts of the world, have estimated how many voters “sold” their vote (i.e. ex-
changed it for some material payoff). Few have done the same with non-contigent benefits
and electoral gifts more generally. Within the context of one election, is it more common for
voters to receive vote buying offers (quid-pro-quo gifts) or handouts (non-contingent gifts)?
I attempt to answer this question through survey evidence from Brazil, using both direct and
non-intrusive questionnaire techniques. The findings demonstrate that about an equal num-
ber of respondents received quid-pro-quo benefits and no-strings-attached gifts in the 2018
general elections. Further analysis that there are systematic differences between people who
receive gifts of each type. Voters in high socioeconomic classes (high income and educated)
were more likely to receive handouts (compared to those with low status) and were also more
likely to lie about having received handouts. This finding demonstrates that although all
types of voters receive electoral gifts, those with high status are less likely to see their gifts as
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“vote buying” and are more likely to stigmatize such transactions. Results also show that,
perhaps surprisingly, those who doubt ballot integrity are more likely to receive handouts
rather than vote buying offers, while those who believe in the secret ballot are more likely to
be offered quid-pro-quo gifts than non-contingent ones. Overall, the findings underscore the
importance of clearly differentiating vote buying and handouts, as the empirical evidence
suggests that they are distinct campaign strategies which can coexist in the same election.
Second, I examine voter attitudes toward nonprogrammatic, particularist distribution.
Public opinion has largely been ignored in academic discussions about clientelism, handouts,
and pork, but it is important to explore as voter beliefs can help explain both individual
election outcomes and how politicians and parties build and maintain bases of support more
generally. To shed light on this subject, I rely on an original survey from Brazil which
centers on a set of conjoint experiments. In the experiments, respondents read vignettes of
hypothetical interactions between politicians and voters and profiles of hypothetical candi-
dates. Various details of the interaction and of the politician’s record are manipulated to
capture variation in types of particularist behavior. The results show that the voters are
more likely to disapprove of nonprogrammatic distribution the more coercive the politician is
over the voters’ choices. Respondents have the strongest negative reactions to quid-pro-quo
gifts, benefits given at the individual rather than group level, transactions involving cash,
actively monitoring voter behavior, and the act of targeting those in the opposition rather
than existing supporters. Beliefs about candidate particularism vary by the type of distri-
bution, which has implications for our understanding of party strategy, voting behavior, and
electoral competition in new, developing, and/or low- to middle-income democracies.
Finally, I look at party strategy with respect to handouts. These non-contingent benefits
to individual voters are starting to receive a sizable amount of scholarly attention as it is
becoming clear that in many cases, parties often give benefits in advance of elections without
explicitly asking for votes in return. This empirical fact is puzzling because it does not fit
with most models and descriptions of vote buying, which require some form of monitoring
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or coercion of the client. If parties do not require that voters who accept gifts support the
party in return, how do costly handouts provide a return-on-investment? I investigate the
strategic reasoning behind non-conditional benefits through a set of survey questions from
Brazil that focus on an original survey experiment. I test predictions made by several existing
theories and one of my own, but find no strong support for any of them. Instead, follow
up analysis reveals that those who see few ideological differences between Brazil’s major
parties are relatively more accepting of handouts. I further find that those voters who see
few differences between the parties were also more likely to report receiving a handout offer
in the 2018 campaign season. I suggest that this is due to the handout’s unique capacity
for building personal relationships with voters, which my qualitative research found to be
essential to any successful election campaign in Brazil. This is distinct from the strategic
logic behind vote buying, a strategy which practically guarantees votes through the use of
coercive monitoring.
The findings from this study make important contributions to the literature on clientelism
and our understanding of elite-citizen linkages more generally. There is a scholarly consensus
that clientelism necessarily involves an exchange of a material gift or service for a vote or
other form of political support. While this is a valid conceptualization, two problems often
arise in the subsequent measurement, data collection, and analysis phases. First, some op-
erationalizations do not appropriately account for the quid-pro-quo nature of the exchange,
instead incorrectly lumping many types of behavior including all forms of targeted distri-
bution under the umbrella of clientelism. Second, though not incorrect, studies which are
careful to consider the quid-pro-quo nature of exchanges ignore the presence of “clientelism-
like” or “not-quite-clientelist” behaviors which may be quite important in explaining election
strategies and outcomes.
In contrast, this study is the first to explicitly estimate and compare quid-pro-quo and
other electoral gifts alongside each other within the same election context. Though previous
studies have estimated the prevalence of vote buying, few have benchmarked those estimates
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by comparing them to estimates of the prevalence of other types of campaign strategies.
Further, no studies, to my knowledge, have attempted to estimate how many voters received
non-quid-pro-quo gifts (handouts) in a single election, let alone compare the estimate to the
number who sold their vote.
This study is also the first to examine voter attitudes about each type of targeted dis-
tribution. Results demonstrate that there are key voters are discerning between different
types of targeted distribution; some forms are seen as more acceptable than others. Most
notably, quid-pro-quo electoral gifts are much more strongly condemned than those given
without condition. Also, those who see few ideological differences between major parties see
handouts less negatively and are more likely to be offered them.
I identify two primary contributions from these findings. First, they underscore the need
to understand contingent and non-contingent exchanges as two distinct, independent types of
strategies. The stigma attached to handouts is quantitatively less than it is for vote buying,
and the benefits handouts confer for parties (standing out from the crowd) is qualitatively
different from vote buying (bribing a vote). To a lesser extent, further, we also need to
differentiate gifts given to groups and communities as theoretically distinct from those given
to individuals, both of which are quite commonplace, often complementary strategies.
Secondly, this is the first study to provide qualitative or quantitative evidence showing
that that Brazilian citizens are uncomfortable with “perverse accountability” (Stokes 2005),
the idea that clientelism forces elites to monitor the behavior of their citizens rather than
the other way around. Voters hold overwhelmingly negative feelings toward electoral gifts
that are exchanged for support, especially when the behavior of the “client” is monitored,
but it is not the inherent act of giving of an electoral gift that is stigmatized. This finding is
compelling because it sheds light on the basis of societal stigma against vote buying; politi-
cians can distribute gifts and help citizens with individual needs, but the vote should not
be used as currency or leverage by either the politician or the voter to extract something
from the other. It also highlights how little we know about how non-contingent exchanges
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affect the relationship between voters and representatives. Do these adversely affect what
democratic theorists would see as “ideal” citizen-elite linkages? With handouts, voter behav-
ior is not necessarily monitored, and there does not appear to be a societal stigma against
it, but politicians who give gifts may still be using their power to exert undue pressure on
that behavior. The literature on handouts is just taking shape, but future work could pay
attention to the consequences of non-contingent gifts for accountability in democracies and
more closely examine the effects of handouts on quality of representation.
1.1 What is Clientelism? Top-Level Considerations
Existing literature typically defines clientelism as an exchange of goods and services for polit-
ical support between politicians and voters. Yet, many studies suffer from poor operational-
izations of this concept. Specifically, the quid-pro-quo exchange aspect of this relationship
is often lost when moving from the conceptual stage to measurement. Here, I introduce key
concepts which I use throughout the dissertation and propose a new conceptual framework
which sees non-programmatic distribution election strategies as varying along two dimen-
sions: contingency, or whether the politician/party gives benefits explicitly in exchange for
support, and target type, whether the recipient of the benefit is an individual or a group of
voters. I discuss early and contemporary debates about clientelism and explain that scholars
are paying increasing attention to non-contingent individuals targeted at individuals, which
I call “handouts”.
Three questions about handouts have yet to be answered. First, how common are hand-
outs relative to other types non-programmatic distributional strategies? Second, what ex-
plains the seemingly large gap in public opinion toward handouts and more traditional
forms of vote buying? Finally, what factors determine when parties and candidates choose
to use vote buying instead of handouts and vice-versa? My dissertation explores these three
open questions by examining voter attitudes about non-programmatic distribution strate-
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gies. Uncovering public opinion about this topic is both of practical importance and key to
understanding why parties may use handouts instead of other campaign tactics.
1.1.1 Concepts and Definitions
In democratic polities, candidates who seek public office must offer something to the elec-
torate in exchange for their support at the polls. Often this offer takes the form of a package
of policies that the politician promises to implement once they take office. In political sci-
ence, these are called “programmatic” appeals – voters cast a ballot for the program they
agree with most. In many countries, though, the offer is more direct: The candidate pays
individual voters for their ballots in one way or another. This approach is referred to as
“clientelism” – voters (clients) pledge their support to a party or candidate (patron) in ex-
change for goods, services, favors, employment, or protection (Hicken 2011; Scott 1972).
Many different types of behaviors may be included under the umbrella term, but at its core,
clientelism entails a transaction of something of monetary value for political support.
Many existing academic studies offer slightly different interpretations of the behaviors
that can be classified as clientelistic. At the center of nearly all definitions and conceptu-
alizations of clientelism, though, is the quid-pro-quo nature of the exchange. Many welfare
and government assistance programs that target specific individuals or groups of people
– e.g. the poor, factory workers, farmers, single mothers – are considered programmatic.
Even though the policies target a specific group of voters, and even though they may have
been politically motivated, they are not technically clientelistic because the criterion that
determines eligibility for the benefit is not political. Clientelist rewards are delivered solely
because they pledge to support the benefactor politically, and they may face punishment for
not fulfilling their end of the bargain. In contrast, targeted programmatic policies may be
enjoyed by any member of the targeted group, regardless of political affiliation.
The term “vote buying” has a close relationship with clientelism, but it is important to
draw a distinction between them. As Schaffer (2007) writes, vote buying refers specifically to
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the specific trade of something of value for some type of change in voting behavior sometime
close to election day. Vote buying is a specific behavior, whereas clientelism refers to a
broader system, an institution, or a type of ongoing relationship based on exchanges.4
Though vote buying is the form that clientelism takes most often in modern democracies,
recent work has correctly shown how clientelist parties may make any number of demands
on the client besides voting in a certain way. Qualitative work from Argentina, for example,
suggests that patrons expect clients to attend rallies or work for the party (Auyero 2000;
Szwarcberg 2015). Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2014) argue that scholars studying
clientelism usually collect data exclusively about vote buying. They introduce the helpful
term “electoral clientelism”, meaning “strategies that exclusively involve the distribution of
benefits during electoral campaigns” (416). This term is useful as it provides a succinct way of
encompassing a variety of clientelist behaviors near election times, including vote switching,
turning out to vote, attending rallies, displaying party propaganda, or paying dues. The
“electoral” part signifies that these strategies are used specifically for the purpose of winning
an election. This is distinct from “relational clientelism” (see Scott 1972; Levitsky 2003),
which involves long term relationships characterized by mutual dependence and ongoing
benefits, and “authoritarian clientelism” (see Magaloni 2006), which denotes the distribution
of rewards by dictatorships to secure loyalty from the population.
Some authors define “vote buying” narrowly to mean rewards given to opposition or
indifferent voters for switching their vote choice (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014;
Nichter 2014; Schaffer and Schedler 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). In other words, a vote can
only be “bought” if, in the absence of the inducement, the recipient would have voted for a
rival candidate or party. Thus, vote buying is distinct from abstention buying (paying people
to not vote), turnout buying (paying supporters to turn out on election day), and rewarding
loyalists (paying people who supported the party post-hoc). For the purpose of investigating
4Because vote buying is an activity and clientelism an informal institution, it makes sense to describe
the former, but not the latter, as illegal or unethical, just as one could say “bribery is hereby illegal” but
not “norms of corruption” (example of an informal institution taken from Helmke and Levitsky [2004]) are
hereby illegal.
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explaining party strategy, this more narrow definition has analytical utility because it clearly
differentiates dissimilar tactics. However, this definition may be too limited. First, it is not
the way that governments, NGOs, lay people, and many other scholars think about vote
buying. For example, the federal law banning vote buying in the U.S. states that “Whoever
makes or offers to make an expenditure to any person, either to vote or withhold his vote,
or to vote for or against any candidate; and Whoever solicits, accepts, or receives any such
expenditure in consideration of his vote or the withholding of his vote” shall be punished (18
U.S. Code § 597). Schaffer and Schedler (2007) define vote buying as “a market transaction
in which parties, candidates, or intermediaries pay (in cash or kind) for ‘electoral services’
delivered by individual citizens – a favorable vote or a favorable abstention” (18). Second,
it is also difficult to tell empirically whether something is turnout buying or vote buying –
voters, especially those in newer democracies, do not always have clear cut preferences or
affiliations. So as to keep the better understood general definition but not sacrifice the utility
of the more narrow definition, I refer to any attempt at influencing an individual’s voting
behavior (whether it be vote choice, turnout, abstention, etc.) through delivery of a reward
as “vote buying” and an attempt to indifferent or opposition voters through such rewards
as “switch buying”.
Recent work by Mares and Young (2016 and 2018) argues that different types of clientelist
brokers (the intermediaries between patrons and clients) have various tools, both “positive”
(i.e. carrots, like money) and “negative” (sticks, like violence), at their disposal to induce
client compliance. Fry, Reuter, and Szakonyi’s article “Hitting Them With Carrots” (2018)
also points out how many politicians couple positive and negative inducements to win votes.
These studies undoubtedly make the important contribution that voters are often influenced
by threats from politicians in addition to their gifts. For this study, however, I do not place
negative inducements under the umbrella of clientelism (unless it is a threat to discontinue
an ongoing benefit or renege on a promise to deliver a reward). As stated above, clientelism
necessarily involves some type of exchange – voters must voluntarily comply with clientelist
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inducements (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). When voters are coerced into acting a certain
way, they do not receive anything in return. Threats of violence, social exclusion, legal
action, or administrative obstruction instead should be classified as “voter intimidation”,
which is outside of the scope of this research.
1.1.2 Operationalizations and Measures in Literature
The generally accepted scholarly definition of clientelism includes a requirement that there
is a quid-pro-quo exchange between political elites and ordinary citizens. Though the con-
ceptual distinction between clientelist and non-clientelist forms of distribution is clear, in
practice, the line is blurred. Given that vote buying is illegal and generally a taboo topic
in most democracies today, clientelist parties usually want to keep their operation a secret;
gifts are not labeled as vote buying, they offer handouts covertly, and they avoid making the
exchange aspect explicit. Because of this, it is difficult for researchers to tell when a party
is actually “buying votes”; both sides must understand that the voter is receiving the gift
because they plan to vote for the party.
Many studies explicitly define vote buying or clientelism as a contingent exchange, but
they operationalize and/or measure the concept without incorporating the quid-pro-quo
element. Finan and Schechter (2012), in their 2012 Econometrica piece titled ”Vote Buying
and Reciprocity,” write that “it is common around much of the world for politicians to offer
goods to specific individuals before an election in exchange for their votes” (863). Yet, they
measure vote buying through a survey question which asks respondents whether “during the
run-up to the 2006 elections, any political party offered them money, food, payment of utility
bills, medicines, and/or other goods (excluding propaganda hats, shirts, and posters).” The
first chapter of Stokes et al. (2013) is focused on conceptualizing modes of distribution.
Their definition of clientelism requires that the criteria of distribution are not public and
that the receipt of benefits is contingent on individual political support. However, they rely
on measurements of clientelism which do not capture whether or not there was a contigent
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exchange. For example, they use this survey question from the Mexican Panel Study (2000):
“In the last few weeks, has any political party given you a gift or token of appreciation,
or helped you resolve any problem?” They also use a database of recipients of Venezuelan
misiones (local social assistance programs) to study whether swing or partisan voters were
more likely to be targeted with vote buying offers. Gonzalez-Ocantos et. al’s (2012) work
on social desirability bias in questions about vote buying begins with the line “[c]lientelistic
electoral linkages are characterized by a transaction of political favors in which politicians
offer immediate material incentives to citizens or groups in exchange for electoral support,”
(202) but the sensitive survey item they use to measure vote buying in a list experiment asks
if a candidate had previously “gave you a gift or did you a favor” (205).
This is more than semantic quibbling; there are important conceptual, theoretical, and
empirical differences between vote buying and other types of gifts that politicians give to
voters. Schaffer and Schedler (2007) offer an interesting discussion of how the meaning
attached to a gift given by a politician varies across cultural contexts. It may be understood
as a one-to-one market transaction, as academics usually conceive of vote buying, but it also
could be interpreted as a free gift, a gesture of goodwill, a reparation for past misdeeds,
a display of electoral strength or quality, or a wage for helping with the campaign. Based
on fieldwork in an Argentinian slum, Auyero (1999) argues that many residents see “gifts”
or “handouts” from clientelist brokers as the manifestation or the demonstration of the
politician’s commitment to the community, not a way of buying their votes. He notes also
notes that many see Peronist rallies as a way for corrupt politicians to provide small payoffs
to communities that are suffering from larger structural or institutional problems. Scholars
have only recently begun analyzing gifts given without explicit quid-pro-quos on their own.
They have found that both the logistics of and strategy behind these gifts are distinct from
those of vote buying (Chauchard 2018; Kramon 2016; Kramon 2018; Mun˜oz 2014).
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1.1.3 A New Conceptual Framework
I propose a new theoretical framework that, instead of dichotomizing programmatic and
clientelist forms of distribution,5 sees clientelism as one type of a broader set of non-
programmatic, particularist distribution strategies. The common link between these strate-
gies is that the benefits are given based on political criteria; the recipients are chosen solely
because they will help the politician gain or keep power. However, I do not assume that this
means there is an explicit exchange involved; politicians may distribute gifts or do favors for
voters without demanding or even implying that the the recipient must do something in re-
turn. I also claim that the level at which the goods are targeted is a conceptually important
distinction. Delivering goods to individual voters is categorically different from targeting
groups of voters because the reasoning, process, enforcement mechanism, and implications
behind both are distinct.
Table 1.1 shows the typology. The strategies vary along two dimensions: whether there
is an explicit quid-pro-quo attached to the gift or it is given without any condition (col-
umn) and whether the good is given to an individual or a group/community. Quid-pro-quo
goods given to individuals (upper-left cell) is the classic definition of vote buying and clien-
telism: politicians give a gift or do a favor for a voter in exchange for their vote. If those
same gifts are given with no strings attached, I refer to them as handouts. Alternative
terms for this concept in the literature include “noncontigent vote buying” (Hicken 2011),
“nonconditional benefits to individuals” (Stokes et al. 2013), and “gift giving” (Hansen
2010).6 Goods given with a quid-pro-quo condition that are targeted at the group-level have
been referred to as “community clientelism” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), “clientelist club
goods” (Hicken 2011), “vote brokerage” (Gingerich and Medina 2013), prebendalism (Van De
5In defining and explaining clientelism, Stokes (2007) writes in the Oxford Handbook of Political Science
“In contrast, again, to pork and programmatic redistribution, the criterion for selecting vote sellers is: did
you (will you) vote for me?” Although he does use the word “programmatic”, Keefer (2007) uses clientelist
politics as a stand-in for distribution of non-public goods: “When politicians are not credible, patron-client
relationships are transported to the political realm, generating high targeted spending, high rent seeking,
and low levels of nontargeted good provision.”
6studies that focus on handouts include Chauchard 2018; Kramon 2016; Kramon 2018; and Mun˜oz 2014
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Walle 2007), and “collective vote monitoring” (Rueda 2017). Finally, politically-motivated
community-level distribution without explicit quid-pro-conditions are the definition of pork
barrel projects.
Table 1.1: Non-Programmatic, Particularist Distribution Strategies
Quid-Pro-Quo Without Condition
Private Goods Vote buying Handouts
“Club” Goods Community clientelism Pork
This conceptual framework offers several advantages. It makes the distinction between
vote buying and handouts explicit, whereas other studies treat them as overlapping or even
equivalent.7 This makes clear that vote buying involves an explicit quid-pro-quo condition,
which avoids conceptual confusion that has led some scholars to use poor operationalizations
of vote buying. This typology also carves out a place for community clientelism and pork in
the framework of non-programmatic distribution strategies. These concepts currently exist
in a gray space in a literature that defines clientelism as an exchange of goods or services
between elites and citizens. Both pork and community clientelism are not really “exchanges”
nor are they targeted at individuals, but they are not programmatic as they are politically
determined. This framework categorizes them as non-programmatic distribution strategies
but as distinct from clientelism, vote buying, and handouts in that they are not given to
individual people.
7For example, Kramon’s (2016) influential article begins with the sentence “The distribution of electoral
handouts – vote buying – is pervasive in much of Africa.” The rest of the piece goes on to describe how, in
contrast to traditional vote buying, unmonitored electoral handouts are celebrated rather than hidden by
candidates.
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1.2 Literature: Old and New Debates
1.2.1 Discussions about Clientelism
Early scholarship tended to view clientelism as a traditional form of social and political
organization, a carryover of pre-democratic relationships into the modern era (Eisenstadt
and Lemarchand 1981; Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Lande´ 1983; Lemarchand 1977; Scott
1972). These studies often focused on the macro-level influences that lead to the emergence
of clientelist systems, predominately in developing countries. In the modernization tradition,
scholars viewed clientelism as an antiquated institution that would diminish with economic
development. This scholarship also approached the issue with a sociological perspective,
emphasizing the social and interpersonal nature of patron-client relationships. In these
accounts, clients had close, personal, ongoing, direct relationships with their patrons. Scott
(1972), for example, defines this mode of relation as an “instrumental friendship” between
two people with high and low socioeconomic or political status (92). Lande´ (1983) similarly
describes clientelism as a “dyadic alliance” between people with differing levels of power
or status. Methodologically, research on clientelism before the 1980s tended to employ
case studies, ethnographies, and other types of intensive field observation. The majority of
studies provided historical accounts of specific cases to chronicle the emergence of clientelism,
describe its character, or discuss the changes it brought to social and political order.
Within the last twenty years, scholars have focused more and more on what Lande´ (1983)
refers to as “middle-level” studies, or those that are considered with specific institutions
within the broader clientelist system8. In particular, political parties are at the center of
much contemporary research. Political scientists have increasingly adopted the perspective
that parties use clientelist tactics as a rational strategy to gain or build power. The dyadic,
interpersonal, and direct elements of the patron-client relationship have been deemphasized,
while much more attention has been placed on the clientelist network which sees resources
8In contrast to macro-level studies which examine political systems as a whole and micro-level studies
which concentrate on individual political actors
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funneled to the bottom and votes sent to the top through a complex web of different rela-
tionships.
Much of the recent influential scholarship on clientelism tries to explain how and why
parties and candidates use clientelist strategies to gain and maintain power. Consider three
of the most topical questions about clientelism and vote buying. First, what type of voters
do parties choose to target with vote buying and other clientelist offers? Different works have
suggested that parties are likely to offer rewards to the poor, those that live in marginal-
ized communities, loyal party supporters, swing voters, “weak” party opponents, those with
particular personality traits, those at the center of social networks, and so on (Auyero 2000;
Jensen and Justesen 2013; Finan and Schechter 2012; Nichter 2008; Schaffer and Baker 2015;
Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013).
Second, how do patrons monitor their client’s political behavior, especially their vote
choice? Since parties face a huge commitment problem by offering vote buying rewards,
they must ensure that those who take benefits actually do as the party directs. This can be
present a challenge when the ballot is secret. A number of scholars have offered explanations
for the logic of clientelism when it is seemingly difficult to ensure voter compliance (Finan
and Schecter 2012; Nichter 2008; Kramon 2016; Mares and Young 2018; Medina and Stokes
2007; Rueda 2017).
Finally, who are the people that actually deliver clientelist benefits? Especially in recent
years, many studies have put brokers (intermediaries) under the magnifying glass, examining
their identity, their relationship with politicians and voters, how they are monitored, and
their effectiveness (Aspinall 2014; Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015; Larreguy, Marshall, and
Querubin 2016; Mares and Young 2016; Novaes 2018; Stokes et al. 2013). The through-line
of all of these open questions is that it is rational, officeseeking political elites who sustain
clientelist politics. They determine the structure of the clientelist machine, which voters get
benefits, what and how much to offer, and when to initiate or terminate the relationship.
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1.2.2 Contemporary Debates about Handouts
Researchers have suggested various ways that parties overcome the enforcement problem
associated with vote buying: They can scare voters into believing that the party can find out
how the person voted (Corstange 2012; Ferree and Long 2016); they may monitor turnout,
which is public record, instead of vote choice (Nichter 2008); they monitor election results
at some aggregate level (Rueda 2017; Gingerich and Medina 2013); they target only those
voters who feel susceptible to social norms to reciprocate electoral gifts (Finan and Schechter
2012; Lawson and Greene 2014); or they rely on brokers who have extensive knowledge of
local networks that can place social pressure on clients to vote as instructed (Stokes 2005;
Ravanilla et al. 2017).
Recently, scholars have begun to take a broader look at this debate and begun to question
whether most parties make any effort to overcome this commitment problem at all. Perhaps
it is the case that parties in modern democracies do not need to guarantee that those who
receive electoral gifts will return the favor, but that giving such gifts generates benefits from
the party in more indirect ways. In such a case, politicians need not monitor voting behavior;
in other words, they give handouts rather than engage in vote buying.
Researchers have proposed several reasons why handouts thrive where vote buying should
not be effective due to the secret ballot. In each explanation, handouts have a signaling
quality; they convey some type of information about the candidate. The first explanation is
that handouts help establish credibility among voters by demonstrating that the benefactor
is a competent and experienced candidate (Kramon 2016). The handout signals that the
candidate will provide more resources to the poor in the future. Second, handouts may show
voters that the candidate is electorally viable (Munoz 2014). Handouts motivate people
to campaign, and candidates who are perceived as likely to win attract media attention as
well as strategic voters, donors, and benefit-seeking activists who want to support winning
candidates. Finally, in countries where vote buying is a fixture of elections, handouts function
as an entry cost for politicians and parties (Chauchard 2018; Guardado and Wantchekon
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2018). Voters have come to expect payments at election time, and they will pay no mind
to those that do not offer them. In all of these accounts, electoral handouts help politicians
get elected by sending positive signals about the candidate’s quality, strength, or future
performance.
Though these studies provide some initial indications about the positive returns from
handouts, much remains to be known about these types of non-quid-pro-quo gifts. Among
other unknowns, three main questions are outstanding. First, how common are handouts
relative to other distributional strategies like vote buying? Are handouts a replacement for
vote buying, or can the two strategies exist alongside one another? Are handouts the way
that candidates win elections, or is it a niche practice limited to particular types of parties,
districts, countries, etc.? Quantitative evidence about the extent of handout-giving remains
limited.
Second, why are voters seemingly so averse to vote buying but so supportive of handouts?
Research has consistently shown that there is a stigma surrounding vote buying; survey
respondents overwhelmingly shun those who engage in the practice and lie about their own
participation in such arrangements (Corstange 2012; C¸arkog˘lu and Aytac¸ 2015; Gonzalez-
Ocantos et al. 2012; Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kiewet de Jonge, and Nickerson 2014; Kiewiet de
Jonge 2015). It is puzzling that, in the accounts of those who have recently studied handouts,
politicians seem so eager to advertise their giving of no-strings-attached gifts. And conversely,
if handouts are so effective at transmitting positive information about politician’s ability to
direct resources and command a following, it is difficult to see why adding an explicit quid-
pro-quo condition to the handout would not achieve the same goal.
It could be the case that individual voters in these countries condemn vote buying but
celebrate handouts. If so, the reason that voters see such a big difference between handouts
and vote buying is not well understood. It could also be that the average voter is accepting
of both handouts and vote buying. No existing studies have looked at public opinion of
vote buying and handouts simultaneously, so it is difficult to tell if voters in countries like
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Kenya (Kramon 2016), Peru (Munoz 2014), or India (Chauchard 2018) would have the same
reactions to candidates offering gifts in exchange for votes as they do to electoral handouts.
Third, when and why do parties and candidates choose to use handouts, especially in
substitute of vote buying? Many candidates, especially those in advanced industrial democ-
racies, build credibility in the eyes of voters without the use of handouts via their party
label, advertisements, endorsements, rallies, incumbency, previous experience, and debates.
Why handouts are particularly effective campaign tools vis-a-vis other tactics is still under-
explored. Further, surveys from countries around the world suggest that a non-insignificant
amount of voters still exchange their votes for rewards. If handouts allow parties to give gifts
with no stigma attached, why bother with vote buying at all? Further study is needed to un-
derstand the conditions under which parties decide that traditional vote buying is preferable
to distributing unconditional benefits.
1.3 Plan for the Dissertation
The dissertation explores the differences between the four varieties of non-programmatic,
particularist distribution that I outline above. In particular, I focus on vote buying versus
handouts, as the two are often confused but have several key differences. In the next chapter,
I provide an overview of the Brazil case and detail the findings I gathered from conducting
qualitative field research in several cities. Chapter three shows evidence that both handouts
and vote buying coexisted in the 2018 election in Brazil. Further analysis shows that there
are demographic and attitudinal differences between the voters who received gifts of each
type. Next, in chapter four, I turn my attention to voter attitudes with respect to different
types of nonprogrammatic distribution. I find that voters react most strongly to particularist
benefits that are more likely to influence voter behavior, such as electoral gifts that are given
as a quid-pro-quo, benefits that are given to individual people, the use of monitoring to
ensure client compliance, and the targeting of opponents rather than supporters. Chapter
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five discusses various explanations for the benefit of giving unmonitored handouts for parties
and politicians. Finally, the last chapter concludes and discusses some of the normative
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To make sense of the arguments and findings in this dissertation, it is necessary to
first understand the backdrop in which the study takes place. In this chapter, I make the
case that Brazil is an excellent laboratory for studying nonprogrammatic distribution. Due
to particular institutional arrangements, political and social diversity, and some structural
factors, politicians use a variety of campaign strategies including different types of targeted
distribution.
Qualitative field research from the 2018 general elections explains the incentives that
politicians have to engage in certain types of targeted distribution. By following several
campaigns for lower house races, I found that electoral strategies did not, by and large, focus
on candidates’ policy proposals or any form of ideological competition. An overabundance
of candidates in every race along with limits to mass communication push politicians toward
targeted distribution, which can help them establish connections to individual voters and
communities.
Due to uncertainty about Brazil’s future and a deep distrust among the public toward
politicians, candidates are pushed to make lofty promises about changes to the political sys-
tem. These promises further reinforce distrust when politicians cannot fulfill them. Through
interviews, I find that voters see targeted distribution through this lens of distrust. They are
skeptical that politicians have the motivation to create real change for their communities,
which is reinforced when candidates show only during election time to give handouts or make
promises about community development.
These results can help us understand why electoral gifts and other types of targeted
distribution continue to thrive as campaign strategies even though people disapprove of
them. The electoral environment makes targeted distribution appealing, as it is a powerful
way to establish a relationship with individual voters and communities where few alternatives
exist. Candidates need to only win a few thousand votes to get a seat in states with millions
of people, so it is not a particularly expensive strategy. Voters are generally turned off by
those who do these activities, but, given their deep distrust of all politicians, they also do not
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believe any candidate will successfully create change through policymaking. Combined with
information overload from the crowded candidate field as well as a desire to elect someone
they know personally, many end up voting based on nonprogrammatic issues like targeted
distribution, and the process is repeated in the next election cycle.
2.1 The Brazil Case
2.1.1 Historical and Institutional Background
This dissertation focuses on Brazil, Latin America’s largest democracy. As a middle-income
country with around thirty years of experience with free and fair elections, Brazil is firmly
democratic, though it has not been without challenges and setbacks to complete stability,
accountability, and fairness since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985. Brazil has
maintained a Polity score of 8 (-10 to +10 scale, +10 representing “full democracy”) since
1991, while Freedom House has rated it as “Free” since 2004, with current political rights
and civil liberties scores of 2 (1 to 7 scale, 1 representing “Most Free”).1
As with most countries transitioning from military dictatorships (Cheibub 2007), Brazil’s
move toward open electoral competition was rocky. Against the backdrop of an economic
crisis, millions of Brazilians took to the streets to demand more representative government
in the Diretas Ja´ movement of 1983-84. The 1988 constitution, which remains in place
today, guaranteed modern civil rights and liberties. Post-dictatorship governments, however,
tried and failed to contain inflation throughout the 80s and 90s, leading to debt issues and
economic stagnation.
The 1988 constitution established a strongly federalist system, with a large amount of
power reserved for state and local governments. This led to regional variation in the speed
and strength of democratization (Borges 2011). Politicians at the state and municipal levels
retained a significant amount of control over the areas they governed, which enabled some to
1It was rated as “Partly free” 1998-2002
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establish powerful party machines (Abrucio 1998; Mainwaring 1999; Samuels and Abrucio
2000). This in turn cemented authoritarian-like dominance over local policymaking, which
caused the personalistic, clientelistic, and corrupt nature of state-society relations in the
dictatorship to carry over to the contemporary democratic period (Hagopian 1996). In
addition, the state has for years struggled to control organized crime, which continues to
threaten democratic order by violently challenging the authority of elected officials and
integrity of elections themselves (Bailey and Taylor 2009; Caldeira and Holston 1999). This
in turn has led to state-led violence and human rights violations against vulnerable civilian
populations (Ahnen 2007; Mitchell and Wood 1999).
Corruption has been a constant, salient political issue in Brazil for the entire contempo-
rary democratic period. The first president elected by direct popular vote, Fernando Collor
de Mello, was impeached and removed from office for having personal expenses paid by money
gained through an influence peddling scheme. Years later, in the Mensala˜o scandal, the rul-
ing Workers’ Party (PT) was found to have paid several members of congress to support
pieces of legislation sponsored by the party and sitting president. The ongoing Operation
Car Wash (Operac¸a˜o Lava Jato) has uncovered evidence implicating hundreds of politicians
and business leaders in a scheme to award contracts to construction firms at inflated prices.
Each of these corruption scandals sparked widespread mass protests. Corruption revelations
can also have significant electoral effects, though corrupt politicians often survive allega-
tions (Bala´n 2014; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Pava˜o 2018; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013;
Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2017).
Brazil’s electoral system is, in many ways, unique. The government is presidential, with
a quite powerful executive branch. As in many other bicameral legislatures, senators are
elected to six year terms by statewide plurality vote. Members of the Chamber of Deputies,
interestingly, are also elected in statewide districts, every four years, via open-list propor-
tional representation. Combined with permissive rules on party creation and candidate entry,
this causes hundreds, often thousands, of candidates to compete against each other within
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each state. Voters are allowed to cast one vote among this multitude of candidates, which
means that many candidates are elected with a fraction of a percent of the overall vote share.
Parties proliferate; over thirty parties are currently registered, twenty five of which hold at
least one seat in the national Congress.
The need for deputy candidates to stand out not only from the vast pool of competitors
but from members of their own party and coalition (due to open list voting) leads them to
adopt a wide array of campaign strategies. Some coast on coattails and name recognition,
like Eduardo Bolsonaro (son of current president), Roma´rio (footballer), and Tiririca (enter-
tainer), who were each among the highest voted deputies in the years they were elected. Oth-
ers adopt bizarre personas, wear wacky costumes, or embrace radical ideas. More commonly,
candidates cater to specific interests or geographical constituencies (Ames 2002; Pereira and
Renno 2003). Though the giant electoral district is designed in some sense to push legislators
to represent the state as a whole, politicians face strong incentives to claim a more narrow,
identifiable base. This leads to personalism, pork barreling, and the strengthening of special
interests.
Compounding the overcrowding effect of the statewide open-list system, Brazil has adopted
strict rules about campaign financing and spending that prevent candidates from advertis-
ing themselves to a large audience. Candidates may not purchase TV or radio advertising –
instead, each candidate is allocated a certain amount of free airtime based on their party’s
or coalition’s vote share in the previous election. In particularly large races, some candidates
have less than 10 seconds to make themselves known to voters. The official campaign season
is limited to just a few months before election day. Recently, Brazil’s Supreme Court also
banned political donations from corporations in an effort to combat corruption. These fac-
tors combined have had pernicious consequences, including greatly widening the incumbency
advantage. Though they cannot buy campaign ads, incumbents and those who are already
successful have substantial authority over the airwaves, which further improves their election
prospects (Boas and Hidalgo 2011; Da Silveira and De Mello 2011). The corporate donations
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ban has allowed independently wealthy candidates to flourish and has shifted the focus of
many candidates from large private companies to wealthy non-profit organizations (e.g. the
evangelical church) and rich individual donors.2
2.1.2 Why Brazil?
Brazil is a great test case for exploring this dissertation topic because the country experi-
ences the various types of nonprogrammatic, particularist distribution identified in the first
chapter. Institutional factors permitting a large number of candidates, especially in deputy
races, makes for a wide range of campaign strategies. Besides appeals based on policy, voters
are courted by candidates via several types of targeted distribution. Clientelism enjoys folk-
loric status in Brazil, and it is still very much a part of contemporary elections at all levels
of government, among all parties, across the country. Various institutional forces, including
the dominance of piecemeal legislation, executive control of the pursestrings, and the low
threshold needed to win an election seat, make pork a large part of legislative politics. Fur-
ther, scholars have found evidence of gift-giving and community clientelism in various parts
of Brazil.
Despite economic development, stable multiparty democracy, and a huge (largely urban)
population, Brazil experiences a variety of clientelist campaign strategies. The country has
a long and storied history of traditional political bossism and machine politics, especially in
small, poor, rural communities in the Northeast (Nunes Leal 1978; Lloyd 2016). Vast political
and economic inequality enabled local strongmen to dominate over Brazil’s vast isolated
interior. The strongmen used their power to influence elections through distribution of
selective, individual benefits (cash, food, loans) and the promise of protection from roaming
bandits. The possibility of violence from the bosses themselves was also an ever present
threat. Elections were not well institutionalized or regulated, meaning the strongmen could
2Because the ban occurred only in 2015, this has not been rigorously studied by academics but suggested
by media outlets, for example: Benjamin, Teo and Felipe Caruso. “Here’s what happened when Brazil
banned corporate donations in elections.” World Economic Forum. Dec 9, 2016
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easily monitor how people voted.
As the country urbanized and its economy and political institutions developed, this tra-
ditional form of clientelism largely faded away. However, vestiges of this system can still be
seen today in a variety of forms. Nichter (2018) explains that “relational clientelism”, that is,
a system in which local politicians form long-term, individual relationships with the voters
in their district by providing ongoing benefits for their political support, is still widespread,
particularly in the Northeast (see also Borges 2018). Though those in powers are not polit-
ical bosses per se, clientelist mayors and city councilors present themselves as providers and
first points of contacts for their constituents (Cepaluni and Mignozzetti 2017). Government
assistance programs are often inadequate for Brazil’s poorest citizens. This presents an op-
portunity for local politicians to win support by doling out things like medicine and building
materials and performing services for voters like helping to enroll their children in better
schools or moving their name up on a surgery list. Others will manipulate government social
assistance programs to benefit their political supporters.
Incumbent mayors and city councilors often engage in this type of clientelism to maintain
a hold on their current positions. In these cases, the politicians can be thought of as patrons
in the clientelist system. Other times, these local politicians serve as brokers for state-
and national-level candidates (Ames 1994; Novaes 2018). In this arrangement, subnational
officeholders use their connections and status in their district to campaign on behalf of the
higher-up candidate. A common practice is for local politicians and their operatives to
distribute cards with their information on the front and that of a higher-level ally on the
back (a dobradinha). In return, the mayoral or council candidates may receive access to
state and federal resources or an ally in their next bid for a higher-level office.
In some municipalities, candidates or parties at all levels may contract independent polit-
ical entrepreneurs who are well connected with residents in a given area to deliver a certain
number of votes (Avelino 1994; Nichter 2010). These types of brokers are often popular com-
munity leaders, though they do not have the power or money to provide ongoing services and
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benefits for local residents as incumbent politicians do. These “campaign coordinators” are
hired on an as-needed basis by parties, who provide them with cash to distribute how they
see fit to potential clients in advance of an election. Brokers will then bribe voters with food,
clothes/shoes, alcohol, medicine, cash, and the like. The brokers take a cut of the money
given to them and/or may be rewarded if the patron politician wins the election. Brokers
usually rely on trust alone to ensure compliance (Avelino 1994). In some cases, though, they
may have other, more creative ways of pressuring clients into voting as instructed: taking
their voter registration card and returning it after the election, accompanying them to the
polling station, quizzing them about the candidate’s appearance (Brazil has electronic voting
and a picture of the candidate is shown before you confirm your vote), monitoring turnout,
monitoring precinct-level results, or promising future benefits should the candidate win.3
Many of these methods rely on intimidation, applying social pressure, and/or non-credibly
threatening to find out how the person voted.
A different style of clientelism takes place in Brazil’s favelas (shantytowns). Community
leaders there, often connected with organized crime, have a remarkable ability to organize
favela residents due to tight living conditions, extensive social networks, and the implicit
threat of violence (Arias 2006; Gay 1990). Favelas are, arguably by definition, marginalized
communities; few economic opportunities exist within and public policy largely ignores them.
This makes them fertile ground for mafia-esque political machines to command the votes of
its residents and deliver them to the highest bidder.
Some prominent studies of community-level clientelism have focused on the Brazil case
(Gingerich 2014; Gingerich and Medina 2013). This shows that brokers make outcome-
contingent contracts with voters: if you support a candidate and she wins, I will give you x
benefit. This system skirts the issue of the secret ballot monitoring problem associated with
traditional vote buying because, at most, the broker needs to monitor only at aggregate-
level returns. The incentive for the voter to support the politician, moreover, could be even
3Whether it is folklore or an actual strategy, there are stories that brokers will give one shoe or half of a
50 real note to voters during the campaign and promise to return with the other half once they are elected
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higher than it is under traditional vote buying; since the benefit is only doled out if the
politician wins, the voter may try to convince others to vote for that politician as well.
Gingerich illustrates this with an example from Minas Gerais, in which several vote brokers
approached the governor to ask for the release of funds for a highway project in exchange
for a controlled bloc of voters.
All of these political organization strategies are clientelist in the sense that money flows
from politicians and/or parties to individual voters in return for political support. However,
each strategy involves a very different relationship between patrons, brokers, and clients –
from one based on extortion and corruption in the favelas, to the pure vote buying practiced
by independent contractors, to the constituency service type that arguably exists in even
some of the most advanced democracies. This variation provides the opportunity to analyze
differences across “types” of clientelism.
In the opposite end of the nonprogrammatic distribution typology, pork is also a com-
mon feature of politics in Brazil (Lyne 2008). In fact, Ames (1995) writes that in Brazil,
“pork buys deputies” (339). Ames contends quite strongly that the electoral system forces
candidates to seek personal votes, particularly by providing pork (1995; 2002). The open-list
system forces deputies to compete against one another for votes, even members of their own
party. Some research has found that pressures for pork barreling are strongest in single-
member districts (Lancaster 1986). Logically, this makes sense; single-member districts have
a small, geographically demarcated constituency, offering members of congress clear incen-
tives to initiate local projects. In contrast, representatives from at-large districts must appeal
to a broader electorate to win reelection. However, when too many candidates compete in
an at-large district, the contrary is true: Because the minimum winning threshold is such
a small fraction of the overall voting population, candidates can “carve out” small con-
stituencies from the large district via tactics like pork. Ames shows that many deputies have
“concentrated” and “dominant” vote shares, meaning that their votes come from a small
number of geographically-concentrated municipalities and that they have a particularly high
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share of the total number of votes in those municipalities.
Two aspects of Brazil’s constitution also make pork barreling more common (Samuels
2002a; Samuels 2002b). First, it gives the executive branch a significant amount of control
over the federal budget. The president proposes and has a line-item veto over the budget.
This has two effects. It makes budgetary politics personal, with individual deputies trying
to court the president. It also makes the budget more specific and piecemeal, since the
president has such tight control over the details. This naturally gives rise to pork-seeking.
Second, Brazil’s system is strongly federal, meaning lots of power is given to state-level
governments. Samuels argues that in contrast to many countries, most federal deputies
in Brazil are motivated by “progressive ambition”; they want to return to state or local
government after one or two terms at the federal level. This further increases the deputies’
incentives to credit claim for local projects; once they return to their home state, they can
campaign based on their previous pork barreling.
Compounding all of these factors is the overall weakness of parties in Brazil. The elec-
toral rules described above, including the statewide open-list system, push elections toward
personalism and away from ideological party-based competition. In addition, structural fea-
tures of parties, including nominating procedures, candidate access to party resources, and
alliance strategy can affect the extent to which votes are party- or candidate-based (Samuels
1999). With the exception of the Worker’s Party (PT), internal party rules mostly push
voters toward thinking about candidates first and their parties second.
As a new concept within political science, few studies have explicitly explored electoral
handouts, non-contingent benefits given to individuals in advance of elections. Nevertheless,
it is reasonable to think that handouts exist in Brazil. Notwithstanding some creative means
of circumvention, ballot integrity is well protected in Brazil, though electoral clientelism per-
sists (Nichter 2010). The strategic reasoning for pork – namely, the electoral system is highly
personalist and competitive – should apply to individual level gifts as well. If, as others have
found, handouts enhance perceptions of the politician’s credibility or viability, candidates
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would be keen to take advantage of this tactic to stand out from the crowd. A pejorative term
for leftists in Brazil is mortadela, coined due to the PT distributing mortadella sandwiches
to those who participated in their events (and, more generally, accusations that people are
paid to host and participate in their rallies). Its counterpart for right-wing sympathizers is
coxinha (Brazilian croquette).
In summary, candidates in Brazil use a variety of nonprogrammatic campaign tactics,
including those forms of targeted distribution that are the theoretical focus of this study.
This extreme variation in styles of campaigning can be exploited to study differences in the
features, purpose, and effects of different modes of distribution. Voters are quite familiar
with these tactics, meaning we can gain a better understanding of targeted distribution
through the perspectives of ordinary citizens.
In contrast to previous studies, this dissertation explores various types of nonprogram-
matic resource distribution simultaneously. This is only possible in a large democracy with
a particular set of political factors like Brazil. Many studies that focus on clientelism, pork,
or handouts conduct their research in countries cannot speak to other types of targeted
distribution because, for one reason or another, they are not as common. Argentina, for
example, has been studied many times over due to its clientelist politics. However, very few
scholars examine pork and handouts in Argentina, simply because institutional factors like
party structure, local organization, and electoral rules make a particular form of patron-
client relationships very common. Americanist scholars have extensively studied pork barrel
politics in the USA, but clientelism and handouts are almost unheard of nowadays. Studies
of handouts have so far focused on a set of countries in which parties are weak and elections
are largely non-ideological (Peru, Kenya, Benin, India) and thus cannot examine how vari-
ation in party structuration, election strategy, or level of ideological competition affects the
causes and effects handouts.
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2.1.3 Context of 2018 Election
In 2018, Brazil held general elections for president, the National Congress (including two-
thirds of the Senate), state governors, and state legislature. Amid an economic crisis, an enor-
mous corruption scandal, high and rising crime rates, and subsequent nationwide protests,
the elections took place in a turbulent political environment. The powerful leftist Worker’s
Party (PT) had won the previous four presidential elections, but its most recently elected
president, Dilma Rousseff, had been impeached for budgetary violations and removed from
office in August 2016. Michel Temer (from the catch-all party MDB), Dilma’s Vice President,
took over the presidency but was extremely unpopular. Temer’s approval ratings remained
consistently in the single digits for his two plus year tenure. Temer was legally barred from
running in the 2018 election due to a 2016 conviction for campaign finance law violations.
The PT, which has held a central position in Brazilian politics for the previous two
decades, was expected to make a strong resurgence in 2018 with the return of former president
Luiz Ina´cio Lula da Silva (“Lula”) to the center stage. Early polling had the PT leader
far ahead of other potential candidates. As part of the Operation Car Wash (Lava Jato)
corruption investigation, however, Lula was found guilty on bribery charges in July 2017
and in March 2018 was officially barred from running in the election.4 Eventually, the party
named former Sa˜o Paulo mayor and Lula’s intended running mate Fernando Haddad as his
successor. Though the PT was still expected to fare well in the election, Haddad did not
command the same level of name recognition or personal popularity as Lula.
Veteran member of Congress Jair Bolsonaro (PSL at time of election, previously a mem-
ber of PSC and several other parties, now head of ALIANC¸A) announced his pre-candidacy
in March 2016 and steadily gained popularity. Primarily known as a fringe, far-right back-
bencher during his time in Congress, as a presidential candidate Bolsonaro branded himself
as a law-and-order political outsider. His incendiary commentary, including praise of Brazil’s
4For more on Lava Jato, see: Watts, Jonathan. “Operation Car Wash: Is this the biggest corruption
scandal in history?” The Guardian. June 1, 2017. For more on Lula’s conviction, see: Cuadros, Alex. “The
Most Important Criminal Conviction in Brazil’s History.” The New Yorker. July 13, 2017.
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military dictatorship and disparaging remarks toward several minority groups, drew strong
support from some and fierce criticism from others. The former army captain attracted con-
servative voters due to his liberal economic policies as well as his “family values” positions.
He was also popular because of his lack of connection to any of Brazil’s many corruption
scandals. Bolsonaro’s support jumped even higher when in September 2018 he was stabbed
at a political rally, which played into his tough-on-crime campaign narrative. Ultimately,
Bolsonaro went on to receive 46% of the valid votes in the first round, almost 17 percentage
points ahead of the next finisher. He then defeated Haddad in the second round, winning
55% of the valid votes.
Bolsonaro’s party, the PSL, was previously one of many small, weak, ideologically ambigu-
ous parties in Brazil. The party hit the lottery by accepting Bolsonaro as their presidential
nominee when he was still a fringe candidate. Riding the president’s coattails, 52 deputies
and 4 senators from the PSL won seats in the election (they previously had one deputy and
no senators), with many more in state-level positions. The party received the highest vote
share of any party and currently holds the second most seats after the PT.
Many political scientists agree that elections in Brazil are mostly based around non-
programmatic issues, with the consistently leftist PT being the sole exception (Ames 1995;
Epstein 2009; Samuels 1999; Samuels 2006). This was less true in 2018 than in previous
elections because of Bolsonaro’s clear economically liberal and socially conservative stances,
which trickled down to many downballot candidates. A left-right ideological divide emerged
and something resembling programmatic party competition developed.
Nevertheless, media accounts indicated that clientelism and vote buying were alive and
widespread in this election. In Rio, there were official denunciations of cases in which can-
didates asked doctors to move up their supporters on surgery waiting lists, gave away free
vegetables, paid militias to threaten people who did not declare their support for the can-
didate, installed exercise equipment at a condo complex, and paid workers at an urgent
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care facility to give special treatment to those that promised to vote for the candidate.5 In
the North, more than 10 people were detained in Alagoas in connection with a scheme in
which a city councilor was giving away construction materials in the name of a state deputy
candidate.6 One long-form article published in El Pa´ıs examined the “step-by-step” of vote
buying arrangements in Recife, Pernambuco.7 Voters could receive R$30 (about $8USD) for
placing a sticker of a candidate in their window, R$130 for displaying a flag on their house,
R$40 for promising to vote for the candidate and handing over their voter registration card,
and/or R$50 for waving a flag during a candidate’s visit to the community. For poor resi-
dents of the city’s periphery, this is a nice payday for very little work. Despite the growing
bases of ideological competition, old campaign tactics still thrived.
Though this election was unique in some ways, including the high salience of corruption,
the “outsider” rapidly rising through the ranks, the significant economic decline, and the
jailing of a leading candidate, this should not create concerns about the validity of this study
or its generalizability. This should not systematically bias the extent to which voters con-
demn or condone different types of nonprogrammatic behavior. These background features
of the election are ultimately tangential to voters’ perceptions of targeted distribution. Also,
though corruption may be unusually salient in this election, it is not clear if this would
make voters systematically more or less forgiving of clientelist behavior. On the one hand,
voters may be hesitant to support any politician who could remotely be considered dirty,
and therefore reject those who buy votes, give handouts, or deliver pork. On the other hand,
Brazilians who now have seen many gross excesses of power at the highest levels may see
clientelist offers as a relatively small infraction.
Additionally, no “perfect case” exists for every study. Every election has unique features
and unusual circumstances. Looking deep into one case, though, allows researchers to develop
5Franco, Luiza. “Eleic¸o˜es 2018: Denu´ncias de crimes eleitorais no Rio va˜o de compra de votos com
legumes a ameac¸as do tra´fico.” BBC Brasil, 27 September 2018
6Globo Alagoas. “Operac¸a˜o em Murici, AL, investiga denu´ncia de compra de votos; mais de 10 pessoas
sa˜o detidas.” 21 September 2018
7Suarez, Joana. “O passo a passo da compra de votos na periferia de Recife”. El Pais, 3 October 2018
CHAPTER 2. THE BRAZIL CASE 36
legitimate hypotheses and properly contextualize their theories. Case-specific studies also
mean researchers can more properly diagnose causal mechanisms and the reasons behind
certain relationships.
2.2 Field Research Motivation and Design
2.2.1 Campaign Shadowing
My first approach to groundtruthing involved accompanying several candidates on the cam-
paign trail in September-October of 2018. Through campaign shadowing, I spoke directly
with politicians, campaign workers, and voters about various issues in modern Brazilian pol-
itics in a natural setting. This allowed me to test assumptions, build stronger theories, make
conjectures, discuss and observe clandestine behavior, document attitudes that are difficult
to measure, and learn the “language” of clientelist and nonprogrammatic politics.
Site-intensive methods (SIMs) serve a critical role in theory building and concept for-
mation (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015; Read 2010). There are three main reasons
this is the case. First, academic work tends to emphasize general abstractions from a lim-
ited amount of data. This can sometimes lead to conceptual stretching, inconsistencies, and
disconnects between theory and reality. SIMs force researchers to confront these tensions
and adapt theories to account for new evidence. Second, ethnography and interviews allow
researchers to generate new questions and hypotheses or draw connections that may not have
been obvious or deducible from secondhand data. Third, SIMs give researchers a chance to
access “hidden data”, or data that is either sensitive or difficult to measure. This is especially
relevant to clientelism, which often involves clandestine, illegal, and socially taboo behavior.
More generally, party organization and strategy are difficult to evaluate and dissect from
behind a desk thousands of miles away. Freidenberg and Levitsky (2006) document through
ethnographies in Argentina and Ecuador how official party structures and policies did not
reflect the actual informal and decentralized nature of the organization, leading to flawed
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theories of party politics.
I took an inductive approach to learning about elections in Brazil. Without following
a strict questionnaire, I tried to understand the ways in which that candidates and parties
persuade undecided voters, mobilize their base, and motivate turnout. I wanted to learn
more about where candidates decide to focus their campaign efforts given the immense size
of their districts. Fenno wrote that the main question he tried to answer in ethnographic
research (“soaking and poking” in his words) for Home Style was “What does an elected
representative see when he or she sees a constituency? And, as a natural follow-up: What
consequences do these perceptions have for his or her behavior?” (1978, xiii). I had a
similar question: How do candidates think of their constituency, and how does this influence
campaign behavior? This contextual information would help build hypotheses and ground
theories.
Building on the methodology of other social scientists who have studied clientelism (e.g.
Scott, Auyero, Szwarcberg, Novaes, and Nichter), I also shadowed campaigns to to get a
hands-on look at how candidates and their staff approach quid-pro-quo and other gifts and
favors: whether they are clandestine or open, if they enter the political discourse, what
tactics are viewed as acceptable and unacceptable, how politicians respond to requests for
assistance, how much the typical campaign devotes to clientelist or programmatic strategies,
what role brokers and outside “campaign coordinators” play in campaigns, how clientelist
candidates and brokers monitor vote choice, what type of rewards are distributed, and so
on.
In total, I followed five legislative campaigns during the 2018 campaign season in Brazil.
These campaigns were chosen partly out of opportunity and partly to achieve a balance of
different candidate profiles. I focused on lower-house (deputy) legislative campaigns, where
representatives must establish close ties with local constituencies, at the federal and local
levels. The campaigns I followed were based in three states in the three of Brazil’s five
regions: three in the Federal District (Center-West), one in Rio Grande do Sul (South),
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and one in Sa˜o Paulo (Southeast). Three of the candidates were running for federal deputy,
the other two for state deputy. Two were incumbents in their current position, one was a
previous city councilor, and two were first-time candidates. They came from four parties,
ranging from far-left to center-right.
I spent between one and three days with each of the campaigns, accompanying the can-
didate and their team to events, meetings, rallies, meals, speeches, and debates. I listened to
the candidates’ speeches and conversations with voters. During the course of the campaigns,
I had several informal and unstructured conversations with candidates, staff, party workers,
strategists, volunteers, community leaders and organizers, and local politicians.
In the course of doing this immersive, open-ended research, I also had the opportunity to
speak informally with several activists – both community leaders (brokers) and NGOs work-
ing against vote buying and corruption. Talking with brokers showed me more about their
identity, their role in their communities, how they are selected by parties, their relationship
with politicians, their tactics for ensuring voter compliance with vote buying arrangements,
and their opinions or feelings about clientelism in general. The NGOs I spoke with have
an immense amount of practical experience with and knowledge about clientelism in Brazil.
One organization in particular, Movimento de Combate a` Corrupc¸a˜o Eleitoral (MCCE), has
played a rather large role in passing legislation against vote buying through popular vote. I
attended one of their monthly meetings and interviewed two of their co-presidents.
2.2.2 Interviews
In addition to observing election campaigns, I conducted structured interviews with Brazilian
voters. Interviews allow for an in-depth exploration of voter attitudes. Over an extended
conversation, researchers may extract much more information from individual participants
than could be transmitted in a questionnaire. Participants are given the opportunity to
explain why they hold certain opinions in their own words. This can be particularly valuable
in exploring causal mechanisms (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015).
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Through these interviews, I investigate how voters think about the more abstract concepts
I am interested in, like democratic representation, politician-voter linkages, and targeted
distribution. I explore if participants see a distinction between programmatic and clientelist
policies/strategies, what types of behaviors they see as illegal/unethical and which ones are
not, and how people believe representatives should relate to their constituency. I also try to
gain a sense of how attitudes about the acceptability of targeted distribution differ across
different communities. Schaffer (1998) found through extensive interviewing in Senegal that
ordinary citizens thought of democracy not as the assurance of civil liberties or competitive
elections but a system that ensures strong community ties, collective security, and material
payouts from supporting victorious candidates. Schaffer’s “ordinary language” interview
research method was essential to this finding as it allowed respondents to express beliefs
about abstract ideas in a in-depth, open-ended format. Since my study aims to uncover how
regular citizens think about concepts like clientelism and representation, the interviews are
a valuable tool for validating the quantitative results and exploring causal mechanisms.
I conducted the interviews with voters in two cities that have reputations for widespread
clientelist activity, Rio de Janeiro and Recife. In each city, I chose a low, middle, and high
income neighborhood that had open air farmers’ markets or fairs (feiras livres). In order to
achieve a certain degree of randomness, a research assistant and I stood at the entrance of
the fair and attempted to interview every tenth passerby. We stopped after completing eight
interviews at each location, for a total of 48 interviews. I asked questions that explored what
issues voters most cared about, whether respondents see a distinction between programmatic
and clientelist policies/strategies, what types of behaviors they see as illegal or unethical and
which ones are not, and how people believe representatives should relate to their constituency
(see appendix for complete questionnaire).
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Campaign Shadowing
Though each campaign was unique in certain ways, I observed several common threads
among all candidates. All candidates, for one, were very focused on grassroots campaigning
and direct contact with voters. At the vast majority of events I attended, candidates spent
their time meeting and talking with voters or delivering short speeches to small crowds.
The candidates repeatedly emphasized how important this was; nothing is as effective as
personal contact with constituents. Due to the electoral rules of the Chamber of Deputies,
strict campaign finance laws, and the overall weakness of parties, it is very difficult for regular
voters to make electoral decisions. This is what makes direct contact so important; many, if
not the majority, vote for deputy candidates they know personally.
The candidates’ parties did not seem to matter much during the campaign. Several
had reported moving between parties before arriving at their current one. They lamented
that elites and voters do not really care about their parties, and within their parties, no
one really cares about them personally. A negative consequence of Brazil’s strict campaign
finance rules, said a couple of candidates, is that they give a big advantage to incumbents
and make it difficult for outsiders to enter the fray. Public campaign financing is based on
vote share in the previous election. Small parties get very little funding, and newcomers to
those parties get even less. One candidate from a small far-left party said that she received
only a few hundred reais (about 4 reais per US dollar), a minuscule amount that barely
affects the campaign. This is yet another reason for the face-to-face nature of the campaign.
Each candidate was allied with other candidates for different positions. They would
distribute small paper cards that advertised themselves on the front, with the electoral
codes for up to five other candidates (state deputy, state senate, federal deputy, federal
senate, governor, president) printed or handwritten on the back. See Figure 2.1 for an
example (from a campaign I did not follow). For the PT, all of these allied candidates
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Figure 2.1: Electoral Propaganda Card
were generally from the same party. Cross-party alliances were common for others. I asked
a staffer for a candidate from a medium-sized center-right party how these alliances were
formed. She stated that it was very ad hoc; both sides thought they could benefit from
endorsing each other. There wasn’t much consideration about the other candidates’ parties
or even their political positions. Another candidate avoided questions from voters about the
presidential race, even though there was a candidate from his party competing in the race.
He told one person that, though he officially endorses his party’s candidate, the voter should
feel free to support whomever they think would make the best president.
The PT was an exception in a number of ways. Alliances were almost always within the
party. There was a larger sense of community and party identification for candidate staff and
followers. One candidate from the PT talked about how, after Lula’s jailing, “our team lost
its captain, but the team still plays.” PT rallies always drew larger crowds. Interestingly,
only the PT really seemed to speak about political opponents, which resonates with Samuels
and Zucco’s (2018) idea of negative partisanship. They decried the rise of Bolsonaro and his
allies, used language of a “coup” and “attacks” against their party, and spoke against bias
from media organizations like O Globo. On the flip side, the only time I saw voters express
open hostility was when it was toward candidates from the PT.
There were noticeable differences in the campaigns between the two incumbents and
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the three non-incumbents. For the incumbents, everything was more organized, fast-paced,
formal, and rigid. The staff waited patiently while the candidate gave speech or talked with
voters and community leaders, but then, at the drop of a hat, rushed to help the candidate
move to their next location. We sped between each event. The staff included photographers,
social media managers, and security detail. Upon arriving at the events, everything was
set up and organized; there were tents, tables, food, drinks, microphones, and speakers.
Members of the community came to these events to hear the politicians speak and eat a
meal. The meetings with other politicians and their staffs were quick and to-the-point. The
days with these campaigns went from around 7:30am to 10pm.
These candidates gave me a glimpse into their overall strategy and organizational plan.
One candidate made a plan based on each municipality in his state. Figure 2.2 provides an
example of the overview of the plan. In this spreadsheet, the campaign lists the name of
every municipality in the state, sorted by vote share in the previous election (column 3).
Next, they list a target range of votes (columns 4 and 5) that they expect to win in the
upcoming election. Next, they assign someone from the campaign or party to be responsible
for that municipality. In the subsequent columns are friendly city councilors and other party
operatives, community leaders, or volunteers that will help with corralling votes. After the
election, these responsave´is (“responsibles”) and operatives may be rewarded based on their
performance.
Another candidate had an even more fine-grained campaign strategy. As a state deputy
candidate, he needed only a few thousands votes to retain his seat. For this reason, he
focused on his hometown, and examined his vote share in the previous election in different
precincts (as shown in Figure 2.3). He then campaigned in those areas because, according
to his campaign coordinator, it is easier to gain votes where he is a known face (he was
previously a professor in the city). This candidate was self-funded, so he did not have the
staff, resources, or party support to assign a network of people with unique responsibilities
to different areas. However, he did tell me that he was approached by enterprising brokers to
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Figure 2.2: Campaign Organization Spreadsheet
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Figure 2.3: Campaign Organization Map
help him win votes; one demanded cash payment, another asked for something in the future.
One thing that both of these campaigns do – and that they said was common – was to
check electoral returns in specific areas, like municipalities or electoral zones and precincts,
after the results were released. These give a way for candidates to reward and punish
based on broker/campaign operative performance. This goes for both clientelist and more
conventional campaigns.
With non-incumbents, the campaigns had smaller staffs as well as more informal meetings
and events. For these candidates, campaign activities consisted mostly of walking around
busy streets and in markets, approaching passersby to introduce themselves and their ideas.
They distributed printed material with their face, name, electoral code, and major positions.
In contrast to the incumbent candidates, who drove to various municipalities throughout
their state, the newcomers focused on one area – for example, their hometown, university
campuses, or low-income neighborhoods. There were no pre-organized rallies or meetings
with food and drink. As a general matter, conversations were slower and more off-topic, and
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my presence was more noticeable.
One common thread among all candidates that I followed was that they had quite simple
campaign messages. In most conversations and speeches, their promises were broad, their
issue positions vague, and their ideology unclear. One operative told me about working on a
campaign in the North of Brazil, where they used cartoons and pictures to advertise rather
than text or speeches. A candidate that I followed stated that his main issue priorities were
“education, health, and the economy.” He advertised previous community projects that he
sponsored, including a campaign against graffiti, anti-drug programs, stricter punishment for
animal abuse and neglect, and the installation of neighborhood dumpsters. He is a pastor,
and spent a significant amount of time in churches giving short sermons or benedictions. In
other words, the candidate relied on several types of appeals, none of which were consistently
ideological or even based around a specific set of policies.
Candidates did, however, often repeat their name, slogan, and electoral code. A couple
of candidates told me that they do not expect to convince anyone that they have the best
policies or they are the best candidate for the job in the short amount of time they have to
speak with voters. Rather, they would at least like to be memorable, and perhaps inspire
voters to seek out more information about them. This type of strategy may simply be a
result of time constraints on interacting and having in-depth discussions with voters. While
this is certainly true to an extent, many of the candidates’ profiles on their websites and
social media accounts offer similarly vague policy proposals and promises.
Corruption was a highly salient issue during this election cycle. Every candidate needed
to emphasize that they would fight corruption in some way. The candidates that I shadowed,
especially the non-incumbents, claimed they represented something “new” or that they would
bring systemic change to the legislature once in office. Some played off their youth, some
claimed they would enact tough anti-corruption laws, others emphasized issues that are not
typically at the forefront in Brazilian politics, and others pointed to the dishonest, illegal, or
backhanded tactics or activity of the incumbents or other politicians. One of the candidates
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said his main issue priority would be to end reelection for federal deputies in order to fight
corruption. Another appealed to mostly college students and young people by advocating
for radical socialist policies.
I was careful not to ask too directly about electoral gift-giving, given the sensitive nature
of the topic. But it did come up on several occasions. At separate campaigns, campaign staff
or the candidates themselves criticized opponents for vote buying. One had previously fallen
short in a mayoral race by a slim margin, and he blamed the loss on brokers delivering cash
to voters in low-income neighborhoods the day before the election. At another campaign,
a staffer told me that it was difficult to transmit their policy ideas and for voters to think
ideologically because too many candidates simply distribute goods in exchange for votes or
other conspicuous shows of support. Candidates give all sorts of gifts, he said, including cash,
food, alcohol, gas, or construction materials. With some campaigns, groups of enthusiastic
voters and volunteers greeted us upon arrival at events. It was difficult to tell if they were
genuinely excited about the candidate or if they received some type of benefit for their
support. If the former, they were very committed supporters; the same people showed up to
events across the state.
Voters were not shy about asking for help regarding personal issues. One needed help
paying for medical bills for an injured child. Another said that his car broke down and he was
not able to commute to work. Yet another wanted help re-siding his house and building a
fence. The requests came on an organizational level as well. One candidate visited an equine
therapy ranch and was told about the importance of their services for their community but
that funding had dried up over the last few years. Another candidate met with a local police
force, and, separately, community leaders at a municipal government office to learn of the
needs of their respective organizations. The politicians, for their part, were keen to promote
their accomplishments and project development within local communities, like the building
of a new community center or laboratory. They also promised to sponsor more projects
of a similar type if they win the election (true of both incumbents and newcomers). The
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contrast between the negativity surrounding electoral gift-giving and the favorability toward
community projects was stark.
2.3.2 Interviews
I conducted interviews with a total of 48 ordinary voters. Participants varied widely in their
interest in and engagement with the interview questions. Many seemed skeptical or appre-
hensive, but most warmed to our questions after some time and felt comfortable expanding
on their replies. Since the interviews were impromptu, the setting was not tightly controlled;
there were some interruptions, distractions, and times in which the respondent’s companions
added their own answers. I decided to keep all completed interviews so as not to select only
people with certain traits such as political interest or extroversion.
In nearly every conversation I had with Brazilian voters, they expressed a deep distrust
toward politicians. They were dismayed with the current state of politics, lamented rampant
corruption and dishonesty, pointed to problems in several areas (violence, unemployment,
health, education, etc.) that needed to be fixed, and expressed skepticism that the next
generation of elected officials would be able to fix these issues. With some exceptions,
interviewees described politicians in broad terms, criticizing them as an entire class, not just
those who are corrupt or from a certain party, ideological stripe or area. Politicians make
grand promises during the campaign that they never fulfill.
Voters’ distrust of the political class seems to be a vicious cycle. In the last section, I
describe how legislative candidates put an enormous emphasis on being “new” and changing
the political system. Candidates know that voters are tired of corruption and inefficiency
in government, so they position themselves at the forefront of structural change. However,
this could backfire and unintentionally reinforce voters’ distrust of politicians. Because
the campaign promises tend to be grandiose and vague, voters have high expectations for
politicians once they take office. When they inevitably fail to follow through on all of those
promises, voters turn once again sour at their elected officials. This leads many to feel
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Figure 2.4: Interviewee Beliefs about Individual/Community Clientelism
resentful toward all politicians and turn off from politics entirely.
This theme recurred when I asked about legislative particularism, including vote buying
and pork/community clientelism. In Figure 2.4, I show the respondents’ views of whether
the exchange of benefits for political support is beneficial or harmful for their communities.
For individual vote buying, the responses were overwhelmingly negative. Voters had a more
mixed view of community clientelism, with a roughly equal number of people saying that
the practice was “positive”, “negative”, and “it depends”.
Voters gave a number of different reasons for their disapproval of vote buying exchanges.
The main ones are shown in Table 2.1, along with how many interviewees provided each
reason. The most common was that people should vote with their conscience, for the person
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Table 2.1: Reasons Given for Negative Attitude about Vote Buying
Reason Count
Not voting conscience, should vote on policy 12
Politician will never return to community 10
Corruption of democratic process, it’s vote buying 9
Opportunity cost, not helping community, only benefits individuals 9
Exploitative, manipulative 6
they believe has the best policies or is otherwise the right candidate for the job. In this
category, respondents stated that people who sell their vote do not do any research about
the candidates or think about the policies that would most benefit their community.
Interestingly, the next most commonly cited reason has to do with the signal that vote
buying gives about the politician’s quality or character. Many interviewees expressed a belief
that once a vote is bought, politicians no longer care about their community. “Candidates
from the outside come here to buy votes,” said one young respondent from the Manguinhos
favela in Rio de Janeiro. “After they come, they never return.” In other words, respondents
saw politicians who buy votes as fundamentally dishonest. They will never do anything they
said they would do because they buy all the votes they need to win the election. This lies
in direct contrast to popular descriptions of relational clientelism in Brazil and elsewhere,
which portray partisan clientelist networks as deeply embedded in local social systems and
the patron-client relationship as durable and based on trust and reciprocity (Auyero 2000;
Stokes 2005; Nichter 2018; Scott 1972). The belief that a politician would not fulfill their
promises was very bothersome for the interviewees.
Some respondents appealed to the democratic process or the inherent inappropriateness
of the buying of votes. In so many words, these respondents reported that the exchange
somehow represented a perversion of ideal practice. I include in the same category a couple
of people who said that vote buying is carried out by militias or organized crime, who
monopolize certain goods and extort residents of their community. Others thought that
giving individual handouts came at the expense of addressing community needs, both in
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terms of actual cost and the attention of policymakers. Finally, some believed that vote
buying was exploitative or manipulative of those who sold their vote.
For those that saw vote buying as a negative, their ideas for helping combat the practice
were varied. Some placed the burden on voters. Eight people said that voters should
denounce instances of vote buying when they see it. Five explicitly said that voters need to
refuse vote buying offers and three said to take rewards but do not do what politicians ask of
you. Nine did not suggest any kind of concrete action but did call for other voters to become
more educated, vote for good politicians, and mobilize for change. Many acknowledged that
the courts and judicial system played a role but few had specific ideas about what should
change to prevent vote buying.
We again can see the distrust that Brazilians have for politicians when looking at re-
sponses to the question about acceptability of community clientelism and pork. Though
some noted that community projects are beneficial in that they bring development and so-
cial assistance to their neighborhood, respondents expressed skepticism that any politician
would actually follow through and realize those projects. For the most part, the interviewees
did not really pick up on or acknowledge the part of the question that indicates politicians
deliver these projects to areas that vote for them. Among the 19 people that gave a mixed
answer (“it depends”), 11 said that their communities would benefit from those projects,
but politicians always promise those and never deliver. Others said it would depend on
community need, if it benefits the whole community or a select group, what type of ben-
efit is given (necessity vs. frivolous), or if there is an exchange involved. Those who saw
these group-level exchanges as negative again expressed that candidates only offer these to
score political points and never return. They indicate that these projects are ineffective and
change little, and politicians only do them out of self-interest.
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2.4 Conclusion
Findings from other chapters of this dissertation need to be contextualized by understand-
ing the case of Brazil. Certain institutional and other political factors make the country
a compelling laboratory in which to study the phenomenon of nonprogrammatic, targeted
distribution. A permissive electoral system, social and political diversity, historical experi-
ence with clientelism, and structural factors like inequality, mid-level per capita income and
a large population all combine to present politicians with a varying mix of incentives for
different political strategies, including different types of targeted distribution. To better un-
derstand when and why a politician may decide to use, for example, vote buying, this chapter
describes the general dynamics of electoral campaigns from both the candidate/party and
voter perspectives.
My work following campaigns in field made several aspects of the political moment in 2018
clear. With the exception the Worker’s Party (PT), around which there was clear ideological
polarization, candidate strategies were not overwhelmingly driven by consistent, clear, and
coherent ideological platforms. There were not certain left-right issues that divided the
electorate. The glut of candidates translates into information overload for voters; even if they
were so inclined, it would be a herculean task for someone to vote as traditional democratic
theory suggests, i.e. placing oneself and all candidates on a spectrum and picking the most
ideologically proximate candidate. Instead, voter decisionmaking happens informally, with
many supporting candidates whom they know personally or have some natural connection
to, like coming from the same area of the state. Campaigns, then, reflect this; they spend the
vast majority of their time on the ground, hands outstretched, ready to be shaken. Pressure
for this type of campaign is only enhanced by campaign laws that limit mass communication.
Amid this type of campaign, it is easy to see the political utility of electoral gifts and
pork. Candidates can establish connections with voters through these types of transactions.
This generates electoral returns for candidates by demonstrating commitment, creating a
precedent for future contact, becoming more memorable, and generating feelings of reci-
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procity and mutual trust. In the following chapters, I assess the actual incidence of different
types of particularist distribution and attempt to shed light on how each strategy is used by
analyzing surveys of voters attitudes toward those types.
Political turbulence brought on by huge corruption scandals and economic decline also
led many candidates to emphasize their intention to create large-scale changes. Interviews
revealed that voters have a deep and widespread distrust toward politicians. Voters by and
large doubt the motivations of politicians, especially those who make lofty promises. The
attitudes that Brazilians have toward quid-pro-quo exchanges need to be understood through
this lens. Voters revealed to me that they believe politicians who give away things like food,
clothing, and medicine before elections only do so to win elections, and will never return to
their community after they are elected; in other words, vote buying further cements feelings
of distrust. Voters generally thought that group-level goods, i.e. pork and “community
clientelism”, could be beneficial for their community, but they were extremely skeptical that
any project would actually be carried out to completion. Observations from this qualitative
work directly informed parts of the surveys I detail in the next chapters. Those surveys help
explain why voters espouse negative attitudes about candidates who engage in particularist
distribution and why I find varying effect sizes for different types of distribution.
Chapter 3
Vote Buying, Handouts, and the
Monitoring Problem: How Common
Are Electoral Gifts?
Existing literature offers a vision of vote buying which suggests that parties target certain
types of voters with individualized benefits in exchange for their votes. To ensure a return
on investment, parties must have a mechanism for monitoring the voting behavior of their
clients or otherwise ensuring that the recipients of these benefits actually vote for the party.
Much scholarly attention over the past decade has been dedicated to explaining how parties
overcome this fundamental commitment problem; when the ballot is secret, why do voters
not simply take the gifts offered by clientelist parties and vote as they want? Empirically,
we see clientelism (or clientelism-like behavior) persist in electoral environments around the
world that have rather strong democratic institutions, a puzzle that many researchers have
been keen to address.
This chapter has three goals. I first show that, despite research pointing to many of
the creative ways in which contemporary parties are able to sustain vote buying operations,
the problem of the faithless elector still seems to persist. I show original empirical evidence
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from several countries which indicates that, although electoral gifts are quite common, most
parties do not have the capability or willingness to monitor voting behavior, and citizens do
not by and large feel obligated to vote for the clientelist party if they receive a gift.
Some recent studies have suggested that clientelist parties ignore the commitment prob-
lem all together; they give electoral gifts without asking for a vote in return or monitoring
voting behavior (e.g. Chauchard 2018; Kramon 2016; Munoz 2014; Schaffer and Baker 2015).
Electoral handouts, or unmonitored vote buying rewards, generate returns not by ensuring
that recipients vote for the party but by raising the reputation or credibility of the benefac-
tor. However, parties’ ability to monitor voting behavior (and citizens’ belief that a party
can monitor their behavior) can vary within an election environment (Ferree and Long 2016;
Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016; Stokes et al. 2013; Gerber et al. 2013). This implies
that there is also variation in the ability of parties to overcome the vote buying commitment
problem.
Can traditional vote buying schemes coexist along with unmonitored electoral handouts
in the same election? The second goal of this chapter is to answer this question with evidence
from Brazil’s 2018 general elections. The question is difficult to answer empirically because
vote buying and handouts can look quite similar to outside observers. To overcome this
challenge, I use two simultaneous list experiments from an original survey. Results show
that a roughly equal percentage of voters received vote buying (contingent) and handout
(non-contingent) reward offers during the general elections. That is, when parties distribute
targeted electoral benefits, they are equally likely to attach a quid-pro-quo requirement as
they are to give them freely.
The final goal of this chapter is to investigate which types of voters were likely to most
receive vote buying and handout offers and which voters were most likely to stigmatize each
behavior. I do this by splitting the sample by key variables and reestimating the extent
of handout and vote buying offers using direct questions and list experiments. The results
show that the rich and highly educated were equally as likely to receive electoral gifts as
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the poor and less educated, though the upper class was more likely to see these gifts as
non-contingent handouts. The rich and highly educated were also more likely to stigmatize
gifts of either type. This problematizes the common understanding that clientelist parties
primarily target the poor. Results also demonstrate that voters who (incorrectly) believe
that parties can monitor vote choice are more likely to be targeted with handouts than vote
buying, while the reverse is true for those who believe in a secret ballot. This finding is
contrary to conventional wisdom, and work like Ferree and Long (2016), which suggests that
clientelist parties target voters who fear their vote choice is monitored.
3.1 The Monitoring Problem
Vote buying refers to the practice of politicians offering gifts or services to voters in advance
of elections in exchange for the recipients’ votes. Traditionally, where democracy is new
and/or electoral institutions are weak, these “gifts” were actually a means of expressive
coercion. Clientelist parties ensured that their clients actually voted for the party through
various legally and morally dubious mechanisms, such as distributing pre-marked ballots,
checking the ballot before it is deposited, or intimidating voters before they entered the
voting booth. With the introduction of the Australian ballot in most democracies, which
requires government-issued standardized ballots that are filled out secretly and deposited
anonymously, these methods became largely obsolete. Yet, in many places, vote buying
has persisted. A great source of scholarly debate has centered on the question of how
parties overcome the fundamental commitment problem associated with vote buying: Why
do parties continue to give electoral gifts when voters can take the benefits and vote as they
wish?
Various methods have been proposed to explain how parties are able to overcome the
“unreliable client” problem. These methods can be grouped into three categories. First,
parties find more creative ways to violate the secret ballot and discover how individuals have
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voted. Examples include parties asking voters to report the pattern of the patron politician’s
shirt in a picture on the electronic voting machine (Nichter 2010), exploiting systematic
variation in ballot design and familial assignment to polling booths to infer individual voting
behavior at the ballot counting stage (Corstange 2012), and bribing or intimidating election
officials into revealing vote choices (Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2019a; Frye, Reuter, and
Szakonyi 2019b). Second, in lieu of monitoring individual vote choice, parties may instead
rely on other, observable measures of voting behavior. This may include monitoring turnout
(Nichter 2008) or precinct-level election results (Gingerich and Medina 2013; Rueda 2017),
both of which are public information. Finally, parties may rely on social pressure or norms
to ensure voter compliance. Stokes (2005) writes that party brokers are deeply embedded
into social networks and can find out if someone voted against the party “if he can’t look
you in the eye on election day” (317). Finan and Schechter (2012) argue that parties rely
on voters’ intrinsic sense of reciprocity to ensure they vote for the party.
Although these mechanisms may be effective in specific cases, I claim that they are
often insufficient to solve the commitment problem. In many cases, monitoring is imperfect;
parties do not have the resources, capacity, or willingness to ensure that everyone votes as
instructed. To demonstrate this, consider empirical evidence from a variety of contexts which
shows that gift-giving still persists even when voters feel they are free to vote as they wish
after receiving a reward.
The Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) is a survey from 2008-09
that contains data about expert evaluations of party platforms and behavior. In total, the
data contains over 9000 cases of party-expert ratings from 88 countries. One section of the
survey focuses on “exchange mechanisms”: how often parties distribute benefits or make
promises to voters or other groups in exchange for political support.
Table 3.1 shows a cross-tab of expert evaluations of parties’ level of effort into delivering
consumer goods in return for votes (columns) by their ability to punish those who shirk on
their promise to vote for the party (row). Each case is one expert evaluation of a given party,
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and the table includes observations from all 88 countries included in the survey. The cells
display raw numbers as well as the column proportions.
Table 3.1: Parties by Effort in Targeted Benefits by Ability to Punish Defectors (DALP)



















The table indicates that, while there does seem to be a correlation between the variables,
a large proportion of those parties which put a significant amount of resources into delivering
targeted benefits cannot exact punishment on those who defect. The majority of evaluations
which state that parties put “major effort” or “moderate effort” into giving or promising
consumer goods to voters cannot assess consequences on those who fail to deliver (50.4%
and 65.8% respectively).
Similarly, Table 3.2 shows evaluations of parties’ effort into delivering targeted benefits
(columns) by their ability to find out how individuals have voted (rows). For those parties
who put a moderate or major effort into delivering benefits, a majority are very or somewhat
successful at finding out how people vote. However, nearly a third of evaluations state that
these parties are “not at all successful” or do not even try to monitor votes (29.0% among
“moderate effort” category and 30.4% for “major effort”).
Table 3.2: Parties by Effort in Targeted Benefits by Ability to Monitor Voters (DALP)
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While these expert evaluations are informative, the tables have limited applicability be-
cause they mix evaluations from different countries and experts. They also measure expert
opinions, which are less important than the beliefs of actual voters; vote buying can work
as long as voters believe the party will monitor and punish them for defection. For this
reason, I now turn to country-specific public opinion surveys to demonstrate that voters do
not overwhelmingly fear the consequences of taking electoral gifts and voting as they wish.
India is frequently studied for its clientelist politics (Anderson, Francois, and Kotwal
2015; Heath and Tillen 2018; Krishna 2007; Markussen 2011; Stokes et. al 2013 p. 40;
Wilkinson 2007). A nationally representative survey conducted in 2009, the India National
Election Study, provides quantitative evidence about the extent of handouts and vote buying
benefits. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of responses to a question which asks to state how
many people in their area accept electoral gifts in exchange for their vote1. Although the
most common answers were “don’t know” and “no one”, a substantial minority of the sample
(46.3%) indicated that at least some individuals in their area accept gifts. If respondents
are reluctant to admit that their neighbors accept benefits for their vote, this estimate likely
understates the true number of Indian voters who believe that people in their neighborhood
accept these gifts.
Do voters who receive these gifts fear they will be monitored and punished should they
vote against the party? A follow-up question on this survey asks “Do people who receive
such gifts feel obliged to vote for the party or candidate that provided them or do they finally
vote as they wish regardless of the benefits they receive from parties and candidates?” Figure
3.2 shows that only around 16% of respondents indicated that their neighbors who received
electoral gifts would feel obliged to vote for the benefactor, while 41.1% said that people
will vote as they wish. This indicates that parties which distribute electoral benefits, they
are not, by and large, buying votes, per se; rather they are understood as gifts in the true
1“There is a view that voters vote for a party or candidate because (s)he has received personal gifts such
as money/food/liquor from that party or candidate. In your area/locality/mohalla/village, how many people
accept the distribution of such gifts?”
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Figure 3.1: Prevalence of Electoral Gifts in India
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sense of the word, one-way largess given without payment. Of course, this survey question
only measures respondents’ perceptions, and perceptions of the behavior of their neighbors
at that. But the results do suggest that there is no widespread expectation that the benefits
parties distribute coerce recipients into voting for the party.
Figure 3.2: Reactions to Electoral Gifts in India
Similar results hold in another context, the Maldives. A survey conducted by the Inter-
national Foundation for Electoral Systems in 2015 asks how the “majority of people might
react” if a party offered a Maldivian voter “money, food, or gifts for their vote.” Respondents
could choose one of three answers: people would take the gift and still vote for the party
they like (defect); take the gift and commit to vote for that party (sell); or choose to not
accept the gift (refuse). As shown in Figure 3.3, over 70% of respondents said that they
think the average person would take the gift and vote as they wish.
Compare these results to those from a related question asked in an election study con-
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Figure 3.3: Maldivian Perceptions of Typical Reaction to Vote Buying Offer
ducted by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems in Nigeria (2015). This survey
directly asks respondents what they would do in response to an offer from a candidate or
party official of money for their vote, with the same answer choices (sell, defect, refuse).
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of responses. Again, the modal response is to take the
money offered and vote for the candidate of their choice. Many people say they would refuse
the money outright (37.3%). There are clear social desirability concerns with this question,
as societal norms dictate that respondents should not admit they would take money from a
party. However, there is no immediately obvious societal bias towards accepting rewards and
defecting instead of refusing vote buying offers outright. If Nigerians felt that they would
face reprisal or some negative consequence to defecting on their promise to vote for the
clientelist party, they would not accept the money in the first place. Instead, a majority of
respondents feel they could get away with taking benefits and not following through, which
indicates that parties have weak capacity to monitor voting behavior.
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Figure 3.4: Reactions to Vote Buying in Nigeria
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3.2 Moving Beyond the Commitment Problem
Many studies within the literature on clientelism over the past decade and a half have fixated
on explaining the commitment problem associated with contingent clientelist exchanges,
suggesting various ways in which parties can identify disloyal clients and assess consequences
on those that receive benefits from the party but do not reciprocate with the requested
behavior(s). More recently, however, scholars have shown evidence indicating that many
parties avoid the commitment problem all together; that is, they distribute benefits to voters
without requiring, expecting, or even suggesting that those who receive gifts reciprocate with
their vote.
In an Annual Review piece, Hicken and Nathan (2019) argue that the commitment prob-
lem puzzle has been overblown and that the search for monitoring/enforcement mechanisms
is a red herring, diverting attention from more interesting and important questions about
clientelist politics. Even when parties have no means of enforcing clientelist contracts, dis-
tributing targeted benefits may still be an optimal campaign strategy if alternative tactics
are unavailable, inefficient, or ineffective.
A host of recent studies offer explanations for why parties still give electoral benefits to
voters even when the commitment problem is not resolvable. Some argue that handouts
generate support by raising the credibility of the candidate or party (Chauchard 2018; Kra-
mon 2017; Munoz 2014; Schaffer and Baker 2015). Others find that parties use targeted
benefits as a way to hold onto loyal supporters who may otherwise threaten to vote for a
rival (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2016; Nichter and Peress 2017).
Much of the existing literature on clientelism assumes or argues that the ability to monitor
votes in a given election context is either possible or impossible. However, some work has
shown that monitoring capacity varies by party or locale (Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin
2016). Even in countries where there is de jure ballot secrecy, parties may be able to
overcome the institutional barriers to vote monitoring. Their ability to do so can vary based
on characteristics of the party, like the amount of resources that they command, their level
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of institutionalization or their incumbency status, or the size and strength of their clientelist
networks. Additionally, institutional factors like the size of polling stations or the level of
security at the ballot boxes could affect how difficult it is for parties to monitor vote choice.
In a setting in which ballots are not secret at all, clientelist parties may still struggle to enact
sanctions on clients that shirk on their promise due to a lack of resources. On the opposite
end of the spectrum, very powerful parties may be able to overcome strong institutional
deterrents to vote monitoring.
The fact that monitoring capacity can vary within a country implies that both vote buying
(quid-pro-quo exchanges) and handouts (free electoral gifts) could be viable strategies for a
given election. For parties that feel confident about their ability to monitor voting behavior,
vote buying may be a rational choice; for others for which the commitment problem poses a
larger challenge, handouts could still be beneficial.
This presents a problem for researchers: Vote buying and handouts look quite similar
to outside observers. As discussed in the second chapter, many scholars fail to properly
distinguish between these two behaviors both theoretically and empirically, instead lumping
them under the umbrella of clientelism or referring to both as vote buying. This is a problem
because the two strategies are analytically distinct; they have different purposes and logistics.
When variation in monitoring capacity varies, how common are handouts and vote buy-
ing? The rest of this chapter seeks to answer this question in the case of the 2018 Brazilian
general election.
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3.3 Assessing Vote Buying and Handouts in the 2018
Brazilian Election
3.3.1 The Brazil Case
Existing literature on Brazil suggests that there is significant variation in the extent to which
parties can and do monitor voting behavior. Drawing on extensive qualitative field research
in Brazil’s northeast, Nichter (2010) makes a distinction between electoral clientelism, which
involves doling out targeted goods in advance of elections, and relational clientelism, which
refers to long-term relationships based on the provision of ongoing benefits in exchange for
political support. Though this does not perfectly map on to the distinction between hand-
outs and vote buying, Nichter acknowledges that the issue of citizen credibility (commitment
problem) is overcome in different ways for each system. Under electoral clientelism, politi-
cians must rely on election day mechanisms to enforce vote buying contracts, such as asking
recipients to state the shirt color/pattern worn by the relevant candidate in the picture on
the electronic voting machine. In contrast, under relational clientelism patrons rely on trust
and reciprocity to ensure their client’s support. “If you spend four years in office giving this
help to a voter, then you can be more or less certain that he’s not going to deny you in the
hour that you also need him,” said one city councilor (8).
Other works which discuss or find evidence of traditional vote buying in Brazil, par-
ticularly in the Northeast, include Bahamonde (2018), Desposato (2007), Epstein (2009),
Lloyd (2016), Nichter (2011), and Sugiyama and Hunter (2013). However, other work sug-
gests that, due to the commitment problem, Brazilian parties and candidates have turned to
other, lighter forms of clientelism. Gingerich argues that the introduction of the Australian
ballot did not, by and large, curb the electoral power of clientelist brokers or liberate depen-
dent voters from powerful patrons (2013; 2019). However, the secret ballot has changed how
brokers maintain control; they now promise a fixed benefit to voters with certain identifiable
traits if the candidate wins election (Gingerich 2014; Gingerich and Medina 2013). Nichter
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(2020) argues that a law passed by popular referendum in 1999 significantly lowered the
legal requirements for prosecution of voting buying cases, leading to a surge in the number
of politicians who were convicted of electoral crimes. However, he acknowledges that clien-
telism is still a viable political strategy and persists throughout Brazil in different forms.
For example, political machines often engage in “request fulfilling”, wherein they provide
benefits for citizens who threaten to vote for competitors should the machine not meet their
demands (Nichter and Peress 2016). Similarly, Borges (2019) argues, contrary to the percep-
tion that political machines control the votes of their clients, that many Brazilian citizens
support likely winners in order to use their ballot as leverage to extract selective benefits
once the candidates are elected.
3.3.2 Estimation Strategy
This study aims to assess the prevalence of both traditional, gift-for-vote exchanges (vote
buying) and unmonitored, free electoral gifts (handouts) in the case of the 2018 Brazilian
election via a nationwide survey of voters. This is a theoretical and empirical innovation over
previous studies which typically only ask whether respondents have been offered something
in exchange for their vote. By asking about vote buying and handouts simultaneously, I can
gain quantitative evidence about how common each are in the same election. This essentially
allows me to estimate how often politicians attach quid-pro-quo conditions to electoral gifts.
If, for example, the estimate for handouts is significantly higher than the estimate of vote
buying, there is evidence that voters do receive targeted benefits from politicians, but they
do not perceive the benefits as “vote buying”.
Some studies have found that questions which ask directly about respondents’ experience
with vote buying offer downwardly biased estimates of the practice due to social desirability
bias (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Corstange 2012). Instead, they suggest using list exper-
iments, a technique designed to extract truthful responses to sensitive questions (Corstange
2009; Droitcour et al. 1991; Glynn 2013; Kuklinski, Cobb, and Gilens 1997). The technique
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works by splitting respondents into two groups, providing them a list of items, and asking
them to name how many of them they have done, agree with, or recognize. The control
group is given only non-sensitive items, while the treatment group is given the same list
with the item of interest added. An estimate of the sensitive behavior or opinion can be
extracted through a difference-in-means between the two groups. Recent research suggests
that combining list experiments with direct questioning in order to improve efficiency and
test key assumptions about the list experiment (Aronow et al. 2015; Blair and Imai 2012;
Kramon and Weghorst 2012).
Combining the list and direct question also allows researchers to study which voters are
most likely to underreport the sensitive behavior. Under the assumptions that (1) the list
experiment produces an unbiased estimate of the true number of voters who were offered gifts
and (2) some who truly received an electoral gift offer say they did not when asked directly,
the difference between these two estimates gives the proportion of “liars” in the sample.
Existing work has used this difference as a kind of measurement of social desirability bias
associated with vote buying (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Kiewiet de Jonge 2015). By
splitting respondents into subsamples and reestimating, researchers can compare how the
prevalence and taboo-ness of the sensitive behavior varies by voter characteristics.
I follow this strategy, with one change: I use the ratio of “yes” responses from the list
experiment to the direct question instead of the absolute difference. This is because the
absolute difference depends critically on the true proportion. Consider an example involving
Behavior 1 and Behavior 2. Suppose for Behavior 1 the estimates from the list and direct
questions are 2% and 1% respectively, while for Behavior 2 they are 50% and 40%. Using
absolute differences would suggest Behavior 2 is more sensitive, since 10% of the sample
lied compared to 1% for Behavior 1, even though only 20% of the those who did engage in
Behavior 2 lied compared to half for Behavior 1.
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3.3.3 Hypotheses
Based on existing literature, I identify three characteristics that may predict an individual’s
likelihood of receiving an electoral gift and/or their propensity to lie about receiving a vote
buying or handout offer.
Several studies have shown socioeconomic status and education to be strongly correlated
with participation in and attitudes toward vote buying. It is typically thought that the poor
are the primary targets of vote buying offers because they are cheaper to pay off and they are
more myopic than the middle and upper class (Jensen and Justesen 2014; Stokes et al. 2013;
Tawakkal et. al 2017). Perhaps because the poor have more experience with the practice
and are more appreciative of benefits they receive from parties and brokers, they also tend
to have more positive normative attitudes toward clientelism than the wealthy, who heavily
stigmatize vote buying (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kiewiet De Jonge,
and Nickerson 2014; Schaffer 2007). Other findings suggest that those with higher education
levels receive fewer vote buying offers and tend to stimatize the practice more (C¸arkog˘lu
and Aytac¸ 2015; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012; Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kiewiet De Jonge, and
Nickerson 2014; Kiewiet De Jonge 2015; Schaffer 2007; Tawakkal et al. 2017; Vicente and
Wantchekon 2009). Though these studies focus on vote buying, not handouts, I expect the
dynamics to be the same.
• Hypothesis 1: The wealthy are less likely to receive vote buying and handout offers
and more likely to stigmatize such offers.
• Hypothesis 2: The highly educated are less likely to receive vote buying and handout
offers and more likely to stigmatize such offers.
The last hypothesis has to do with the likelihood of a party attaching an explicit quid-pro-
quo requirement to the delivery of the gift. Ferree and Long (2015) argue that in settings
where parties lack the capacity to monitor individual vote choice, they can still sustain
contingent exchanges by instilling the false belief that the ballot is not secret and threatening
to enact punishments on those who defect. Even in advanced industrial democracies, voters
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have significant doubts about ballot integrity; in the United States, about 25% of voters
believe their vote is not completely secret (Gerber et al. 2013).
Thus, I predict that voters who believe the ballot is monitored are more likely targets
for vote buying. In the absence of real enforcement mechanisms, sophisticated parties would
be wise to put pressure on those who think they are being monitored rather than those
who know they can “take the money and run.” Of course, it is quite difficult for parties
to perfectly target voters based on an unstated belief. But if their networks are deep and
strong, as they are in, for example, Argentina (Auyero 2000; Stokes 2005; Szwarcberg 2015),
then they may have their pulse on the feelings, attitudes, and beliefs of their clients.
• Hypothesis 3: Those who doubt ballot secrecy are more likely to receive vote buying
offers than those who trust ballot secrecy. Those who doubt ballot secrecy are more
likely to receive vote buying rather than handout offers.
3.3.4 Data
This study uses data collected from an original nationwide survey of Brazilian voters in
November 2019. The survey was conducted online with a convenience sample recruited by
the survey firm Netquest. Netquest collects contact information for tens of thousands of
Brazilians and incentivizes them to participate in research studies through small gifts. They
invite randomly selected subjects to participate until specified quotas are met (in this case,
1750 respondents). In total, 1754 valid responses were recorded.
The sample leans slightly more wealthy than the national population. The median in-
come in Brazil is R$2298 per month, which falls in the median sample income category,
R$2201 to R$2500. However, 21.8% of the sample falls into the highest of the 17 income
categories, with a salary over R$5600. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of different demo-
graphic variables in the sample and according to the Brazilian census. The sample appears
to be quite highly educated. It also has a skewed geographic distribution; there are about
20% fewer respondents from the Southeast region than would be expected from a random
CHAPTER 3. HOW COMMON ARE ELECTORAL GIFTS? 70
sample.








HS Diploma or Higher 86.4% 48.0%
On the questionnaire, the direct questions ask: “During the election season last year
(September to October 2018), did a politician (or a member of the politician’s staff) offer
you a present or favor [in exchange for your vote / without asking for your vote in return]?”
For the list experiment, respondents receive the following prompt:
Politicians campaign in various ways. I am going to read for you a list of some of the common
ways in which politicians try to obtain votes. I want for you to tell me how many of these
ways you personally experienced during the elections of 2018.
• A candidate personally visited your home.
• Control: None
– Handout Treatment: A candidate, or someone from the candidate’s staff, offered
you a present or favor (without asking for your vote in return).
– Vote Buying Treatment: A candidate, or someone from the candidate’s staff,
offered you a present or favor in return for your vote.
• You saw a candidate participate in a debate on TV.
• You received a pamphlet or flyer from a candidate (or someone from the politician’s
staff)
These items were based partly on previous studies (e.g. Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012 and
Corstange 2012) as well as observations from field research. Good list experiments should
avoid ceiling and floor effects, meaning that they should be designed so that no respondents
will say yes to all items or no to all items (Glynn 2013). The first control item, a candidate
visiting a home, is plausible but not very common, and the last, receiving some sort of flyer,
is something most all Brazilians experience every election cycle.
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Respondents were randomly split into three groups: vote buying treatment, handout
treatment, and control. Estimates from the list experiment were drawn from a simple differ-
ence in means in the number of items chosen between each of the treatments and the control
group.2 Those who received the vote buying treatment in the list experiment were asked
the direct question about vote buying, and those who received the handout treatment were
asked directly about handouts. The control group was asked directly about both.
3.3.5 Results
Figure 3.5 displays the main results. In each “row”, I show the estimated proportion of
vote buying (VB) and handouts (HO) in the overall sample or various subsamples (high or
low education level, high or low income, belief or disbelief that parties can find out how an
individual person voted). The estimates from the list experiment are shown in green and
the direct question in red, with 95% confidence interval bars extending from both. Recall
that I treat the distance between the two point estimates as an indication of the size of
social desirability bias; a greater distance means more respondents were unwilling to admit
to receiving an offer when asked directly but were willing when they had a bit of cover.
Results from the overall estimates indicate that vote buying and handouts were equally
common in the 2018 elections. From the direct questions, I estimate that 4.4% of Brazilians
voters were offered handouts during the campaign (95% confidence interval [0.0329, 0.0575]).
This compares to 6.1% who received vote buying offers (CI: [0.0477, 0.0768]). According to
the list experiments, 21.5% of voters were offered handouts and 20.4% who received vote
buying offers. Because the handout and vote buying list treatments were given to separate
groups, I cannot estimate the overall extent of electoral gift-giving, i.e. the amount of people
that were offered either or both a handout and vote buying reward. However, this evidence
shows that handouts are vote buying are both fairly common and can coexist within the
same election cycle. When distributing electoral gifts, candidates sometimes ask for votes
2Meaning, the one control group served as the baseline for both treatment groups
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in return, other times they do not. More precisely, regardless of the candidates’ intentions,
words, or actions, there is variation in the extent to which voters understand that they are
receiving gifts in exchange for their vote.
Figure 3.5: Estimates of Vote Buying and Handouts from 2018 Brazilian Election
The large gap between the estimates from the direct questions and the list experiments
demonstrate that handouts and vote buying are subject to the same social desirability bias.
Based on bootstrapped standard errors, the differences between the list and direct estimates
for both vote buying and handouts are statistically significant (p < 0.05). The 17.1 per-
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centage point gap between the estimated percentage of voters that received handouts from
the direct and non-intrusive questions indicates that 17.1% of voters received a handout but
would lie if asked plainly about it. This is almost four times as high as the percentage of
respondents who admitted to receiving a handout when asked directly. In other words, for
every five people that receive a handout, four of them feel the need to lie about it. The
corresponding gap for the vote buying questions was 14.3%, which is 2.3 times the direct
question estimate. Thus, these results seem to suggest that social desirability bias associated
with handouts is actually higher than it is with vote buying (though it is difficult to say if
this is a statistically significant difference). This contradicts the proposition that politicians
can avoid stigmatization by offering gifts without an explicit quid-pro-quo condition.
When broken down by income, results from this survey show an interesting pattern: while
vote buying offers seem to be targeted at the poor, handouts seem to be quite common among
both the poor and the wealthy. From the list experiment, I estimate that the proportion
of those receiving vote buying offers in 2018 was 26.2% among “low” income (R$2900 or
less) individuals (7.4% from the direct question) and 12.7% among those with high income
(4.3% according to direct question), as shown in rows 4 and 5. For handouts, I estimate that
5.5% of low income voters and 2.9% of those with high income received offers. However, the
list experiment actually shows that the wealthy receive more handouts; the list experiment
estimate of handouts for the wealthy is 23.1%, compared to 20.9% for the low income group
(compare rows 11 and 12).
Contrary to Hypothesis 1 and current literature suggesting that parties primarily tar-
get the poor with largess, these results indicate that the wealthy receive electoral gifts at a
roughly similar rate. However, the rich are more likely to see these gifts as non-contingent
(i.e., as handouts rather than vote buying). This could be driven by parties, which interact
with rich and poor voters differently, or by voters themselves, who have different under-
standings of the purpose or intent behind the gifts. Results also show that the rich are more
likely to lie about receiving a handout. I estimate that for every 9 rich voter that receives a
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handout, 8 will lie about it; in contrast, only about 3 in 4 of poor voters will lie. However,
it is important to note that, due to large standard errors surrounding list experiment esti-
mates, the differences between income groups do not achieve statistical significance (based
on bootstrapped standard errors). That is, I do not find that, controlling for income, one is
significantly more likely to targeted with handouts or vote buying.
Similar results hold with respect to education. I split respondents into two groups based
on education level, one “low” (secondary degree or less, i.e. 0 to 12 years of formal education)
and one high (more than secondary degree, or more than 12 years). According to the list
experiment, the percentage of respondents that were estimated to have received vote buying
offers was 27.1% among the low education group and 14.2% among the highly educated (rows
2 and 3; p < 0.1). For handouts, the proportions were 23.3% for the low group and 20.4%
for the high (rows 9 and 10; not significant).
For both vote buying and handouts, the highly educated were more likely to lie about
having received an offer. The ratios of the estimates from the list experiment to the estimate
from the direct question for vote buying are 3.20:1 among the low education group and 3.46:1
for the high (rows 2 and 3). For handouts, the ratios are 4.01:1 for the low education group
and 6:45:1 for the high (rows 9 and 10). These ratios can be interpreted as the number
of people who receive an offer and lie about it for every 1 person who receives an offer an
admits to it. These results suggest that, interestingly, all people are more likely to lie about
receiving a handout compared to receiving a vote buying offer (not significant). Also, the
highly educated are more likely to lie about receiving an offer, particularly for handouts;
more than eight out of ten (86.6%) of highly educated people who receive a handout offer
will deny it when asked about it directly (p < 0.05). This is despite the fact that the low
and high education groups reported receiving a roughly similar number of handouts.
With respect to the respondents’ beliefs about the secrecy of the ballot, results are exactly
opposite what was predicted by Hypothesis 3. Respondents were split into two groups, one
consisting of those who think parties “definitely could not” or “might be able to” find out
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how an individual voted if they wanted to and the other those who believe parties “probably
could” or “definitely can”. Those who do not believe parties can monitor vote choice received
about 17 percentage points more vote buying offers than those who believe that the ballot is
secret (p < 0.05). For handouts, those who believe the ballot is monitored received slightly
(4 percentage points) more offers than those who think it is secret (not significant). In
other words, among those who believe the ballot is secret, parties are more likely to use vote
buying; for those who believe the ballot is monitored, handouts are more common. 3 There
was a significant difference between list and direct estimates for vote buying between those
who believe the ballot is secret and those who do not (compare rows 6 and 7), indicating
that social desirability bias is strong for people who believe the ballot is secret and receive
vote buying offers.
The results are surprising and counterintuitive. They could potentially be understood if
we assume that parties are highly sophisticated and also cognizant of the stigma associated
with vote buying. If voters believe parties can monitor voting behavior, and parties are aware
of this belief, they can offer gifts without explicitly asking for a vote in return since both sides
know that the party could find out how the recipient voted should they so desire. Conversely,
if both sides believe (know) the ballot is secret, offering the benefit as a quid-pro-quo is less
threatening given that there is no real threat of punishment. In this case, parties may make
the exchange explicit in order to invoke the voters’ sense of reciprocity to ensure they return
the favor (Finan and Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene 2014). The explanation may also
simply have to do with a non-obvious lurking variable or large confidence intervals.
3.4 Discussion
This chapter has explored the extent to which parties attach quid-pro-quo conditions to
electoral gifts using original data from Brazil. This chapter produced three main insights.
3An alternative explanation for these findings is that those who believe the vote is monitored are system-
atically different on confounding characteristics from those who do not. While this is impossible to rule out,
I find very little correlation between belief in vote secrecy and income (0.01) or education (0.02).
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First, vote buying and handouts were equally common in election under study, suggesting
that these two strategies can coexist in the same election environment. This addresses
the debate in the clientelism literature about the vote buying commitment problem; this
problem is solvable for some but not others, leading different types of parties to adopt
different variations of clientelist strategies.
Second, I find, in line with previous literature, that vote buying is primarily targeted
at poor and uneducated citizens. However, the results present a more complicated picture:
the rich and highly educated were as likely, if not more likely, than lower SES respondents
to report receiving offers for handouts. Thus, electoral gifts are equally common among
the lower and upper classes, but the latter are more likely to understand the gifts as free
handouts rather than “vote buying”. Upper class respondents were also more likely to
stigmatize transactions of either type. This challenges the common perception that targeted
electoral benefits are a means by which political machines exploit the poor.
Finally, the chapter presents some puzzling evidence about ballot secrecy and vote buying.
Interestingly and contrary to expectation, those who believe in a secret ballot seem to be
more likely to be offered vote buying rewards and those who believe their vote is monitored
are more likely to be given handouts. This runs counter to the theory that clientelist parties
sustain vote buying operations by instilling doubts about ballot secrecy among their clients.
This result could suggest that parties are highly sophisticated at targeting and well aware
of societal biases against vote buying. However, more complete data and more thorough
testing is needed to establish strong support for this hypothesis.
Chapter 4
Coercive Clientelism and Free Gifts:
How Voters View Nonprogrammatic
Politics
4.1 Introduction
The findings from the previous chapter point to an important fact about electoral gifts:
Both vote buying and handouts seem to be quite unpopular. Particularist exchanges are
subject to heavy stigmatization, which clientelist parties must be careful to address when
distributing benefits. Yet, the bases of this bias against voter-politician exchanges is not well
understood. Where does this stigma come from? For what reason(s) do voters dislike for
individualized rewards? Because of the literature’s nebulous understanding of the meaning
of clientelism, many different types of behavior are grouped under the same umbrella – could
some of these behaviors be stigmatized more than others?
Keeping in line with the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1, which places clien-
telism as part of a broader category of non-programmatic distributions, this paper examines
voter attitudes toward different types of particularist exchanges. Based on qualitative field
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research, I develop several testable hypotheses about the factors which make voters more or
less likely to condemn nonprogrammatic exchanges. Specifically, I expect that voters have
a particular aversion to politicians that distribute rewards to individuals rather than the
public or a specific community, those that give benefits explicitly in exchange for a vote,
those who monitor the behavior of their clients, and those who are clientelist and already
have a reputation for corruption. I also predict that voters condition their attitudes based
on characteristics of the potential recipient: voters are more willing to forgive clientelist ben-
efits that flow to those in need or those who already support their patron’s party. Finally,
I hypothesize that what is offered makes a difference; voters disapprove of handouts of cash
or other material goods more than the contingent exchange of special favors or services.
I test these hypotheses through an original survey conducted with an online sample of
over 2000 Brazilians conducted in October 2018. The results indicate support for several of
the hypotheses. In addition, I show that respondents are significantly less likely to vote for
candidates who have a reputation for certain types of particularist distribution, but that the
effect is highly conditional on the details of the exchange. The findings seem to indicate that
voters have a particular aversion to the coercive aspects of particularist benefit distribution.
Specifically, clientelism, or quid-pro-quo gifts, are judged very harshly; individual vote buying
is viewed almost as negatively as a revelation of corruption. The act of monitoring vote choice
and giving benefits to opponents rather than supporters also seems to rub voters the wrong
way.
The following section examines previous literature about nonprogrammatic distribution
and outlines the need for further study of voter attitudes. I then detail the hypotheses I
develop about the factors which shape public opinion about different types of distribution
and the candidates that give them. In the next section, I discuss the empirical strategy and
the results. Finally, I discuss the meaning of the various empirical results and detail their
importance for the study of clientelism, pork and handouts, and electoral competition in
developing democracies more generally.
CHAPTER 4. HOW VOTERS VIEW TO NONPROGRAMMATIC POLITICS 79
4.2 Theory
In many countries, particularist benefits form the basis of the relationship between citizens
and elites. In spite of theory which sees democratic competition as primarily a fight over
policy and ideological positioning, electoral campaigns around the world often hinge on
which candidate can deliver the most valuable benefits to individual voters. These non-
programmatic benefits influence party organization and even policy positions (Calvo and
Murillo 2019). Academic studies have found nonprogrammatic distributions to play, at
present or at some point in history, a significant role in the politics of places as far-ranging
as Argentina (Auyero 2000), Great Britain (Seymour 1915, 181), Greece (Mavrogordatos
1997), Hungary (Mares and Young 2018), India (Wilkinson 2007), Japan (Scheiner 2007),
the Philippines (Hicken et al. 2015), Mexico (Cornelius 2004, 50-52), Russia (Hosking 2007),
Thailand (Callahan and McCargo 1996), Taiwan (Wang and Kurzman 2007), Ukraine (Birch
1997), and the USA (Stokes et al. 2013).
Existing literature tend to focus on explaining how and why parties and candidates use
these non-programmatic particularist benefits. On vote buying and community clientelism,
for example, central debates concern which types of voters parties choose to target with offers
(Auyero 2000; Jensen and Justesen 2013; Finan and Schechter 2012; Nichter 2008; Stokes
2005; Stokes et al. 2013), how parties monitor their clients’ votes in the presence of a secret
ballot (Finan and Schecter 2012; Nichter 2008; Kramon 2016; Mares and Young 2018; Medina
and Stokes 2007; Rueda 2017), and the identity and role of clientelist brokers (Aspinall 2014;
Holland and Palmer-Rubin 2015; Larreguy, Marshall, and Querubin 2016; Mares and Young
2016; Novaes 2018; Stokes et al. 2013). In the emergent literature on handouts, scholars are
wrestling with the strategic logic behind giving gifts without expecting anything in return
(Chauchard 2018; Guardado and Wantchekon 2018; Kramon 2016; Mun˜oz 2014). And in the
much wider literature on pork, key questions include when and why some politicians prefer
legislative particularism to universalism (Ames 1995; Golden and Picci 2008; Shepsle and
Weingast 1981; Stratmann and Baur 2002) and understanding the interplay between policy
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and pork (Alston and Mueller 2006; Evans 1994).
Despite the breadth of research on this topic, surprisingly little is known about how
voters view these different types of nonprogrammatic distribution. Studies of vote buying
present competing visions about the role of clients in the exchange relationship. Handouts
and community clientelism are relatively new concepts and thus have not been explored in
great detail. For pork, meanwhile, it is typically assumed that voters reward politicians who
“bring home the bacon”, but at the same time, voters decry wasteful spending, especially
when they do not benefit from it.
4.2.1 The Importance of Voter Attitudes
It is important to put voter attitudes about particularist benefits under the microscope for
five reasons. First, an accurate portrayal of public opinion is important for understanding
the effects of these benefits on democratic accountability and institutions. Many works in
political science which discuss the normative implications of clientelist systems argue that
vote buying and similar behavior necessarily limits accountability because politicians do not
have to win over the median voter through policy or ideological appeals. If ordinary citizens
similarly see particularist exchanges as a form of electoral corruption, the issue needs to be
treated as a serious problem in election management, alongside fraud or campaign finance
violations. If voters have a different conception of representation or accountability, however,
the exchanges may be less normatively troubling.
Second, nonpolicy benefits can shape the electoral arena and determine who wins and
loses. Non-programmatic transfers often serve as the main linkage between voter and party
(Calvo and Murillo 2019; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). These transfers influence voting
not only by building support from those who receive benefits but in more indirect ways as
well. For example, Weitz-Shapiro (2012) finds that mayors who give clientelist rewards to
supporters face backlash from middle class voters.
Third, norms surrounding particularist benefits can act as a powerful influence on the
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behavior of both voters and politicians. As social creatures, people are highly influenced
by the attitudes and behaviors of the people around them. Political scientists and sociolo-
gists have found social norms to exert a strong impact on, among many other things, voting
turnout (Gerber and Rogers 2009), lawfulness/corruption (Fisman and Miguel 2007), politi-
cal participation (Dalton 2008), willingness to disagree (Paluck and Green 2009), and human
rights (Soysal 1995). It is important to study norms regarding nonprogrammatic politics to
understand why it thrives in some settings and is practically nonexistent in others. A well-
off voter may take clientelist rewards without hesitation simply because it’s the way things
have always been done in her community. A poor voter who personally has no moral issue
with accepting a handout may balk at a vote buying offer out of fear of stigmatization by
his peers. Studying norms (i.e. popular attitudes) can shed light on why parties and voters
choose to adopt certain distribution strategies.
Fourth, it is becoming increasingly clear that the nature of nonprogrammatic particularist
distribution is changing, with an increasingly autonomous role for voters/clients. Previously,
scholars saw clientelism as a top-down, hierarchically organized institution sustained by of-
ficeseeking parties. New empirical is not consistent with the perspective of clientelism as
elite-driven or a product of solely institutional factors. Clientelism exists in a wide variety
of institutional settings (Muller 2007), it exists in dictatorships as well as competitive mul-
tiparty systems (Hicken 2011), and it survives despite development in countries like Japan,
Italy, Belgium, and Austria (Kitschelt 2007). The persistence of electoral gifts, especially
handouts, in countries with strong democratic institutions including the Australian ballot
further problematizes classic thinking about machine politics. Political parties no longer
have the tools and resources necessary to enforce vote buying contracts with force, meaning
the power gap between patron and client has shrunk quite significantly. Survey and qualita-
tive evidence from India, Latin America, and Africa shows that citizens are more often than
not the ones that initiate contact with politicians to demand goods or services (Auerbach
and Thachil 2018; Nichter and Peress 2016). On the other end of the spectrum, citizen-led
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activism is responsible for an important anti-vote-buying law in Brazil (Nichter 2011). It
would be wrong to consider voters as passive actors who are subservient to the interests of
the political elite and whose actions are influenced solely by a small set of socioeconomic
characteristics. In fact, a host of studies that offer explanations for how clientelism dies out
use public opinion as the underlying mechanism. Stokes et al. (2013), for example, contends
that economic development led to the decline of clientelism in the U.S. and Great Britain
partly by changing voter responses to vote buying offers.
Finally, various governments, NGOs, and academics have designed programs aimed at
combating vote buying and selling in many different countries. To know whether these inter-
ventions will be successful or worthwhile, it is necessary to have some knowledge of baseline
attitudes toward clientelism and handouts. For instance, if there is already a universal stigma
around vote buying, programs aimed at teaching average citizens about the negative con-
sequences of vote buying will change very little. Moreover, if people have no conception of
what clientelism is or how to identify vote buying, interventions designed to change attitudes
will also be ineffective. If handouts are judged less harshly or even positively, these programs
should put emphasis stigmatizing the exchange of vote and not on the gifts themselves.
4.2.2 Public Opinion about Particularist Distributions: Previous
Findings
This chapter explores public opinion with regard to nonprogrammatic particularist distribu-
tion strategies. It will help adjudicate between existing studies which provide contradictory
visions for how voters view the particularist benefits. It will also test several of the reasons
that scholars have proposed to explain why voters dislike these types of distribution as well
as the bases for the stigmatization of things like vote buying. Finally, it will offer a picture
of how considerations about these benefits affect how voters view candidates as a whole,
allowing an explicit measurement of the importance of these benefits to other factors like
party and policy stances.
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Existing literature provides a mixed bag of findings about public opinion toward clien-
telism (quid-pro-quo exchanges at the individual- or group-level). The standard academic
view suggests that voters are anti-clientelistic because elites constantly monitor client be-
havior. Political machines that command a vast network of brokers and clients can exert
undue influence on the outcome of the election. While individual voters may choose to sell
their vote, they are often forced into doing so by the patron, and they must sacrifice their
right to an autonomous electoral choice. Some quantitative evidence backs the assertion
that voters have a preference against clientelist politics. Perhaps the strongest evidence
supporting this idea is the fact that survey questions about vote buying are almost always
subject to social desirability bias (C¸arkog˘lu and Aytac¸ 2015; Corstange 2012; Gonzalez-
Ocantos et al. 2012; Kiewiet de Jonge 2015; Kramon 2016). This could be driven solely
by respondents’ fear of admitting illegal activity. However, other types of survey questions
which ask about hypothetical clientelist situations also show that respondents disapprove
of vote buying (Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kiewet de Jonge, and Nickerson 2014). Outside of sur-
veys, Weitz-Shapiro (2012) finds that clientelist handouts decrease support from nonpoor
constituents even as they generate votes from clients.
Accounts from ethnographic research complicate the picture of universal stigmatization of
vote buying behavior. Many studies which rely on intensive, field-based case study methods
suggest that clientelist relationships are mutually beneficial, long-lasting, and personalistic.
These relationships, further, are built upon trust, reciprocity, and respect. Scott (1972), for
example, writes that one important distinguishing feature of a patron-client relationship is
its face-to-face quality: “The continuing pattern of reciprocity that establishes and solidi-
fies a patron-client bond often creates trust and affection between the partners” (p. 94).
Influential work based on in-depth field research in Argentina describes clientelist parties
as a “problem-solving network” and their brokers as first lines of support for residents of
marginalized communities (Auyero 2000; Szwarcberg 2015). In many poverty-stricken areas,
normal government services fail to provide for these basic needs, and parties act as a lifeline
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for ordinary citizens (Diaz-Cayeros, Esteves, and Magaloni 2016). Based on fieldwork in an
Argentinian slum, Auyero (1999) problematizes the notion that poor people vote in exchange
for gifts. For many clients, the “gifts” or “handouts” are the manifestation or the demon-
stration of the politician’s commitment to the community, not a way of buying their votes.
Some quantitative research also finds that voters voluntarily support their patrons solely out
of gratitude, reciprocity, or indebtedness (Finan and Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene
2014). Additional mixed-methods work from India, Latin America, and Africa shows that
citizens are more often than not the ones that initiate contact with politicians to demand
individual goods or favors (Auerbach and Thachil 2018; Nichter and Peress 2016).
Public opinion toward non-contigent forms of distribution, handouts and pork, is some-
what unclear as well. Political scientists generally assume that politicians who “bring home
the bacon” are rewarded handsomely by their constituents (Ames 1995; Leigh 2008; Mayhew
1974). However, this does not necessarily mean that public support for pork is universal.
For instance, Samuels (2002) demonstrates with evidence from Brazil that there is no direct
link between pork and electoral success; instead, pork allows politicians to attract donations
from private sources. Others have found that the effects of credit claiming for pork is fre-
quently negative, with effects being moderated by voter and candidate party (Bickers and
Stein 1996). In the U.S. and elsewhere, voters decry pork as wasteful spending (Ellwood
and Patashnik 1993), with projects like the Gravina Island “Bridge to Nowhere” in Alaska
encountering fierce opposition. Overall, public opinion with respect to pork is difficult to
describe because few studies have explicitly studied the issue from the perspective of voters.
Public opinion with respect to handouts is also unclear because it is a relatively new
concept in political science. The consistent finding that vote buying is mostly shunned and
stigmatized would lend credence to the idea that electoral gifts like handouts are disliked.
However, research on handouts suggest that non-contingent gifts are different in kind and
may be treated quite differently by candidates and voters. For example, some authors have
argued that politicians aggressively advertise their handouts to be seen as more credible, ca-
CHAPTER 4. HOW VOTERS VIEW TO NONPROGRAMMATIC POLITICS 85
pable, and strong (Hansen 2010; Kramon 2016; Schaffer and Schedler 2007), while those who
do not give handouts are disregarded by voters (Chauchard 2018; Guardado and Wantchekon
2018). This would suggest that voters see handouts as a constant among all parties and/or
something to be celebrated.
In addition to the disagreement about whether nonprogrammatic forms of distribution
are viewed positively or negatively, even fewer studies have examined the specific aspects
of these particularist benefits that voters like or dislike, the bases of the stigma against
things like vote buying, and the possibility of variation in attitudes across different types of
distribution. Survey-based research sometimes uses attitudinal measures based on questions
about very specific hypothetical scenarios (“A voter accepts a gift from a party in exchange
for her vote; is this ethical?”). These questions cannot provide much insight about why the
respondent may approve or disapprove of the exchange. Qualitative studies, furthermore,
typically examine one case in great detail. While these studies may explain the opinions of
certain voters in that context, they cannot say much about how those same people would
view nonprogrammatic distribution had it taken a different form.
There is some evidence that voters discriminate between different varieties of clientelism
and non-contingent benefits. Auyero (1999) describes how the meaning of a favor or handout
can change based on the setting of the interaction, the duration of the relationship between
broker and client, and the type of benefit offered. Brokers are expected to assist members
of their party and community with disparate needs both in and outside of election times. A
politician that offers cash or alcohol to someone they barely know at a campaign are more
transparently buying votes and are more likely to be turned away by voters. Quantitative
evidence also backs the idea of conditional attitudes. Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kiewet de Jonge,
and Nickerson (2014) show in a survey-experimental framework that normative evaluations
of hypothetical vote buying situations depend on respondents’ partisan attachment, level of
education, previous experience with vote buying, and level of interpersonal reciprocity. In a
separate study, Kiewet de Jonge (2015) finds that certain types of people are more likely to
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lie about vote buying behavior on surveys; social desirability bias is greater among the highly
educated, those who refuse to answer questions about their personal income, and those who
live in countries where clientelist goods are largely innocuous (e.g. campaign propaganda,
clothes, food).
This chapter adopts the perspective that attitudes toward nonprogrammatic forms of dis-
tribution are conditional while making several improvements to these existing studies. First,
it integrates these previous findings in order to estimate which factors are most important
in changing voter attitudes. For example, it is difficult to say the relative importance of
voter-level characteristics (e.g. SES, experience with vote buying) compared to the specifics
of the benefit distribution scheme in determining voters’ beliefs about the acceptability of
the behavior.
Second, these studies have mostly focused on quid-pro-quo, individual exchanges and
grouped different types of behavior under the umbrella of “clientelism” or “vote buying”. As I
argue in the first chapter of this dissertation, vote buying is part and parcel of a broader set of
nonprogrammatic distribution strategies. Existing studies do not offer adequate comparisons
because their focus is only quid-pro-quo electoral gifts. I compare true vote buying to similar
behaviors that differ only in very specific ways. This will allow me to assess if, for example,
voters dislike “vote buying” or electoral gifts in general.
Third, some surveys include questions which ask respondents to rate the acceptability of
hypothetical vote buying situations (see, e.g., those analyzed by Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kiewet
de Jonge, and Nickerson 2014). However, these surveys tend to ask about the ethics of the
voter’s behavior in these transactions. Ordinary citizens are rarely in a position to judge the
behavior of other citizens; the more interesting question is whether or not the respondents
believe the candidate’s actions are justifiable. Many of these questions also do not vary any
part of the vignette, making it difficult to assess what aspects of the situation the respondents
like or dislike.
Lastly, few studies estimate the overall effect of particularist behavior on a candidate’s
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or party’s overall electoral chances. Voters may indicate that they disapprove of something
like vote buying in the abstract, but considerations about vote buying may not enter into
voters’ overall evaluations of candidates or their likelihood of voting for one candidate or
another.
4.3 Hypotheses
This section describes several hypotheses about which key features of particularist benefit
distribution affect voter opinions. These hypotheses are partly based on findings and conjec-
tures from existing literature. They were also informed by original qualitative field research;
during Brazil’s 2018 general elections, I spent time shadowing five legislative campaigns in
three Brazilian states and also conducted interviews with 48 Brazilian voters in the cities
of Rio de Janeiro and Recife. This field work allowed me to explore how voters and elites
thought about and discussed clientelism and other nonprogrammatic electoral strategies.
The general prediction is that voters will tolerate some legally and morally ambiguous be-
havior if it means their preferred candidate is elected, and they may even appreciate certain
forms of clientelism, but they will punish more flagrant violations of democratic rules and
norms.
Studies of electoral clientelism generally focus on vote buying, or the exchange of some-
thing of material value to a voter near election day, and ignore the mix of strategies that
politicians may use to gather support (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014; Hicken
2011). Existing studies of public opinion generally rely on surveys which ask questions about
individual voters who receive some type of material benefit in exchange for their vote. How-
ever, some research shows that parties often distribute electoral handouts with no explicit
quid-pro-quo conditions. Auyero (1999), for one, notes how many clients in Argentina see
the benefits that brokers provide not as an explicit vote buying exchange but as a demon-
stration of their commitment to helping their constituency. Qualitative and quantitative
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evidence from Kenya shows that parties distribute electoral handouts not with the intention
of winning the votes of those who receive gifts but to increase electoral chances by raising
expectations about future provisions of resources to the poor (Kramon 2016). Some authors
write that vote buying is akin to an entry fee in places like Thailand and India, a practice
that serious candidates must engage in but one that requires no reciprocal action from voters
(Callahan and McCargo 1996; Chauchard 2018; Guardado and Wantchekon 2018).
I expect that the contingency of electoral gifts – whether or not there is an explicit quid-
pro-quo condition attached to the handout – affects voter attitudes. Making the transaction
a tit-for-tat exchange of some specific benefit for political support, rather than a free, no-
strings-attached gift, sends a negative signal about the nature of the interaction. There are
three reasons vote buying is viewed more negatively than handouts. First, explicit quid-pro-
quo deals place an undue and unfair burden on the recipient to act in the way the patron
desires. In this way, clientelist politicians corrupt the electoral process by dictating how
voters should behave. Even if the vote is not monitored, politicians who make the exchange
explicit are attempting to infringe on the right of citizens to make an autonomous electoral
decision. Second, this type of exchange sends a negative signal about the politician’s type
and honesty. The demand to vote in a particular way makes it seem as though the politician
is only offering help in order to win the election and will not be responsive to the recipient
once they are elected. Voters who think that the candidate is solely self-interested in this
way may infer that they are corrupt. Third, quid-pro-quo exchanges of benefits for votes are
considered vote buying, which is outlawed in almost every democracy worldwide. Making an
explicit offer of this nature seems (and in fact is) illegal, which leads people to disassociate
from and condemn the transaction.
• Hypothesis 1 : Contingency – Voters have an aversion toward quid-pro-quo partic-
ularist benefits. They will be less likely to support politicians who give explicitly
quid-pro-quo benefits than those who give unconditional handouts or those that give
nothing at all.
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Existing scholarship on particularist benefits overwhelmingly focuses on politician-voter
interactions, including vote buying and handouts. As some authors have noted, however,
particularist goods including those that are clientelist can flow to groups of voters or whole
communities. Club goods (benefits which can be withheld from other groups) can be traded
as part of a clientelist exchange if they are provided with a quid-pro-quo condition (Kitschelt
and Wilkinson 2007, p. 14; Stokes 2007a). Empirical research documents this type of
clientelism in a variety of settings. For example, Callahan and McCargo (1996) write that in
Thailand’s 1995 election, “Buying individual votes was not the only way of dispensing cash.
Some candidates made multiple ‘donations’ of several thousand baht to organizations such
as housewives’ groups and youth clubs; others gave hundreds of thousands of baht to temples
in order to win endorsement from well-respected monks, a practice that seemed especially
common in Si Sa Ket Province” (387). Prebendalism, a system in which elected officials
share government revenues with political supporters or members of their ethnic or religious
groups, is widespread in various sub-Saharan African governments (Chandra 2007; Joseph
1987; Van de Walle 2007). Rueda (2017) finds that parties in Colombia, where the ballot is
secret, target benefits and monitor votes at the polling station level. Research from Brazil
shows that some candidates promise to give a fixed benefit to all members of geographic area
if they receive a sufficient number of votes from its residents (Gingerich and Medina 2013).
The second hypothesis is that voters are more inclined to tolerate benefits given to a
group, community, or city (e.g. food bank, building a road, opening a new school) than
those given to individual voters (e.g. bag of rice, building a fence) for several reasons. First,
because private goods are excludable, those who do not get individual rewards receive little
payoff from the delivery of the benefit. Benefits that are provided to a whole community, even
if they are given explicitly and solely to win votes, are generally not regulated. This means
that even those that were not a part of the initial transaction (and generally disapprove of
such transactions) do receive some benefit from the exchange. Second, offering individual
goods sends a signal of the candidate’s potential performance. Politicians who invest their
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time, energy, and resources into fulfilling individual needs do not tend to focus on “big
picture” improvements needed in their district. Third, offering rewards to specific people
puts greater pressure on those individuals to behave in certain ways. Even if their behavior
is not monitored, clients may feel indebted to those that offer them an individualized favor
or gift, which would make them more inclined to vote for their benefactor or participate
in their rallies. In contrast, although the offer of community goods may change people’s
attitudes toward the politician in some ways, it is less likely that any one individual feels an
undue amount of pressure to repay the politician for such gifts.
• Hypothesis 2 : Private/Public — Voters disapprove of particularist benefits more
when politicians offer individual or private goods rather than community or public
goods.
Thus, going back to the conceptual framework described in the first chapter, I predict
that vote buying (individual quid-pro-quo gifts) are viewed quite negatively whereas pork
(group-level benefits given without condition) are celebrated. Community clientelism (group-
level quid-pro-quo) and electoral handouts (non-contingent private goods) lie somewhere in
the middle. The benefit of this conceptual framework is that it allows apples-to-apples
comparisons; by studying attitudes about all four of these concepts simultaneously, I can
produce a clearer idea of the behaviors that voters like or dislike as well as shed light on the
reasons that voters have for particular attitudes about nonprogrammatic distribution.
In addition to either demanding a quid-pro-quo or giving benefits freely, politicians may
choose whether or not to monitor the behavior of the recipients after delivering the ben-
efit. Academic treatments of the normative implications of clientelism usually argue that
the system is pernicious because it requires or encourages patrons to monitor the political
behavior of their clients, infringing on the right to free expression. In certain cases, though,
parties may offer quid-pro-quo gifts but make no attempt at monitoring behavior, relying
only on trust, reciprocity, and goodwill of their clients (Finan and Schecter 2012; Kramon
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2016; Lawson and Greene 2014). Do average people perceive a philosophical difference be-
tween these cases where voter behavior is or is not monitored? I suspect that voters are
very troubled by the idea of political elites checking up on how individuals have voted or
otherwise behaved. The right to a secret ballot is the cornerstone of democratic elections,
and people react strongly when that right is violated.
• Hypothesis 3 : Monitoring – Voters judge particularist benefits more harshly as if the
candidate or party attempts to monitor the vote choice(s) of their client(s).
Another normative argument commonly levied against particularist benefits is that it
skews election results by forcing people to vote against their conscience. Since rational par-
ties should target benefits to people who would not have voted for the party otherwise,
the argument goes, those who receive electoral handouts betray their true preferences; as a
result, those who win do not represent the views of the median voter (Stokes 2005). Em-
pirically, though, research has found that parties most often distribute rewards to people
who already support them, rather than those who are neutral or party opponents (Nichter
2008; Stokes et al. 2013). If recipients behave as they would absent the benefit they re-
ceived, this argument would not apply; in fact, particularist benefits could be construed as
a positive in that in may increase voter turnout. I predict that voters have more negative
attitudes of nonprogrammatic, particularist benefits when those who receive goods are swing
or opposition voters.1
• Hypothesis 4 : Switch Buying – Voters are less likely to condemn particularist benefits
if the potential recipient already supports the benefactor candidate/party.
Unlike corruption, which involves public officials using their office for private enrichment,
particularist benefits generate some positive welfare returns for regular citizens. Politicians
who give these benefits can and do argue that their actions help improve communities in
1Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kiewet de Jonge, and Nickerson (2014) show empirical evidence for this assertion via
a survey experiment from Bolivia.
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their districts and the members of their constituency. Some research suggests that parties
and clientelist brokers often act as a lifeline for residents of communities in which official
government services and programs fail to adequately address the population’s most basic
needs (Auyero 2000; Diaz-Cayeros, Esteves, and Magaloni 2016). Payments from campaigns
are often quite valuable to the poor (Stokes et al. 2013). For outside observers, the small
negative impact of one person selling their vote on the integrity of the overall electoral process
might be outweighed by the rather large impact that the gift has on the daily life of the
recipient. For those that strongly disapprove of particularist benefits, their negative feelings
may be attenuated if the politician is at least helping those in need in the process of buying
votes.
• Hypothesis 5 : Recipient Neediness – Voters are more likely to condone an nonpro-
grammatic benefit distribution if the potential recipient(s) is (are) in greater need.
Independent of the level at which the particularist benefit is offered (private vs. public),
the type of inducement could matter in terms of the appropriateness or “normality” of the
gift. Parties offer a range of benefits to their clients – from material goods like food, tea,
alcohol, clothing, drugs, building materials, medicine, community centers, public squares,
hospitals, and schools; to access to things like jobs, special positions within the administra-
tion or bureaucratic privilege; to services or favors like childcare, counseling, transportation,
help with paperwork; to cash (see Schedler (2002) and Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2004)
for extensive lists of goods offered to voters in Mexico and Argentina). Voters might evaluate
two situations very differently based on what is given and received, even if the exchange hap-
pens in exactly the same way otherwise. For example, handing out free buttons or stickers
at a parade is a normal part of political rallies in most democracies; handing out free cash in
the same way would raise eyebrows. Auyero (1999) notes how the type of good distributed
matters in clients’ perceptions of their patrons: “[W]hat is being given (and received) and
how it is being given (and received) are equally important elements in the operation of po-
litical clientelism” (323). He argues that delivering certain types of goods such as food or
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medicine, which are needed on a daily basis, require skill, effort, and attention on the part
of brokers. It is not the actual good that makes clients indebted to the brokers’ party, but
the “sacrifices” they make out of “passion” for their clients.
I expect that people are generally more tolerant of candidates that perform special favors
or services for voters than those who give out material goods or cash. This difference arises
for three reasons. First, members of the legislature are normally expected to help their
constituents resolve specific problems. Asking for a vote in return for performing a service
may be considered clientelism, but it does not seem like a flagrant violation of democratic
norms because the candidate is still fulfilling their constituency service duty. In contrast,
elected officials are not normally in charge of distributing money or material goods to specific
individuals. Observing this type of behavior then immediately raises red flags for voters, who
infer that the politician is buying votes. Second, there is again a signaling effect in the type
of benefit offered. In order to offer a service, politicians must invest time in building a
relationship with and learning the needs of the people in their district. Although not always
the case, candidates who offer material benefits often give them indiscriminately at rallies and
gatherings. Finally, services usually fulfill a need that cannot be resolved by other means:
helping a child get into a specific school, enrolling in a social service program, finding a
doctor to resolve a medical issue, etc. Material benefits, on the other hand, are usually
cheap, consumable, one-time goods: vegetables, tea, bricks, gas tanks, etc. To the extent
that particularist services are generally more valuable than material rewards and the client
would not be able to resolve the problem outside of the transaction with the politician or
party, voters may be more sympathetic to service-based transactions.
• Hypothesis 6 : Type of inducement – Voter attitudes toward particularist bene-
fits depend on what type of inducement is offered. They judge offers of money and
material/physical gifts more harshly than they do offers of jobs or favors/services.
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4.4 Empirical Strategy
4.4.1 Purpose and Experimental Design
To test these hypotheses, I rely on an original survey conducted with a nationwide sample
of Brazilian voters. The survey was distributed on an online platform through a Brazilian
survey firm in the days leading up to the first round of the 2018 general election.
The survey centers on two distinct conjoint experiments. Commonly used in the field
of marketing to test how people value different features of a product, conjoint analysis has
become an increasingly popular tool for causal inference in the social sciences. In this type
of survey experiment, respondents are given a randomized combination of characteristics
for one or more objects (e.g. products, programs/policies, political candidates, medical
treatments) and asked to rate or choose between them. This structure allows researchers to
simultaneously test for the effect of multiple variables and easily compare effects across treat-
ments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2013). It also facilitates analysis of treatment
interactions. Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto (2015) find that effects estimated
from a conjoint survey experiment mirrored results from a real-world natural experiment
remarkably well.
In the first experiment, I show respondents a series of vignettes describing a hypothetical
interaction between a candidate for state deputy (congress) and a voter or a community
leader involving a particularist offer on the part of the candidate. I manipulate various
details of the interaction, including whether the politician explicitly asks for a vote in return
for the gift (H1), whether the politician approaches an individual voter or community leader
(H2), whether the politician threatens to find out how the person voted (H3), the voter’s or
community’s political leanings (H4), the voter’s or community’s economic status (H5), and
the type of reward offered (H6). The possible vignettes are shown here, with randomized
elements in [brackets]. Respondents saw either:
“Suppose a candidate for state (or district, if you live in the Federal District) deputy is talk-
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ing with a voter who [frequently/rarely] has trouble making ends meet. The voter usually [sup-
ports/does not support] the politician’s party. After the conversation, the candidate offers her
[money / medicine / access to a surgery with a waiting list / a job] [end of paragraph / in exchange
for her vote. To ensure that the voter votes for him, the politician says he will [trust in the voter
/ send a campaign manager to accompany the voter to the polling station]].”
Or:
“Suppose a candidate for state (or district, if you live in the Federal District) deputy is talking
with an influential leader of a relatively [poor/wealthy] community. The community usually [sup-
ports / does not support] the politician’s party. After the conversation, the candidate offers [money
from the state government for the community / to construct a hospital in the community / to help
members of the community resolve health problems / to give jobs to members of the community]
[end of paragraph / in exchange for the leader’s help in winning votes in the community. To ensure
that he wins votes in the community, the politician says he will [trust in the leader / check the
results of the election in the area]].”
For the outcome variable, I ask respondents to rate how ethical the politician’s actions
were on a five-point Likert scale from “completely unethical” to “completely ethical”. By
testing the effect of each experimental treatment on respondent evaluations of the ethicality
of the exchange, this design allows me to assess which aspects of nonprogrammatic benefit
distribution that voters like or dislike. Each respondent repeated this task four times to
ensure an adequate n.
While this design could help us understand how Brazilian voters think about nonpro-
grammatic distribution in the abstract, it does not provide much evidence for how voters’
overall evaluation of a candidate is influenced by information about their particularist be-
havior. Voting for the candidate may be a nonstarter for one voter while it may be a minor
blemish for another, even if both voters deemed the behavior unbecoming of a politician.
To gain a more accurate measurement of the effect of information about particularist
tendencies on voting behavior, the second conjoint experiment more accurately simulates
how voters make electoral decisions. In this experiment, respondents are presented with
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a profile of two candidates for a state deputy election which gives information about each
candidate’s “campaign promises” (particularist behavior), in addition to their party, main
issue priority, previous performance, corruption allegations, and electoral base location.
The randomized elements of the candidate profiles are as follows:
• Party: [PT/PP/MDB]
• Principal Issue Priority: [improve the economy of the state / improve the economy
of the state through a reduction in government spending / improve the economy of the
state through an increase in investment in the public sector]
• Campaign Promises: The candidate promised to [serve the best interests of his state
/ provide building materials to [families who need help finishing construction of their
homes / families who need help finishing construction of their homes and pledge to
vote for the candidate / communities that need help finishing construction on hospitals
/ communities that need help finishing construction on hospitals and deliver him lots
of votes]].
• Previous Performance: During time as mayor, municipality saw a [rapid/steady]
[increase/decline] in economic growth
• Transparency: [An audit conducted by a federal anti-corruption agency revealed [0
/ 2 / 6] irregularities in the finances in the mayor’s municipality / no information
available].
• Electoral Base: Most of this candidate’s supporters live [near you/far from your
municipality]
After reading the two profiles, respondents are asked to say for which of the two candidates
they would be more likely to vote. If the “Campaign Promise” treatments significantly
affect respondents’ likelihood of voting for a given candidate, then, there is evidence that
information about particularist behavior actually affects actual voting decisions. This design
will also allow us to compare the effect of information about nonprogrammatic benefits to
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other factors that may be relevant for electoral decisions like party, allegations of corruption,
and performance. Each respondent again repeated this task four times.
4.4.2 Data
In total, 2,226 people were interviewed for the survey. Since I use an online convenience
sample, I created post-stratification weights and applied them to achieve distributions on
gender, region, and socioeconomic status that are more reflective of the population of Brazil.
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of these variables in the sample compared to their population
distributions according to the Brazilian 2010 census. This survey, as with many online
convenience samples, oversamples wealthy respondents; only 13.3% of our sample is from the
lowest socioeconomic classes (D & E), where those classes make up 28.0% of the Brazilian
population. There are more respondents from the richer South region that would be expected
by a random sample (4.9% more than census figures); none of the other regions are over- or
undersampled by more than 3.5%. There is a higher-than-expected proportion of females in
the sample (55.9%).










SES – A 8.2% 5.0%
SES – B1 11.7% 8.9%
SES – B2 25.7% 15.7%
SES – C1 22.7% 20.7%
SES – C2 18.3% 21.8%
SES – D-E 13.3% 28.0%
The skew of the sample may raise concern that the results of the survey are biased.
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Since the survey oversamples wealthy respondents who are generally less in favor of non-
programmatic politics, this sample should see particularist behavior as less ethical and legal
than what we might expect from the general population. The skew, however, should not
systematically impact the hypotheses about the conditional nature of voter attitudes; I have
no apriori expectations that the wealthy are more likely than the poor to discriminate be-
tween different types of particularist behavior. Additionally, a recent paper by Miratrix et
al. (2018) shows that, when respondents from online samples are randomly selected into
treatment groups, sample quantities taken from high-quality surveys estimate average popu-
lation treatment effects quite well. They argue that applying poststratification weights are a
conservative choice, as they improve estimate precision only slightly while causing significant
loss in statistical power.
4.4.3 Analysis Plan and Assumptions
I analyze the results of the survey by following estimation strategies described in Hainmueller,
Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014) and Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2020). There are two quan-
tities of interest: the average marginal components effect (AMCE) and the marginal mean
(MM). The AMCE is essentially the average change produced by a given attribute level, rel-
ative to a baseline, on the outcome variable, averaging across all respondents and all profile
features. The MM is simply the mean of the outcome variable in tasks when a feature is
present. The advantage of the AMCE is that it offers a clear causal interpretation; however,
it is dependent on the choice of a baseline category and can offer misleading results for in-
teraction variables and subgroup analysis. The MM is not particularly useful for assessing
causal effects but they offer easier interpretation and more accurate description of respon-
dent preferences, including their overall levels of favorability, their preference orderings, and
their relative valuations of different attributes.
For the first conjoint, the AMCE can be interpreted interpreted as the average change in
respondents’ rating of the ethics of the politician’s behavior as a result of that attribute being
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present in the vignette (compared to some control condition). In the second experiment, the
AMCE gives the change in probability that a candidate profile is chosen if a given treatment
is presented. Take the candidate’s political party as an example. We may want to see
if respondents are more likely to say they would vote for a candidate from the Worker’s
Party (PT) or from the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). The AMCE computes the
probability that a PT candidate with a given set of characteristics (i.e. their performance,
issue priority, etc.) is chosen, then computes the probability that a candidate from MDB
who otherwise has exactly the same profile is chosen, then subtracts the two probabilities.
It then does this for all possible candidate profiles, and then averages all the probability
differences.
The MM, in this example, would simply calculate the mean proportion of respondents
who chose a candidate when they were a member of the PT. Because AMCEs rely on the
choice of the baseline category, values can only be compared within attributes, not between
them; we know how much incremental change is produced by a change from a baseline party
to the PT, but not the average overall level of support for candidates from the MDB or PT.
Thus, the MM is more easily interpretable, though we cannot (always) clearly see whether
there are significant differences between attribute levels.
Estimation of the AMCE relies on three assumptions. The first is that there is stability
and no carryover effects. This essentially means that respondents’ choices on the outcome
variables in any given task do not depend on information given in other tasks. To alleviate
this possibility, the vignettes make clear that in each task, respondents are to consider a
new hypothetical vote buying situation or a new set of candidates. I test whether there are
carryover effects by estimating treatment effects separately for all first-task responses and
responses from all other tasks. The results are shown in Appendix A. For the candidate
profile experiment, responses do not appear substantially different for the first task. There
is one exception: the effect of all the “campaign promise” treatments besides vote buying
(i.e. community clientelism, handouts, and pork) are basically null in the first-task-only
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group. In other words, respondents tend to care more about community clientelism and
electoral handouts in later tasks. This may indicate that respondents start to infer that I
am asking about clientelist behavior in this attribute after seeing several of the treatments,
and they therefore begin to rate all types of particularist behavior less positively in later
tasks. Responses to the other conjoint do not vary much across tasks.
The second assumption is that there are no profile order effects, i.e. the treatments
have the same effect no matter the order they are presented in the profile. This can be
partially tested by randomizing the order of attributes in the profile, and then testing whether
treatment effects differ in different randomized orders. Unfortunately, software limitations
prevented the survey firm from randomizing elements of candidate profiles and vignettes.
Randomizing the order of some attributes in the vignette experiment would also make little
sense for respondents as well (e.g. “the politician will monitor trust in the voter to vote as
instructed. A politician approaches a voter and offers them money...”).
The last assumption is that profiles are properly randomized so that potential outcomes
are statistically independent of the profiles. Randomization was done properly in the can-
didate profile experiment, so this assumption is satisfied. Due to a technical error, the
randomization partly failed in the vignette experiment. For certain attributes in certain
tasks, respondents were only given some of the treatments. This error means that treatment
assignment is systematically tied to task number. This could be a problem if task number is
related to outcomes. As mentioned above, however, outcomes do not appear to be related to
task number for this experiment. Thus, this assumption seems to be satisfied as treatment
assignment is independent of outcomes for each attribute.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Experiment #1: Hypothetical Scenarios
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of the ethics variable over all respondent-tasks. Respon-
dents were allowed a “don’t know” option. In total, the don’t know option was chosen 789
times out of (2226∗4) = 8904 tasks; these were removed from the analysis. The figure shows
that the modal answer was “completely unethical”, making up around half the responses.
There was a significant amount of variation, however. “Neutral” was the next most common
response, followed by “somewhat unethical”. Around 15% of scenarios were judged as some-
what or completely ethical. These results suggest that respondents largely think of these
exchanges as unethical, though there might be some variation that could be explained by
the attributes. I also asked respondents about the legality of the politician’s actions. The
responses to this question were very highly correlated with the ethics variable, only with
more non-responses. I therefore make the decision to focus only on the ethics variable as the
main outcome.
I show the marginal means for the voter and community leader vignettes separately
because the profiles (and the results) differ so drastically. In Figures 4.2 and 4.3, I show
mean of the ethics variable when each feature level is present for non-missing responses,
along with 95% confidence intervals.
The two figures show that there is significant variation in respondents’ view of the ethical
appropriateness of the politician’s actions. The average rating is much higher across nearly
all conditions when the politician gives benefits to the community rather than individuals.
The monitoring and gift type attributes seem to pull the dependent variable most strongly;
respondents’ opinions of the politician’s actions seem to drop rather significantly when they
offer quid-pro-quos and when they offer money.
I next estimate a regression predicting respondent view of the ethics of the politician’s
actions with all of the conjoint variables included as predictors. I plot the AMCEs in Figure
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Figure 4.1: Proportion of Respondent-Tasks by Ethics Rating
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Figure 4.2: Marginal Means of Ethics Ratings – Community Leader
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Figure 4.3: Marginal Means of Ethics Ratings – Voter
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4.4. This shows the expected change in the respondents’ view of the ethics of the politician’s
actions (completely unethical = 1, completely ethical = 5) when each attribute level is
included in the vignette. The full results, including the actual coefficient estimates and
p-values, are given in table form in the appendix.
Figure 4.4: Effect of Treatments on Ethics Rating of Hypothetical Exchange
As expected from the marginal mean plots, the biggest effects come from the quid-pro-
quo and target attributes. Respondents are much more likely to judge situations negatively
when the vignette describes a politician asking for a vote in return for offering the benefit
and when the politician approaches an individual rather than a community leader. This
lends support to hypotheses 1 and 2. Respondents also view situations quite negatively
when the politician offers money as opposed to services (access to a surgery with a waiting
list / resolve health problems) or employment. Contrary to expectations, the material goods
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treatment effect is actually positive; respondents on average judge the clientelist situation
as more ethical if the politician offers material goods (medicine/hospital). Though they
are smaller in magnitude, there are positive and significant effects for the recipient already
supporting the politician’s party (H4) and the election results being monitored (H3). The
recipient’s level of need does not seem to make much of a difference.
Because the community leader and individual vignettes differ so significantly, I also es-
timate regressions with the same variables broken into two samples, one for each type of
vignette. The results for these are shown in Figure 4.5 (voter) and Figure 4.6 (leader). The
results with respect to the quid-pro-quo attribute remain the same in both regressions; re-
spondents see quid-pro-quo exchanges as much less ethical than those without the explicit
ask attached. Offers of money are again judged more harshly than all other types of benefits
in both situations. Some of the other treatment effects with regard to gift type differ be-
tween the regressions here. Offers of employment for individual voters are those most likely
to be judged as ethical compared to other benefits; for leaders, respondents judge offers of
jobs more negatively than offers to help resolve medical issues and bring a hospital to the
community. For community leaders, offers of money are judged much more negatively than
those involving material goods and services. For individual voters, the treatment effects for
money, material goods, and services have overlapping confidence intervals. In both vignette
types, the effect of sending someone to monitor vote choice is in the expected direction, but
very small. The same is true for the political leanings attribute – respondents are somewhat
more likely to see an offer as ethical if it is given to party supporters. Finally, the effect
of recipient neediness actually goes in the opposite direction of what was expected accord-
ing to H5 in both regressions; respondents see offers given to more well-off individuals and
communities as more ethical.
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Figure 4.5: Individual Voter Vignettes Only
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Figure 4.6: Community Leader Vignettes Only
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4.5.2 Experiment #2: Candidate Profiles
Figure 4.7 shows the main results of the candidate choice experiment. The estimated AMCEs
are plotted along with 95% confidence intervals. Here the treatment effects represent the
predicted change in probability of voting for a candidate if their profile includes the given
attribute level. Values to the right of zero indicate increased probability. Once again, full
results with the estimated coefficients are shown in the appendix.
Figure 4.7: Effect of Treatments on Probability of Voting for Candidate
The results suggest that voters care deeply about a politician’s corruption record. Com-
pared to a neutral control group (“no information available”), candidates that were previ-
ously investigated and found to have several irregularities in their city’s budget were sig-
nificantly less likely to be chosen by respondents. On the reverse side, those who were
investigated and found to have no irregularities were significantly more likely to be picked.
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More relevant to this study, there is a large negative effect for the “vote buying” treat-
ment; candidates who promise to give families construction materials in exchange for their
votes are much less likely to be chosen than candidates in the control group. Interestingly,
this negative effect is as big as the “six irregularities” corruption treatment – in other words,
respondents are as likely to vote for a candidate who buys votes as they are to vote for one
who was shown to be highly corrupt in a previous position. The negative effect of clientelist
behavior diminishes greatly, nearly to zero, when it is said that the politician will give the
construction materials unconditionally, i.e. without the condition that the family vote for
the candidate in order to receive the handout (“handouts” treatment). Results are similar
for the “community clientelism” and “pork” treatments. Compared to the control group,
respondents are significantly less likely to vote for someone who will build a hospital in areas
where he earns a lot of votes, but they are no more or less likely to vote for someone who
promises to build hospitals in general. This suggests that respondents object not to politi-
cians giving away free gifts, but giving gifts to those that support him or her politically.
They especially object to politicians who reward individuals rather than communities.
I also once again show the marginal means of each attribute (Figure 4.8). In this case, the
x-axis can be thought of as the average probability of support for a candidate that has the
specific trait. The vertical bar signifies the average probability of support across all profiles.2
The MM plot clearly shows the importance of corruption. Going from no irregularities to six
drops average support by over 15 percentage points. The plot makes clear that a candidate
who buys votes has about as much support, on average, as someone who had between two
and six corruption infractions. In comparison to the AMCE plot, this figure also lends a
slightly more positive interpretation to non-contingent benefits. Candidates who give pork
and handouts are viewed as positively as someone who oversaw a municipality with a stable
increase in economic growth.
2If the experiment was forced choice, the average would by definition be 0.5. However, because I allowed
a “neither” option, the mean dropped to just below 0.3.
CHAPTER 4. HOW VOTERS VIEW TO NONPROGRAMMATIC POLITICS 111
Figure 4.8: Marginal Means of Candidate Choice Experiment
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4.6 Discussion
The empirical results provide evidence that voters react negatively to particularist behavior
when it involves a politician offering a benefit explicitly in return for political support,
offering gifts to individual voters rather than communities, offering money over other types of
benefits, or giving benefits to political opponents/swing voters rather than party supporters.
Considerations about nonprogrammatic behavior only seem to negatively impact voters’
overall evaluations of candidates when they give contingent benefits, especially if they are
given to individual voters. The data offer some but not resounding evidence that respondents
judge politicians more harshly if they monitor voting behavior. There is little support for
the hypotheses that respondents are more accepting of particularist benefits when politicians
offer benefits to the poor rather than the rich or when they offer services rather than material
goods; if anything, the results suggest the opposite of these hypotheses is true.
What do these results suggest about the psychology of voters’ beliefs, attitudes, and
behavior when it comes to politicians who engage in nonprogrammatic forms of distribution?
The main findings suggest that voters have a particular aversion to the coercive nature of
electoral benefits. In other words, respondents feel that voters’ behavior should not be
influenced by their receiving of a gift. For example, offering gifts as a quid-pro-quo seems to
have a large influence on voters’ attitudes, especially when their behavior is monitored and
rewarded/punished as a result. This means that the more pressure the candidate places on
the recipient to reciprocate the gift or favor, the more the exchange is condemned by outside
observers. This also explains why individual-level gifts tend to be judged more harshly
than benefits targeted at groups/communities. When the interaction is directly between a
politician and a constituent, there is a stronger implication that the gift is to be returned
in kind. Likewise, gifts that are given to people who already support the benefactor are
viewed more positively. This fits with Hypothesis 4, which posits that “switch buying” is
viewed more negatively, because the recipient must switch their political allegiance in order
to accept the gift.
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This suggests that if particularist benefits are to be given, voters think they should be
given completely freely. The underlying implication is that people believe that votes should
not be influenced by particularist benefits, not that the benefits themselves are wrong. In the
candidate profile experiment, non-contingent benefits, seem to have a non-significant or even
effect according to the AMCEs. According to the MMs, though, candidates who give pork
and handouts have a higher than average probability of being selected, with marginal means
as high as candidates who oversaw a municipality with a stable or rapid increase in economic
growth. These marginal means and AMCEs are even higher when looking at the first tasks
only; respondents’ views of non-contingent particularist behavior tend to decrease across
tasks, perhaps as they start to associate it with vote buying and community clientelism.
This is not to say the experiments show that handouts and pork are a significant boon for
the candidates, as the marginal probability of support for each is just above 30%. However,
they do not suffer from the same condemnation as quid-pro-quo gifts.
The next chapter will investigate why parties choose to give electoral handouts even when
they cannot be sure that they receive political support in return. As part of this section
of the project, I launched an additional survey in Brazil in late 2019 that further probed
voters’ attitudes toward handouts and vote buying. The survey was again completed online
using a convenience sample recruited by a survey firm (total n of 2026).
I included questions that directly asks about respondents’ belief in the acceptability of
both behaviors: “To what extent would you say it is acceptable for politicians to offer
presents or favors to individual people [in return for their votes/without asking for their vote
in return]?” Responses to these questions are shown in Figure 4.9. The figure demonstrates
how, while handouts are viewed more positively than vote buying, they are by no means
universally accepted; about 60% of the sample indicate that it was “completely unacceptable”
for politicians to give electoral gifts even when they do not ask for a vote in return.
To further test the reason I propose for voters dislike of electoral gifts and particularist
behavior in general – that they coerce voters into acting in a certain way – I ask respondents
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Figure 4.9: Acceptability of Handouts and Vote Buying
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to say to what extent they believe people who accept personal gifts or favors from politicians
feel obligated to vote for that politician (four-point Likert scale). If my hypothesis is correct,
this item should be negatively associated with respondents’ views of the acceptability of
electoral gifts. To test this expectation, I estimate a regression with the respondents’ views
of the acceptability of both handouts and vote buying as outcomes and their perception of
whether people who receive gifts feel obligated to return the favor as the main explanatory
variable. I add a set of standard control variables, including income, education, and ideology
(as proxied by favorability toward the leftist PT), to account for the possibility of confounding
variables.




Obligated? (0-3) −0.154∗∗∗ −0.037∗
(0.028) (0.021)
Income (0-16) −0.034∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Education (0-18) −0.027∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005)






Adjusted R2 0.104 0.093
Residual Std. Error 1.089 (df = 1344) 0.811 (df = 1305)
F Statistic 40.235∗∗∗ (df = 4; 1344) 34.752∗∗∗ (df = 4; 1305)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The results shown in Table 4.2 show that, as expected, the more voters believe recipients
feel obligated to vote for politicians that give them a gift, the more they are likely to see
handouts as unacceptable. This lends credence to the idea that voters dislike handouts
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because they see them as unduly influencing the recipient’s vote choice. Interestingly, there
is a weaker association between the obligation variable and view of handouts; the coefficient
is negative, but its size is less than half it is in Model 1, with a p-value of 0.08. This speaks to
the importance of treating each of the two as distinct behaviors. Handouts and vote buying
are also judged more negatively by those with high incomes and education levels as well as
by those on the right.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper examines the attitudes of voters toward nonprogrammatic types of distribution
in order to more properly understand the role of citizens in sustaining electoral particularism
and to shed light on the foundations of stigma against behaviors like vote buying. I argue that
voters assess the acceptability of individual transactions not in a vacuum but by examining
the specifics of the arrangement. I analyze various features of the transactions that may
change voter attitudes and predict that they discriminate based on the level at which benefits
are targeted, whether or not there is an explicit quid-pro-quo arrangement, the neediness
of the recipient, the political leanings of the recipient, whether the vote is monitored, and
the type of gift offered. The empirical evidence, drawn from two conjoint experiments,
suggests that voters in Brazil are more willing to punish candidates who offer benefits in
a manner that is coercive over the voter’s electoral choices. Specifically, respondents react
most negatively to hypothetical candidates that do vote buying compared to other types of
distribution like handouts and pork. Respondents were also quick to judge benefits given to
individuals rather than communities and offers which involve monitoring voting behavior,
particularly among opposition voters.
The results of this study shed light on a currently understudied aspect of the voter side
of elite-citizen linkages. This informs our understanding of party strategies in new and
developing democracies as well as the persistence of clientelism in countries with strong
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political institutions and a secret ballot. There appears to be less of a stigma against “vote
buying” when the quid-pro-quo nature of the exchange is not emphasized, which explains
why we continue to see clientelism-like behavior in areas where ballot integrity is respected.
Future scholarship should be explicit about the “variety” of nonprogrammatic distribution
they are describing – e.g. whether beneficiaries are individuals or groups, whether there are
explicit agreements, how behavior is monitored, etc. Each type involves a different type of
relationship between patron and client. Some of these relationships may be more normatively
troubling than others, and the set of factors that sustain or diminish each is unique.
Chapter 5
Why Do Candidates Give Handouts?
Explaining Unmonitored Gifts
5.1 Introduction
Why do parties choose to give electoral gifts without asking for a vote in return? The
strategic logic behind traditional vote buying is clear; gifts incentivize voters to support the
party, and parties have some means of monitoring and threatening their clients to ensure
they follow through on their promises. But when voters are free to take handouts and vote as
they wish, the purpose of the gifts is not immediately understood. One popular explanation
argues that the act of giving handouts transmits information about the politician; those who
give gifts are seen as more credible, skilled, and likely to win the election. Much of the
evidence for this theory comes from new and developing democracies.
In this chapter, I develop a theory, which predicts that the positive informational benefits
of handouts occur only for weak parties. Candidates that come from strong parties are
already seen as credible and electorally capable by virtue of their party’s label and resources.
I argue that, for candidates from strong parties, using handouts sends a negative signal about
the candidate’s competence and credibility. Those who need to use targeted benefits in spite
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of the other tools available to them through their party are seen as desperate and weak. I
test this using an original vignette survey experiment in Brazil.
The results show that voters have overwhelmingly negative reactions to politicians who
give handouts, even for candidates from weak parties. Though this does not completely
support the hypotheses, the results also call into question the validity of the positive in-
formational theory. Voters condemn handouts, not celebrate them. I conduct follow up
analysis that tests the predictions made by commonly held theories about handouts. I find
little support for these, either.
In further empirical analysis, I find that voters who perceive very little ideological differ-
ences between Brazil’s major parties are comparatively less likely to punish politicians for
giving handouts. This is consistent with my qualitative research, in which I find that the
institutional features of legislative elections in Brazil amplify the importance of individual,
face-to-face connections with voters. I suggest that handouts are a way for politicians to
establish that personal connection and differentiate themselves from the multitude of other
candidates competing in the election. I show that those who see few differences between
parties were significantly more likely to receive handout offers in the 2018 general elections.
However, more robust testing on a new sample is necessary to establish credibility for this
theory.
5.2 The Information Theory of Handouts
A recent set of studies have argued that parties and candidates often give targeted pre-
electoral benefits without explicitly asking for a vote in return (Hicken and Nathan 2019).
I call these benefits “handouts”. Handouts are almost exclusively discussed in the context
of contemporary democracies because modern parties are often incapable of violating the
secret ballot, which is how political machines of yesteryear sustained vote buying (quid-pro-
quo gifts) operations. This has puzzled political scientists because handouts seem like an
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ineffective campaign strategy at first glance; the benefactor faces a commitment problem
because they cannot guarantee that the recipients actually vote for the party in return for
the gift. A recent ongoing debate in the literature centers on explaining why clientelist
parties continue with targeted exchanges even when traditional, monitored vote buying is
infeasible.
One popular theory advances the idea that handouts are valuable tools for information
signaling. According to this idea, handouts do not necessarily make recipients more likely to
vote for the candidate, but they do build support indirectly by transmitting positive infor-
mation about the candidate. For example, they could make candidates’ campaign promises
more credible. Kramon (2016) shows through an experiment in Kenya that voters who learn
of a politician handing out cash at a rally were more likely to vote for the candidate and also
had higher prospective evaluations of the candidate compared to control. He argues that
this holds where distributive politics is non-programmatic; the delivery of the pre-election
gift demonstrates the politician’s ability and commitment to providing similar resources once
they are elected to office.
Handouts may also signal electoral strength to voters (Mun˜oz 2014, Schaffer and Schedler
2007). Handouts may not be useful for ensuring that citizens vote for the clientelist party,
but they can be used to induce conspicuous demonstrations of support, such as partici-
pation in rallies, placing advertisements on personal property, or doorknocking. Support
begets support; candidates who are perceived as likely winners attract attention from news
media, benefit-seeking donors, and strategic voters. Clientelistic rewards can also create a
“social multiplier” by inducing conversations among the payoff recipient’s personal networks,
attracting further attention (Schaffer and Baker 2015).
Other authors liken gift-giving to a prisoner’s dilemma; handouts have no discernible
effect on vote choice, and all parties would be better off if they did not provide particularist
benefits, but those that unilaterally choose not to lose credibility and are disregarded by
voters (Chauchard 2018; Guardado and Wantchekon 2018). Szwarcberg (2015) describes
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how the presence of “mercenary candidates” (those who are only interested in the material
payoffs from election or promotion) poisons the political well, so to speak; knowing that
poor voters will follow whomever provides them immediate benefits, honest or issue-focused
politicians are forced to engage in clientelism as well.
The results of the conjoint experiments in the previous chapter do not seem to support
this informational theory. Handouts, by and large, are seen as mostly unethical. They do
not significantly increase respondents’ views of hypothetical candidates and might even have
a negative effect on their likelihood of voting for the candidate. Kramon’s suggestion that
handouts indicate future redistribution to the poor is also inconsistent with my qualitative
findings. Voters in Brazil reported that they fear politicians who offer targeted benefits
during campaign season do so only to get elected and never return to the communities they
claim to represent.
The findings about the positive informational effects of handouts largely come from a
particular set of countries in which parties are weakly institutionalized, campaigns are per-
sonalist, and voters have little familiarity with their voting choices. In many new or devel-
oping democracies, where clientelism is most common, parties often have unclear ideological
platforms (Markowski 1997), there is little mass partisanship (Dalton and Weldon 2007),
elections are volatile (Lupu and Stokes 2010; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007), and voters care
mostly about valence issues rather than ideological ones (Ho et al. 2013).
One weak aspect of the informational theory is explaining why handouts are particularly
effective at delivering the relevant information. As Hicken and Nathan (2019) write, why
not deliver the same information about the candidate’s reputation or strength via a radio
ad? It is easy to imagine that handouts work well in new democracies, because voters lack
other information on which to base their electoral decisions. Often, voters do not yet have
a rapport with the candidates, ideological cleavages have not formed, and infrastructure to
campaign in more conventionally democratic ways has not developed.
I argue in this chapter that handouts are effective only for weak parties. Handouts help
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candidates via information delivery in weak party environments because voters do not have
other cues to help them make decisions. However, when other information is available,
I argue that handouts can have reverse informational effects : they send negative signals
about candidate competence and strength. As described above, in some countries like India
(Chauchard 2018) and Benin (Guardado and Wantechekon 2018), handouts have become so
pervasive in elections that those who do not give them immediately lose credibility. I claim
the opposite is also true; when other information about the candidate is available, handouts
tend to be viewed negatively.
This attitudinal change occurs because voters expect strong parties to campaign in more
sophisticated ways. Consider two meanings of the word “strong”. First, candidates who
come from parties with clear ideological brands are already perceived as somewhat competent
and viable1 by virtue of the strength of their party’s label. When those candidates choose
to distribute handouts, they signal to voters that they do not believe they are strong or
skilled enough to win based on their policy platform alone. Handouts are an “easy” political
tactic in the sense that they are simple, direct, and blunt. Voters expect that parties which
have strong ideological base will win votes by campaigning on their policy program. This
expectation is subverted when candidates use handouts, which are perceived as tools used
by parties and candidates with fewer resources and less experience.
Second, candidates who come from big parties (those with lots of resources) are generally
perceived as strong. It is more competitive to become nominated from such a party, lending
a prestige factor to the party label. Parties with larger budgets also can pay for things like
advertisements and rallies, and they have more infrastructure and organizational capacity. It
therefore seems like a sign of desperation when candidates from these parties use handouts,
which require little infrastructure, rather than using the platform provided to them by the
party. This theory produces the following hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: Voters are more likely to disapprove of candidates from parties with
1More precisely, more competent and viable than those who come from weak parties
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clear programmatic brands when they receive information that the candidate dis-
tributes electoral handouts.
• Hypothesis 2: Voters are more likely to disapprove of candidates from parties with
ample resources when they receive information that the candidate distributes electoral
handouts.
5.3 Empirical Analysis
5.3.1 Study Design and Data
To test the hypotheses, I use an original survey experiment. In it, respondents read a profile
of a fictitious candidate for state legislature. I vary the candidate’s party, their incumbency
status, and whether or not they give a handout. The vignette is worded as follows:
Imagine there is an election campaign happening in your state. A candidate for state deputy,
a member of the [PT/AVANTE/MDB/PCdoB], comes to your neighborhood. He is from a
different city in your state. [The candidate is currently completing his first term as a state
deputy; in the last election, he was elected by a small margin./In the last election, the
candidate ran for the same office, but lost the election by a small margin.] Prior to
entering politics, he worked as a teacher. The candidate states that, if elected, his main priorities
will be to improve education quality, promote economic growth, and fight corruption. To show his
commitment to his future constituents, he also states he will [always defend the best interests
of the citizens of your state/personally help people in your neighborhood to pay for
their energy bills this month].
In the vignette, the handout treatment is represented by the last sentence, in which
the politician offers to pay for individuals’ utility bills. This is based on an actual story I
observed while shadowing campaigns. For consistency, I chose a control condition with the
same lead-in but a generic promise about serving the constituency.
I chose four parties as treatments, all of which vary along two dimensions: size and
ideology. The PT is large, well-organized, and has a clear programmatic brand. The MDB
is the largest party in the country and is well-known, but it is a catch-all organization
without any clear ideological position. The PCdoB, the Communist Party of Brazil (not to
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be confused with the Brazilian Communist Party), is quite small but has a clear Marxist
ideology. Avante is small and has no clear ideological platform.




The incumbency treatment serves two purposes. First, I expect that respondents will
view those candidates who give handouts quite differently depending on whether they are
currently in office. If the candidate is an incumbent, it may imply that they are taking money
from the state to pay off political supporters, which presumably appears more corrupt than
using private campaign funds for the same purpose. Second, this allows me to compare the
effect of handout vis-a-vis other information cues. As outlined in the theory section, current
explanations of the returns of handouts do not do well to explain why handouts in particular
are effective information delivery mechanisms relative to other signals of candidate quality
and strength. Incumbency should give respondents the impression that the politician is
capable, competent, viable, and resourceful.
The outcomes of interest are a set of four-point Likert scale questions:
• Based on this information, how likely would you be to vote for this candidate?
• Would you say this person is a competent politician?
• If you had to guess, would you say this person could win this election?
• Based on this information, do you think this candidate would be a good representative
of your state?
• Based on this information, do you think this candidate would be a good representative
of your neighborhood?
• If you had to guess, how likely is it that this person is a supporter of President Bol-
sonaro?
The main outcome of interest is the respondents’ likelihood of voting for the candidate.
The rest of the questions are useful for testing mechanisms. Handouts may increase or
decrease the likelihood of voting for the candidate by changing their attitudes about the
politician’s competence, his ability to represent the state or a particular community, his
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electoral strength, or his ideological position.
I expect, consistent with the information theory, that handouts will significantly increase
respondents’ likelihood of voting for the candidate, as well as their evaluation of the can-
didate’s electoral strength and competence. However, I predict that the candidate’s party
moderates this relationship; handouts will be effective only for candidates who come from
weak parties. If Hypothesis 1 is true, the PT and the PCdoB will experience null or neg-
ative effects for giving handouts. If Hypothesis 2 is true, the PT and MDB will be judged
negatively for giving handouts relative to the PCdoB and AVANTE.
If it is true that voters want to support strong and competent candidates, respondents
should be more likely to vote for incumbents rather than non-incumbents. If my theory is
correct, incumbency status will moderate the effect of handouts; handouts are viewed more
negatively for incumbents.
The data for this study were collected from the 2019 nationwide survey of Brazilian voters
described in Chapter 4. The respondents, recruited by a survey firm, completed an online
questionnaire about various political topics. In total, 2026 valid responses were recorded.
As with many online samples, the respondents were slightly more wealthy and educated
than the national average. A fewer than expected number of respondents came from the
Southeast region of Brazil.
5.3.2 Results
Table 5.2 shows the main results of the survey experiment. The outcome in each is the
respondents likelihood of voting for the hypothetical candidate fitted on a numeric scale
ranging from 1 (“not at all likely”) to 4 (“very likely”). The average respondent had a rather
unfavorable rating of the politician, with a mean of 1.753, mode of 1 (“not at all likely”) and
median of 2 (“somewhat likely”) based on 2,018 observations. The explanatory variables
are all binary. Model 1 shows the bivariate relationship between handouts and candidate
evaluation, while Models 2 and 3 add all experimental conditions as well as interactions for
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party and incumbency, respectively. Avante (small, non-ideological) is the omitted reference
category for the party variable.
Table 5.2: Main Results of Survey Experiment (OLS)
Dependent variable:
Likelihood of Voting for Candidate (1-4)
(1) (2) (3)










Handout × MDB −0.031
(0.105)
Handout × PCdoB 0.299∗∗∗
(0.105)
Handout × PT 0.144
(0.106)
Handout × Incumbent 0.069
(0.075)
Constant 2.019∗∗∗ 2.120∗∗∗ 2.086∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.056) (0.049)
Observations 2,018 2,018 2,018
R2 0.093 0.102 0.097
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.098 0.094
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Looking first at the main effects, the results are quite surprising. Contrary to expectations
based on the information theory, handouts significantly lowered respondents’ evaluations
of the candidate in all models; candidates who give handouts are judged more negatively
by over a half a point on the four-point likelihood scale. It seems that the sample leans
right: The average evaluation is quite low, and respondents were significantly less likely to
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express support for a candidate from the leftist PCdoB or PT. The coefficient for incumbency
is basically zero, indicating that respondents on average do not notice or value previous
experience in office.
I find no support for the hypotheses. In Model 2, the interactions between handouts
and partisanship are either non-significant or the opposite of what was predicted. The
significant and positive handout × PCdoB coefficient, as well as the positive interaction for
PT, indicate that respondents judge handouts less harshly if they come from the ideological
parties. Follow up analysis (not shown) reveals that this effect probably has more to do
with the PCdoB and PT being leftist rather than ideological per se. I split respondents by
their opinion of the ideological platform of the leftist PT, either postive, negative, or neutral,
and reestimated Model 2 on each. Among PT opponents, there were positive and significant
coefficients for the PCdoB and PT interaction terms, while the coefficients were near zero for
supporters and the indifferent. This suggests that right-leaning voters temper their negative
attitudes toward parties they disagree with if they can benefit from them in the form of
immediate payouts. However, it is important to keep in mind the relative magnitude of these
effects. By adding together the coefficients, we see that a typical respondent who receives
the handout and PCdoB treatment rates their likelihood of voting for the candidate as 1.55,
or somewhere between “not at all likely” and “somewhat likely”. There is no significant
interaction between incumbency and giving handouts.
I next examine the mechanisms that link handouts to the main outcome variable. Cor-
relations between respondents answers to the questions about the candidate are shown in
Figure 5.1. All variables are positively correlated.2 According to simple and multivariate lin-
ear regressions, every evaluation category, besides respondents’ perception of the candidate’s
support of president Bolsonaro, was significantly and positively related to their likelihood of
voting for the candidate. In other words, respondents are more likely to vote for a candidate
they see as strong, likely to win the election, and a good representative of their state and
2Higher values indicate greater probability of support, winning, and supporting Bolsonaro and better
ratings on competence and quality of representation
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community. Of course, given these are associations between attitudes based on questions
asked in succession, it is impossible to say which direction the causal arrows point.
Figure 5.1: Correlations Between Post-Treatment Outcome Questions
I next estimate simple linear regressions using the handout treatment as a predictor and
the various mechanism questions as outcomes. Results show that voters who receive the
handout treatment rate the candidate as less competent and a worse representative of their
state and community. There is no statistically significant relationship between the candidate
giving a handout and the respondents’ belief that the candidate supports Bolsonaro or that
he is likely to win the election.
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5.4 Testing Alternative Explanations
In this section, I test whether there is empirical support for a number of explanations of
the benefits of handouts. I find little evidence consistent with any particular theory of why
candidates choose to give handouts. Based on further exploration of the data, I identify
one variable that may provide a clue about party strategy with respect to handouts in
Brazil: Respondents who perceive little difference between Brazil’s major parties both have
relatively more favorable views towards candidates that give handouts and were more likely
to report receiving a handout during the 2018 election. This is consistent with findings from
my qualitative research indicating that politicians use particularist benefits to stand out in
a crowded candidate marketplace.
5.4.1 Credibility
Kramon (2016) asserts that handouts generate positive returns by demonstrating candidates’
ability and commitment to bringing future provisions to the poor once in office. In his
experiment, respondents were significantly more likely to rate a politician as credible if they
heard that he or she gave away money freely at a campaign event.
The results of my survey are in direct opposition to these findings. In the survey experi-
ment, respondents thought of those who give handouts as less competent and worse potential
representatives of their state and community. The handout treatment was the most consis-
tent and strong explanatory variable in predicting likelihood of voting for the candidate,
and the sign was always negative. When asked directly if they believe it is acceptable for
politicians to offer presents to voters even without asking for a vote in return, 59.5% of
respondents described the practice as “completely unacceptable”. As outlined in Chapter 4,
the great majority of those who accepted handouts in the 2018 election were inclined to lie
about it. All of this suggests that handouts are shunned rather than celebrated, providing
evidence that the credibility theory does not apply in the case of Brazil.
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It could be argued that my findings simply reflect social desirability bias rather than
true belief among voters. However, even if the results are purely driven by concerns about
social norms, they still provide evidence against the credibility hypothesis, which suggests
that politicians openly and enthusiastically advertise their handouts. If the sole purpose
of giving away cash is to show off the candidate’s finesse in securing resources for her con-
stituents, naturally she would want to publicize any handout she gives, which is inconsistent
with a political culture in which handouts are shunned. Additionally, I use the same type
of estimation strategy that Kramon relied upon to provide empirical evidence for the credi-
bility theory. Finally, my qualitative work is consistent with the finding that voters disliked
electoral gifts, whether there is a quid-pro-quo or not. Interviewees expressed dissatisfaction
that politicians cater to individual interests rather than the community or public as a whole.
5.4.2 Electoral Strength
Another branch of the information theory advances the idea that handouts signal electoral
strength, which generates attention and further support from media, donors, activists, and
strategic voters (Mun˜oz 2014; Schaffer and Schedler 2007). The survey experiment does not
rule out this possibility, but initial evidence is not supportive. Contrary to expectation,
there is actually a negative (non-significant) correlation between the handout treatment
and the respondents’ perception of the candidate’s likelihood of success in the election.
Incumbency should also be a relatively strong cue of electoral strength, but it does not
seem to significantly increase support for the candidate. The respondents’ perception of the
candidate’s likelihood of victory does emerge as a significant predictor of their probability
of voting for the candidate. However, it is difficult to assess which attitude causes which;
respondents may support a candidate because they are likely to win, or those who like a
particular candidate might say they are strong because of motivated reasoning or a halo effect.
This survey experiment cannot rule out this electoral strength theory because handouts may
help candidates in indirect ways, liking increasing name recognition or attracting donations,
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that are not captured by this strategy. The evidence for any direct effect of handouts on
electoral support, though, is lacking, especially considering the large overall negative impact
of handouts on the main outcome variable.
5.4.3 Turf Protection
A group of studies allege that handouts should be considered a form of “turf protection”, or
a means by which parties prevent defection from loyal supporters (Hicken et. al 2019; Diaz-
Cayeros et al. 2016; Nichter and Peress 2017). Where clientelism is or has been common, core
party supporters feel they should be the primary beneficiaries of party largess. If candidates
are not able to fulfill their requests or demands, voters threaten to abandon the party and
vote for someone else. This creates a suboptimal equilibrium for parties; all would be better
off if they did not provide particularist benefits, but each is worse off if they unilaterally
choose to stop giving gifts (Chauchard 2018). Some research has found that handouts have
no measurable effect on turnout or vote choice, but that those who do not engage in gift-
giving behavior are disregarded by voters (Guardado and Wantchekon 2018).
If this theory is true, respondents should report that they received handouts mostly
from candidates that they already know – specifically, those they have supported in the
past. To test this, I asked respondents who indicated that they received a handout offer
during the 2018 elections to identify the benefactor: whether the politician is someone they
previously supported, someone they previously opposed, or someone they had not previously
known. Table 5.3 shows the number of respondents who reported that they received an
electoral gift offer (vote buying or handout) by their view of the politician that offered it to
them. The results show that the majority of beneficiaries of handouts and vote buying were
voters who previously did not know the benefactor candidate. Contrary to prediction, only
about a quarter (26.5%) of those who reported receiving a handout in 2018 were previous
supporters of the candidate. A roughly equal number were previous opponents. There are
also no significant differences between the distributions between handouts and vote buying.
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If handouts are intended to retain supporters, so are vote buying offers. These results do
not necessarily disprove the turf protection theory, but the empirical evidence is inconsistent
with its hypotheses.

















Another theory of handouts, which is based on evidence from Brazil, contends that voters
accept benefits from politicians in order to gain leverage over them (Borges 2018). By es-
tablishing a pre-election link with a politician, those who receive assistance and promise to
vote for the candidate can more easily extract resources from elites once they are elected to
office. By claiming that they helped the candidate get elected, and relying on the personal
relationship they have built, voters legitimize their requests for larger distributions down
the road. Borges argues that voters in Brazil see politicians and the bureaucracy as funda-
mentally unreliable stewards, so their best option for problem-solving is to rely on personal
connections with those in power.
To explore the validity this theory, I derive a testable hypothesis about those who ac-
cept handouts. This theory implies that accepting handouts makes it easier for citizens to
solve future problems because they have established a personal connection with someone in
power. In the survey, in addition to the questions about receiving handout and vote buying
offers in the previous year’s election, I asked respondents about their experience solving per-
sonal problems over the previous year. Respondents were asked to state if they had sought
assistance in enrolling a child in public school, accessing medical care at a local clinic, or
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obtaining a utility service from local government. Follow up questions asked them to name
the person or agency they sought for help with the problem and to say how easy or difficult
it was to obtain this service (four-point Likert scale).
I predict that those who admit to accepting a handout will report having an easier time
resolving their problem. I estimate separate regressions using the ease of resolution questions
as numeric outcome variables and the self-reported handout offer as the main explanatory
variable. I also estimate models with three control variables added: income, education, and
political ideology (using as a proxy favorability toward the platform of the leftist PT party).
The n for each model varies because each model is estimated using only respondents that
said 1) they sought help for a problem and 2) responded to the handout question.
Table 5.4: Effects of Handouts on Ease of Problem Resolution (0-3; OLS)
Dependent variable:
School Enrollment Medical Service Utility Repair
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Handout (0/1) −0.248 −0.160 −0.118 −0.012 0.015 0.128
(0.171) (0.174) (0.138) (0.137) (0.223) (0.233)
Income (0-16) 0.021∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.011) (0.007) (0.014)
Education (0-18) 0.012 0.015∗ 0.014
(0.013) (0.008) (0.017)
PT Favorability (0-4) −0.015 0.026 −0.056
(0.044) (0.026) (0.051)
Constant 1.958∗∗∗ 1.664∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 1.485∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.184) (0.034) (0.116) (0.070) (0.254)
Observations 290 288 818 813 183 181
R2 0.007 0.032 0.001 0.045 0.00003 0.018
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.018 −0.0003 0.040 −0.005 −0.004
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The results, as shown in Table 5.4, do not support the hypothesis. The handout coefficient
is non-significant across all models. This coefficient is actually negative in four models; those
who report receiving a handout offer say they had a more difficult time enrolling children
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in schools and accessing a medical service. The wealthy and highly educated tend to more
easily resolve their problems. Though this does not disprove the leverage buying theory, the
empirical evidence is not consistent with its predictions.
5.4.5 Standing Out
The 2019 Brazil survey reveals that many politicians offered handouts to voters in the 2018
campaign season, but there is little empirical evidence supporting any existing proposed
explanation of the purpose of handouts. As Hicken and Nathan (2019) write, it is important
to not just identify the benefit of handouts in a vacuum, but explain their yield or efficiency
relative to other possible campaign tactics. In other words, why spend one dollar on targeted,
individual benefits rather than advertisements, rallies, or meet-and-greets? With this in
mind, I propose an additional explanation for the benefits of handouts that is based on
posthoc empirical analysis: Relative to programmatic strategies, handouts become more
attractive the less voters perceive major ideological differences between parties or candidates.
According to democratic theory, voters should select the candidate that most closely
reflects their ideological or policy preferences. However, voters may be presented with a
situation in which two or more candidates have quite similar ideologies. This may occur
due to strategic reasons, like when two parties converge to the median voter’s preferences, or
when there is uncertainty about the party’s true ideological preferences. Voters may perceive
few differences between the parties or candidates competing in any given election due to a
number of individual-level factors; perhaps they have low political interest or knowledge or
they are simply cynical about political elites and institutions. These issues may be amplified
in new or developing democracies, where parties have not established strong or consistent
reputations, ideological cleavages have not formed or deepened, and mass partisanship is low
(Dalton and Weldon 2007; Ho et al. 2013; Lupu and Stokes 2010; Mainwaring and Zoco
2007; Markowski 1997).
These situations, in which voters perceive no major differences between competitors,
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provide strong incentives for personalism. Candidates need a way to differentiate themselves
from the rest of the field because programmatic appeals are likely to fail. Campaign strategies
that emphasize ideological appeals, position taking, or issue advocacy are less effective for
these voters because they believe there are alternative candidates offering the same policy
package. Candidates then find ways to stand out amongst the field of like-minded parties,
such as highlighting previous experience, adopting anti-institutionalist stances, capitalizing
on name recognition, or advertising pork.
My qualitative research shadowing campaigns during the 2018 elections in Brazil revealed
that politicians struggle to even be recognized by voters. Institutional features and electoral
laws make reputation building difficult. Legislators are elected in a state-wide open-list
proportional representation system, and barriers to entry are low. This causes the electoral
field to be very crowded; hundreds, sometimes thousands, of candidates enter state and
federal lower house elections. There are dozens of parties, many of which have inconsistent
ideological platforms. One factor that contributes to this phenomenon is the fact that the
open list rule also forces candidates to compete against one another in the public sphere.
Strict campaign finance laws governing how candidates are allowed to raise and spend funds
mean candidates often lack a platform to advertise themselves or their ideas. Parties and
candidates cannot buy more TV or radio airtime than they are allotted by law based on their
vote share in previous elections. More so than in other democracies, campaigns in Brazil
are won on the ground. Candidates need to establish personal connections with voters via
grassroots campaign or extensive campaigning networks that reach individual communities.
Handouts represent one means of creating these individual connections. Other authors
have suggested that politicians give handouts to convey information about themselves, such
as their credibility or electoral strength. While these may true, their true purpose may be
much simpler: to help make themselves more memorable to voters. Freely distributing gifts
at rallies and other campaign events can help draw voters in and create interest and buzz
for the candidate. Moreover, gifts and favors often require individualized attention, which
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builds a personal relationship and provides a reason for future contact between the campaign
and voters.
These effects are amplified for voters that see little ideological differences between the
candidates. Because they have no strong prior preferences over the field, it is easier to
convince them to vote for the benefactor candidate. Scholars of clientelism have intensely
debated how parties are able to ensure that those who take vote buying rewards actually
fulfill their end of the bargain when the ballot is secret; why do voters not simply take the
benefit and vote as they wish? When the voter lacks preferences over the field, however, one
could ask the opposite question: Why would a voter not vote for the party that gave them
something for their vote? The voter faces no conscience cost for abandoning their “true
preference”, but could face some psychological cost from accepting a gift and not returning
the favor. Even if the gift generates no feeling of indebtedness, the handout may simply
make the candidate more memorable. Where voting is compulsory, as it is in Brazil, voters
cast plenty of ballots for more arbitrary reasons.
To provide evidence for this theory, I again rely on the 2019 survey of Brazilian voters.
To measure voters’ views of the differences between parties, I ask respondents to place six
parties3 on an ideological scale ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right). I then take the
standard deviation of all of each person’s ratings. Respondents are allowed two “don’t
know” options (I’m unfamiliar with this party; I don’t know this party’s ideology). These
are excluded from the standard deviation calculation. If the respondent answers “don’t
know” to all parties, I impute a value of zero; I see not knowing the ideology of any party
as functionally equivalent to thinking all parties have the same ideology.4 It is important
to note that there is not a significant associate between the party placement variable and
either education or income, which diminishes the possibility that this variable is a proxy for
something else like political knowledge.
If the theory I have outlined above is true, those who see fewer differences between
3The four used in the survey experiment (PT, MDB, PCdoB, AVANTE) and two others (PSL, PSDB)
4Results are robust to excluding these NAs and imputing mean and median values.
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parties should be relatively more likely to vote for someone based on a handout. Put another
way, those who see greater differences between parties should be relatively more likely to
condemn handouts. Thus, in the framework of the survey experiment, I expect there to
be an interaction between the party differences variable and the handout treatment: the
handout effect should be more negative for those who score high on the difference variable.
Table 5.5 shows the results of OLS models that include the interaction term between
the handout treatment and the party differences variable. For easier interpretation, I also
estimate a separate model that treats the party difference variable as binary (split at the
median). The coefficient for the handout treatment is negative and highly significant as it
is in Table 5.2. As expected, the interaction terms for both models are also negative and
significant; the negative effect of handout on likelihood of voting for the candidate is greater
for those who see large ideological differences between parties. In other words, all voters
react negatively to information about handouts, though the effect is significantly attenuated
for voters who see little differences between parties.
This shows that those who see little differences between parties are potentially more
receptive to handouts, but it does not mean parties actually target these “low difference”
voters. Having found initial evidence for the theory, I investigate whether these voters were
actually more likely to receive handouts in the 2018 election. To do so, I estimate a logistic
regression model using as a dependent variable whether or not the respondent reported
receiving a handout offer. I estimate one model with the numeric differences variable alone
and one with three control variables added: income, education, and political ideology as
measured by favorability toward the leftist PT platform.
The results, as shown in Table 5.6, indicate that there is a significant negative relationship
between the differences and handout variables; that the greater the respondent’s perception
that there are ideological differences between the parties, the less likely they are to receive
a handout (p = 0.001, 0.060). The predicted probability of receiving a handout drops from
0.093 when respondents see no differences between parties (Differences = 0) to 0.022 when the
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Table 5.5: Perception of Party Differences Conditions Effect of Handouts
Dependent variable:
















Handout x Diffs (Numeric) −0.042∗∗
(0.020)






Adjusted R2 0.096 0.096
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Log Likelihood −261.899 −250.561
Akaike Inf. Crit. 527.798 511.123
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
differences variable is at its maximum (7.071). Income, education, and being left-of-center
also seem to be negatively associated with receiving handout offers.
5.5 Conclusion
Parties and candidates in Brazil frequently give electoral gifts without explicitly asking for
a vote in return. Much scholarly attention has been paid to explaining why these electoral
handouts are still effective campaign strategies even when ballot secrecy prevents parties
from monitoring the voting behavior of gift recipients. One key explanation has to do
with the informational effects of gift-giving; some researchers argue that the true returns
from giving handouts come from second-order effects, in that they show others that the
candidate is capable, committed to redistributing resources to the poor, and/or likely to win
the election. The findings from the previous chapter of this dissertation are not consistent
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with this explanation; handouts seem to have null or negative effects on voters’ attitudes
toward candidates.
In this chapter, I propose that the positive informational payoffs from handouts hold only
for weak parties. Candidates from strong parties have other technologies for establishing rep-
utations for credibility and electoral strength, including a greater amount of resources, their
well-known party label, and more extensive organizational capacity. A survey experiment
designed to test this theory shows no support for the hypotheses. No matter the party,
respondents have an overwhelmingly negative reaction to candidates giving handouts. This
not only disproves my theory but provides evidence against the arguments for the positive
informational payoffs of handouts. Further analysis shows no strong empirical support for
several popular explanations of the benefits of handouts.
In follow up analysis, I find that voters who see few ideological differences between parties
are less likely to condemn handouts and more likely to be targeted with offers by candidates.
I argue that this occurs because programmatic appeals become less effective when voters
believe several candidates offer the same policy package. Handouts may be advantageous over
other forms of personalism because they allow politicians to establish a stronger individual
connection with voters, which I found in my qualitative research to be essential to establishing
any sort of name recognition and ultimately to win legislative elections in Brazil. This idea
follows the theory laid out by Pava˜o (2018) who asserts that corrupt politicians in Brazil
survive because voters think corruption is a constant among all politicians and thus no honest
alternatives exist.
Because this finding is posthoc, further analysis on a new sample is necessary to establish
credibility for the theory. This could be assessed with a modification of the survey experiment
in this paper that varies a politician’s ideology or policy positions along with whether or not
they give handouts, in addition to more direct questions probing respondents’ beliefs about
the (dis)similarity between parties in their country. Although the hypotheses were not
supported, the findings provide reason to be skeptical of current explanations of handouts.
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Empirical evidence is not consistent with existing theories, indicating the need for further
study of the phenomenon of non-quid-pro-quo electoral gifts.
Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks and Implications
for Democracy and Policy
Voters often make electoral decisions based on a variety of nonprogrammatic considerations
in addition to their beliefs about the parties’ or candidates’ policy platforms. This often
includes targeted pre-election distribution, or the delivery of largess to voters with the intent
of building or maintaining popularity. It is common for politicians in many countries to
distribute cash or other material benefits to individual voters in exchange for their vote. As
recent scholarship has shown, they may also offer the same benefits even without asking for
votes in return. Community-level vote buying, in which candidates provided resources to
areas that promise to deliver a certain amount of support, is also part of many candidates’
mix of campaign strategies, along with pork barrel projects.
In both academic circles and ordinary political discourse, there is a strong belief that
electoral competition based on ideologically distant policy proposals is superior to campaign
appeals based on nonprogrammatic considerations. Clientelism, especially when used as a
substitute for above-board forms of distribution, is typically considered to be a departure
from ideal democratic practice. As Larry Diamond noted in a 2007 lecture, “There is a
specter haunting democracy in the world today. It is of bad governance... Governance that
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is drenched in corruption, patronage, favoritism, and abuse of power.” Although the vast
majority of countries in the world today have at least nominally democratic institutions,
many of those in power corrupt the democratic process by pursuing personal rather than
collective objectives. Clientelism, in which the criteria for receiving redistribution is political
and requires reciprocal action from voters, could be considered an example of such corruption
because it forces both elites and voters to privilege their individual welfare at the expense
of the collective interest. Scholars have advanced three main arguments to make this case.
First, clientelism distorts the accountability relationship between politicians and voters.
In classic models of democratic accountability, citizens decide whether or not to reelect an
incumbent politician by casting retrospective judgments of their representatives’ performance
(Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986, Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999). In anticipation of this
judgment – and the possibility of losing office – politicians exert effort in office and enact
the program preferred by the median voter. Clientelism destroys the accountability function
of elections by preventing citizens from making an autonomous voting decision. If citizens
fear losing out on material payoffs by not voting for their patron, they will not use the ballot
to express their true preferences (Lyne 2007). In turn, politicians will not feel compelled to
appeal to the median voter; to stay in power, they just need to distribute a sufficient amount
of targeted goods and find a way to punish individuals that do not fulfill their end of the
bargain. Thus, clientelism unduly influences electoral choices made by voters, limiting their
freedom of expression (Schaffer 2007a). This inverts the accountability relationship between
the representatives and the represented – voters must prove their loyalty to politicians rather
than politicians demonstrating competence to their electorate (Stokes 2005).
Second, clientelism produces efficiency losses because it shifts politicians’ focus to a nar-
row interest group rather than the public as a whole. Once in office, candidates who win
elections by buying votes focus on rewarding or expanding their clientele rather than pro-
viding public goods or passing legislation that the electorate prefers. This argument has
two distinction flavors in the literature. The first argues vote buyers tend to unfairly am-
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 144
plify the voices of their clients (Baland and Robinson 2007). These representatives may
propose policies that benefit only their narrow base, or they may abandon the normal leg-
islative arena entirely in order to seek pork and patronage for their followers (Desposato
2007; Keefer 2007). The second variety of this argument claims that vote buyers silence the
voices of their clients (Stokes 2007; Stokes et al. 2013). Because parties can win the support
of vote sellers just through delivery of some benefit, they have no incentive to account for
those voters’ opinions. This is especially unjust as parties usually target underprivileged
groups of voters like the poor and uneducated. Thus, clientelist parties can buy the votes
of the poor and cater their policy program to the interests of the rich (Hasen 2000, Karlan
1994). Levitsky (2003) shows how this happened with the Peronist Party in Argentina. The
expansion of neoliberalism in the late 1980s led to simultaneous growth of both white collar
workers and an urban, informal-sector poor working class. The PJ, which had roots in orga-
nized labor, responded to these demographic shifts by coupling a free market platform with
material vote buying in order to appeal to both groups. In both flavors of this argument,
one group’s preferences are being disregarded by elected officials. Equality before the law,
and more specifically the principle of “one person, one vote”, lies at the heart of democracy;
clientelism demands inequity.
Finally, some researchers claim that clientelism is unjust because it is intricately linked
with corruption. Because some clientelist activities (e.g. vote buying) are illegal, clientelism
fosters a culture of impunity by eliminating the accountability function of elections, and de-
mand for resources necessary for clientelist benefits leads politicians to obtain funds through
illicit means (Singer 2009). Other researchers have discovered links between clientelist par-
ties and organized crime (Gay 1990; Szwarcberg 2015). Epstein (1985, p. 987) makes the
argument that even in the case where gifts are paid for privately, vote buying promotes
rent-seeking as it leads those in power to use public coffers to “recoup their losses” and pay
back their brokers and supporters.
The empirical results of this study, particularly those in Chapter 4, indicate that voters
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have beliefs about clientelism that seem to reflect the first argument. The types of behavior
that are deemed most unacceptable are those in which politicians exert influence over the
political behavior of ordinary citizens. This includes requesting or demanding a vote in
return for the payment, targeting individuals rather than groups, monitoring the recipient’s
behavior, giving benefits to political opponents rather than supporters, and offering cash
instead of material gifts or favors. The basis of the first argument outlined above is that
clientelist politicians somehow force the hand of voters, preventing them from expressing
their “real” preference.
The study provides mixed evidence on whether voters agree with the second and third
arguments. Voters indicated, both in the qualitative interviews and in the conjoint ex-
periments, that offering benefits to specific people is more unethical than giving analogous
benefits to communities or groups of voters, even when both are given in exchange for po-
litical support. When the recipient is a group, politicians must answer to a wider range of
voters, and they usually cannot exclude people from enjoying the clientelist benefit even if it
was given for political reasons. The magnitude of the individual-group effect in the experi-
ments, however, were less strong than other considerations. If voters believed that clientelist
benefits were likely to silence the voices of clients, I would expect that respondents would
react more strongly to situations in which the client is poor rather than wealthy. The results
did not bear out this hypothesis; respondents were actually slightly more willing to tolerate
gifts to the poor. As for the third argument, if voters agreed that clientelism is intricately
tied with corruption, I would expect that respondents would see electoral gifts coming from
incumbents as more unjust than those from non-incumbents, as voters would infer that
the gifts were financed by public money. The survey experiment described in Chapter 5
in fact showed no such result. Respondents barely reacted to the hypothetical candidate’s
incumbency status, especially when it was interacted with the handout treatment.
How are we to view non-clientelist, nonprogrammatic targeted distribution normatively?
I contend that each of these concerns is significantly diminished if there is no quid-pro-quo.
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Recipients of handouts and pork are not required to reciprocate the gift or favor in order
to receive it. Theoretically, voters can take handouts from all parties that offer them and
vote with their conscience. Umbers (2018) makes a compelling case that the ethical problem
with vote buying is that it involves a “failure of respect for persons as autonomous agents”
(561). His argument is that the vote buyer demands the voter enter into a contractual
arrangement to support the candidate, which implies that the voter may not consider any
alternatives. This demonstrates a lack of respect for the voter as an autonomous agent who,
by virtue of being the ultimate authority in a democracy, has the right to freely deliberate,
express, advocate, and endorse. Umbers’ case rests on his perception that vote buying is
akin to a contractual agreement, in which support is exchanged for some reward. Without
the contigency requirement, though, the gift comes with no strings attached, and voters are
free to consider other options. Thus, autonomy is respected.
Even though there is no explicit quid-pro-quo, handouts may be objectionable because
they still influence voters’ behavior through generating a feeling of indebtedness or some other
mechanism. Indeed, as I outline in Chapter 5, this is what many respondents fear happens
when voters accept gifts from politicians. Even if this is true, I argue it is not necessarily
morally objectionable. This is because handouts influence rather than pre-determine voter
behavior. Candidates must always offer something to their constituents for their support.
Often this takes the form of a policy package that the candidate promises to implement
once they are elected. To advertise their programs, candidates will hold rallies, launch ad
campaigns, participate in debates, or make speeches. All of these campaign tactics are
designed to influence voters’ opinions about candidates. It would be unreasonable to suggest
that these are unjust for this reason. Democratic theorists have argued that voters will cast
ballots for incumbent politicians if they judge that the candidate has performed well in their
previous term. This is the same sort of judgment that voters make when they vote for a
candidate because they were offered a handout. In an open and fair election, voters have the
right to enter a voting booth and fill out their ballot however they desire, for any reason. As
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long as their hand is not forced, it cannot be said that electoral gifts invert the accountability
relationship between citizens and elites in the same way that vote buying does.
It is also difficult to say that non-contingent gifts force politicians to cater to any specific
group at the expense of others. Because there is no monitoring, politicians who give handouts
cannot be certain who their “clients” are, unlike with clientelist machines. Likewise, they
cannot deliver rewards or punishments based on the behavior of specific individuals or groups.
Non-contingent gifts influence rather than circumvent or ignores voters’ decisions at the
ballot box. As the opening vignette to this dissertation demonstrates, moreover, handouts
are practically a requirement to succeed in certain countries due to rising expectations and
the dynamics of electoral competition. Various studies have suggested that, rather than elites
using targeted distribution of benefits to exploit certain classes, citizens are often the ones
demanding material goods or requesting favors from politicians (Chauchard 2018; Guardado
and Wantchekon 2018; Nichter and Peress 2017; Szwarcberg 2015). A working paper by
Rizzo (2020) argues that citizens request individual help from politicians because the costs
of working through official bureaucratic channels are too high. This echos Auyero (2000)
who explains that clientelist brokers act as problem-solvers for people who have no other
options. In the absence of the electoral incentive for handouts, those citizens may be left to
go without.
It is also important to keep in mind that the absence of targeted benefit distribution does
not guarantee purely programmatic elections. Electoral rules quite often provide incentives
for politicians to appeal to niche groups rather than the median voter. In elections where
voter turnout is low and/or the number of seats available is high, moreover, programmatic
candidates too appeal only to the interests of a narrow slice of the overall constituency. Voters
also do not always vote for the candidate or party that most closely reflects their ideological
beliefs. Some vote strategically, others care about the personality of the candidates, and still
others punish incumbents for rather arbitrary reasons like floods, sports team losses, and
shark attacks.
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The argument about corruption is difficult to disentangle. It is an empirical question
whether non-quid-pro gifts encourage private enrichment. It would stand to reason, however,
that handouts are less likely to foster a “culture of impunity” compared to vote buying.
Handouts, since they are not quid-pro-quo, are technically not illegal in most countries.
Handouts do not require extensive broker networks like clientelism does, meaning that they
require fewer resources and potentially create less of an incentive to steal from public coffers.
Non-conditional gifts overall are less heavy-handed than clientelist carrots, so politicians
are probably less likely to rely on nefarious intermediaries like those with connections to
organized crime.
The empirical results of this dissertation shed further light on the implications of handouts
for democracy. Chapter 3 shows that the wealthy and highly educated are much more likely
to receive handouts than those with low SES. A common criticism levied against vote buying
is that it is exploitative of the needy and uneducated; parties target these voters because
they are easier to pay off and have weaker attitudes about democratic elections. One cannot
make this case about handouts.
Another important finding comes from Chapter 5, which is that those who are targeted
with handouts tend to see fewer ideological differences between major Brazilian parties.
Voters in clientelist arrangements face a difficult choice between accepting a vote buying
benefit and voting with their conscience. Rationally, clientelist parties should primarily
target with rewards those are weakly ideologically opposed to their party (Stokes 2005).
Those who are relatively close to the party will vote for them anyway, rendering the reward
useless, while those who are strongly opposed to the party will be costly to pay off. Thus, if we
accept this model, vote buying causes people to switch their vote from their true ideological
preference; a troubling idea for those who believe in democracy. Consider an alternative
situation in which the voter has no strict ideological preferences about the parties competing
in the election. This fundamentally alters the dynamic of the gift exchange. The voter has
no true preference to express and thus faces no “conscience cost” to accepting a benefit.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 149
This significantly diminishes any ethical criticism against handouts on the grounds that it
prevents voters from an making an autonomous electoral decision.
Before condemning handouts and launching anti-gift-giving campaigns, as several scholars
and international NGOs have done, it is important to understand the meaning of handouts in
a given context. In Kenya, handouts offer crucial information about the ability of politicians
to provide future resources to the poor (Kramon 2016). Taiwanese candidates give gifts to
voters as a sign of respect and virtue (Rigger 1994, 219). An anti-vote-selling “education
campaign” failed to meet its objectives in the Philippines due to perceived insensitivity and
judgment by foreign organizations (Schaffer 2007b). The results from Chapter 4 demonstrate
that voters see ethical gray areas in different types of distribution, and researchers and
democracy promoters should be cognizant of these cultural realities.
There is strong potential for fascinating and fruitful research debates about non-contingent
targeted distribution. The question of why parties choose to invest in handouts even though
they cannot guarantee a return on investment is still unresolved. Hicken and Nathan (2020)
provide a nice overview of the literature’s discussion of party strategy with respect to hand-
outs. It does not seem that any one explanation can provide a complete explanation for the
logic of handouts. In contrast to vote buying, where the purpose is clear, it is possible that
handouts generate positive payoffs for parties through several different channels: generating
feelings of goodwill and reciprocity, allowing the candidate to be taken seriously or be talked-
about by voters, signaling strength, enhancing beliefs in the provision of future resources,
offering information about candidate credibility, preventing defection of supporters who re-
quest services, and so on. Future research should pay particular attention to the context
under study and how political, economic, and social factors interact with the purpose of
handouts. Offering cash at a rally may be viewed as “entry fee” in India (Chauchard 2018),
a credibility signaling device in Kenya (Kramon 2016), a way to build reciprocity in Peru
(Finan and Schechter 2012), or an unethical form of bribery in Brazil (Chapters 2 and 4
here).
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Future work should pay close attention to the differences between different types of
nonprogrammatic, targeted distribution. Too often, behaviors of different classes are lumped
together leading to confusion and misleading results. Researchers must, in particular, be clear
whether they are speaking about vote buying or handouts, meaning they need to observe
or measure the quid-pro-quo nature of the exchange. This dissertation has shown that both
can be viable election strategies in the same election.
More research should be devoted to voters understanding of targeted community benefits,
including pork and community clientelism. Much of the literature draws a contrast between
programmatic politics and clientelism, leaving these group-based distributions in an awkward
middle space. It is clear that there are strong societal stigmas against vote buying and the
democratic ideal is purely policy and ideology based electoral competition. But few studies
have examined public opinion about pork and community clientelism. Does the clientelism
stigma extend to politically-determined, localized project funding? Do voters see pork as a
necessary part of constituency service or an example of wasteful government spending? Voter
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Chapter 8
Appendix A: Interview Questionnaire
1. On a scale of 1 to 10, how interested are you in politics?
2. What would you say is the most important issue facing the country today?
(a) What needs to be done to solve this issue?
3. What would you say is the most important issue facing your community here in [neigh-
borhood]?
(a) What needs to be done to solve this issue?
4. What bothers you most about politics?
5. What do you wish your elected representatives would do better?
6. We would like to talk more specifically about elections and campaigns. Thinking
specifically about state and federal deputies, where there are so many candidates to
choose from, what would you say are the most important qualities or issues that you
look for in a candidate?
7. (For Rio de Janiero) Now we would like to ask you about some situations that some-
times occur in Brazil. Last month, in a neighborhood in Zona Oeste, an ex-vereadora
was found to be distributing vegetables to residents of her neighborhood. In return for
the vegetables, the vereadora asked the recipients to vote for her brother, a candidate
for federal deputy. In Baixada Fluminese, a candidate for state deputy offered to help
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some voters jump in a line for a surgery in exchange for their vote. Have you observed
or heard of situations like this here in Rio de Janeiro, where a politician or their oper-
atives offers voters some type of gift or service in exchange for their vote? [if no – they
are not very common, but according to the Public Ministry of Rio, these exchanges
were much more widespread this year than they have been in previous elections].
(a) In general, do you think these types of exchanges are beneficial or harmful to your
neighborhood/city? Why?
i. (if harmful) What do you think can be done to help solve this problem?
ii. (if harmful) Do you think there are things regular voters like you can do to
prevent these exchanges?
8. It sometimes happens that politicians help finance community improvement projects,
like construction of new roads, schools, hospitals, etc. in areas where they received
many votes during the election. Have you observed or heard of deputies or senators
that reward their supporters by sponsoring these types of community improvement
projects?
(a) In general, do you think these types of local projects are beneficial or harmful to
your neighborhood/city? Why?
Chapter 9
Appendix B: Conjoint Assumptions
Candidate Choice Experiment Spillover Effects Assumption: Task 1 Only
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Candidate Choice Experiment Spillover Effects Assumption: Tasks 2-5
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Hypotheticals Experiment Spillover Effects Assumption: Task 1 Only
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Hypotheticals Experiment Spillover Effects Assumption: Tasks 2-5
Chapter 10
Appendix C: AMCE Regression
Tables
Table 10.1: Hypothetical Situation Experiment
Attribute Level Estimate Std. Err P-value
Gift Type Material Good 0.1275 0.1327 0.3369
Gift Type Money -0.3902 0.0729 0.0000
Gift Type Service 0.0342 0.1029 0.7397
Monitoring QPQ & Monitoring -0.4392 0.0790 0.0000
Monitoring QPQ, No Monitoring -0.2407 0.0919 0.0088
SES Rich 0.0309 0.0542 0.5686
Supporter Supporter 0.0589 0.0821 0.4729
Target Voter -0.3279 0.0692 0.0000
Notes: Estimates of AMCE. Number of observations: 8115. Number of respon-
dents: 2142. Baselines: employment (Gift Type), No quid-pro-quo (Monitoring),
poor (SES), Non-supporter (supporter), community leader (target).
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Table 10.2: Candidate Choice Experiment
Attribute Level Estimate Std. Err p-value
Base Close -0.0016 0.0075 0.8336
Corruption No Irregularities 0.0682 0.0109 0.0000
Corruption Two Irregularities -0.0494 0.0110 0.0000
Corruption Six Irregularities -0.0799 0.0108 0.0000
Party PT -0.0131 0.0108 0.2228
Party PP 0.0212 0.0096 0.0265
Performance Rapid Decrease -0.0349 0.0114 0.0021
Performance Stable Decrease -0.0376 0.0108 0.0005
Performance Rapid Increase 0.0211 0.0113 0.0633
Priority Budget 0.0101 0.0096 0.2926
Priority Investment -0.0092 0.0093 0.3265
Promise Community Clientelism -0.0394 0.0123 0.0014
Promise Handouts -0.0231 0.0127 0.0701
Promise Pork -0.013 0.0123 0.2922
Promise Vote Buying -0.0832 0.0117 0.0000
Notes: Estimates of AMCE. Number of observations: 17808. Number of respondents:
2226. Baselines: Far (base), control (corruption), MDB (party), stable increase (perfor-
mance), generic statement (priority), generic statement (promise).
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